March 30, 2012 § Leave a comment
Benny Begin, one of the members of the cabinet Octet that is presumed to be behind any major Israeli security decisions, said in a speech yesterday that support for a Palestinian state is not a policy binding on the Netanyahu government but is something that is advocated solely for international audiences (Hebrew only). Begin added that the decision to support two states side by side has not been formally discussed within the government, and furthermore that someone like him could only serve in the government because such an understanding does not exist. He also expressed the opinion that a Palestinian state is not viable in the current environment because Israel’s security needs would require it to be completely demilitarized, and that is something that a sovereign Arab state will not be willing to accept.
This double talk, where a politician says one thing to international audiences and something very different to a domestic audience in his own language when he thinks nobody is paying attention, is something that Israelis and American Jews condemn all the time when it is done by Palestinians, and rightly so. In this case, it was said by a cabinet minister rather than the prime minister himself, and Begin’s strange aside about how he respects the prime minister as first among equals but that no formal decision on a Palestinian state was made by the government indicates that Begin’s position on this is at odds with Netanyahu’s. That at least provides some measure of solace. But just as we American Jews blast Palestinian politicians like Abbas Zaki for saying that the ultimate goal is to destroy Israel itself but that such things shouldn’t be announced to the world, we need to call out Begin for doing the exact same thing. Netanyahu says that he supports a Palestinian state and that he is ready to negotiate whenever the Palestinians are willing to come to the table. He therefore needs to denounce Begin as going against official Israeli policy, or Begin needs to explain why what the world believes is Israel’s official position is not in fact Israel’s official position. This kind of nonsense is incredibly damaging to Israel by destroying any international credibility that it has, and it is patently dishonest to make a huge stink over Mahmoud Abbas’s refusal to negotiate if in fact the Israeli government has tacitly decided that it is not prepared under any circumstances to accept a Palestinian state. So c’mon Bibi, do the right thing here and make it crystal clear that Begin is wrong and speaks for nobody but himself. If you don’t, then your silence will send a very different message.
March 29, 2012 § 1 Comment
WRM is one of my favorite analysts because he is uncommonly thoughtful and erudite and often brings up points that I would not have thought to consider on my own. His latest missive on the Kadima election, however, is an anomaly for him as it seems like he dashed it off without really considering what actually went on over the past few weeks in Israeli politics. He contends that Kadima dumped Livni in favor of Mofaz because Kadima voters want to compete with Netanyahu on Iran and other defense issues, and that by “wrap[ping] itself in the khaki” the party is moving to the hawkish right. This sounds plausible as a surface explanation if you just look at Mofaz being a former defense minister and IDF chief, but it ignores the scope of the entire primary campaign, during which Mofaz explicitly campaigned on social issues rather than defense issues. It also breezes past the fact that Mofaz is on record as advocating negotiations with Hamas and that he blasted Netanyahu today for advocating a strike on Iran that Mofaz deems premature at this point and described as disastrous and ineffective. Most devastatingly, Mofaz blew out Livni on the strength of the 25% of Kadima’s voters who are Arab Israelis and who voted for Mofaz at a 71% clip. I agree with Mead that Mofaz is likely to eventually join the Likud coalition, but this election was certainly not an effort on the part of the Kadima rank and file to become more hawkish, nor was it a referendum on defense and security issues. In fact, it was precisely the opposite. Like I said, WRM’s analysis is all the more surprising considering how high he has set the bar for himself with his work, so I am confident that he simply wasn’t paying terribly close attention to the Kadima primary.
March 29, 2012 § Leave a comment
Former Turkish Chief of Staff Ilker Başbuğ’s trial is underway, and he made headlines on Tuesday by walking out of the courtroom after denouncing the entire proceedings as a sham and as a black stain on Turkey’s reputation. It probably did not help matters that the court is actively trying to appeal to the darker side of public sentiment by asking its very first question about a picture of Başbuğ in Israel at the Western Wall, as if this is somehow ipso facto proof of his guilt. Başbuğ is determined not to go down quietly, and his lack of reticence may highlight the fact that the government went too far in charging him and mark the beginning of a shift in the power imbalance that has developed between the civilian government and the army. This piece in Hurriyet is a good rundown of the various absurdities contained in the Başbuğ indictment, from conflicting claims as to the general’s place within Ergenekon to lack of evidence to support the charge of violence to whether the allegations even support the ultimate indictment.
Up until this point, however, such inconveniences have not prevented Turkey’s generals from being convicted and imprisoned. Aside from Başbuğ, prosecutors yesterday asked from 15-20 years for 365 officers who are Sledgehammer suspects, and half of all of Turkey’s admirals and 10% of its active duty generals are already in prison on charges of conspiring to overthrow the AKP government. The government has eviscerated the power and authority of the military and jailed generals almost at will, and there is no question that Erdoğan and other top officials clearly have the upper hand over the military. This is not generally a bad thing, as complete vertical accountability – in which there is no unelected official or group at the top that has the final say in state affairs – is a requirement of true democracy, but the pendulum has shifted so far in the government’s direction that few take the slew of allegations against members from every branch of the Turkish armed forces as legitimate. Indeed, it is almost certain that the Sledgehammer documents were forged but up until this point the government has not faced any real consequences or pubic outcry for its actions against military officers that are clearly trumped up.
With Başbuğ, however, the government went after its biggest target to date and it may have committed a bad misstep. If Başbuğ continues to push back hard against the legitimacy of the charges against him and even the authority of the special court set up to try him (rather than the Supreme State Council), it might be a turning point in the government’s efforts to root out military plots, imagined or otherwise.
March 28, 2012 § 2 Comments
Mark Perry has a long piece on the FP website contending that Israel is gearing up to use Azerbaijan as a possible staging ground for an attack on Iran, and that at the very least Azerbaijan will provide a safe landing point for Israeli bombers following a strike in addition to serving as a base for search and rescue operations. It is tough for me to know quite what to make of Perry’s reporting. At first glance, this seems like a strange move for the Azeris to make. They stand to create a diplomatic firestorm with Iran and Turkey, both of whom are Azerbaijan’s neighbors and both of whom are significantly larger and militarily more powerful than Azerbaijan. To openly assist Israel in attacking Iran would place Azerbaijan in the path of certain Iranian retaliation, and unlike U.S. backing of Israel, no such protection and military help is guaranteed to come Azerbaijan’s way. From an international relations perspective, given its proximity to Iran, the power imbalance between the two countries, and the absence of great power backing, it seems to make more sense for Azerbaijan to bandwagon with Iran than to help Israel balance against it.
On the other hand, in many ways Azeri assistance to Israel in an effort to poke Iran in the eye has been a long time coming. Iran and Azerbaijan have an extremely tense relationship dating back to the fact that Azerbaijan was once part of Iran and there are 20 million ethnic Azeris living in Iran over whom the Azeri government oftentimes claims sovereignty. The relationship between the Iranian government and its Azeri citizens mirrors that of Turkey and its Kurdish citizens, with the Iranian government discriminating against Azeri language and culture in an effort to make Azeris more Iranian. In addition, Azerbaijan recently arrested 22 people on charges of spying for Iran, and after Israel canceled its $140 million deal to provide Turkey with drones it turned around and announced a $1.5 billion arms deal with Azerbaijan that included drones and missile defense. Azerbaijan provides 30% of Israel’s oil and transports it there via an Azeri pipeline, which is another move that must antagonize the Iranian government. There are also lingering disputes over Iranian trade deals with Armenia and a host of other issues that make the Iran-Azerbaijan relationship one fraught with danger.
The sum total of all this is that it makes perfect sense to me that Israel is trying very hard to secure Azeri assistance for all sorts of contingencies as it makes military plans to deal with Iran. It does not necessarily follow, however, that Azerbaijan will take what would be a massive escalatory step forward in actively helping Israel attack Iran. I buy Perry’s argument on allowing Israel to launch search and rescue missions from Azeri territory more than I buy the notion of Israeli bombers using Azeri airfields as a secret staging ground for bombing runs. The first would come dangerously close to the line of open hostility toward Iran while the second would blow right past it, and I’m not sure that Azerbaijan is in a secure enough position to risk the latter scenario.
March 28, 2012 § 8 Comments
Anyone who knows me at all knows how strongly I feel about my alma mater. I loved every second I was there; it was the place where I found myself intellectually, grappled with complex issues surrounding religion and faith, and most importantly met my wife. My best friends to this day remain the ones I made in college, and I try to stay involved with the university by donating what little money I can afford, getting involved in different alumni committees and groups, and going back to visit any chance I get. I have degrees from three different universities and will soon add another from a fourth, and I don’t feel a genuine heartfelt affinity for any of them save the first. Unfortunately, it turns out that the place I love so much also happens to house an idiotic, hypocritical, shameful group of fools. That’s right Brandeis Students for Justice in Palestine, I’m looking straight at you.
Is it because I object to a Palestinian state? Nope. Is it because I want Israel to continue to occupy the West Bank? Certainly not. Is it because I think that Jewish life is more valuable than Palestinian life? Wrong again. It is because I have zero patience at all for a group that thinks the best way to combat anti-democratic behavior, suppression of free speech, and silencing of dissent is to exhibit anti-democratic behavior, suppress free speech, and silence dissent. Please, someone explain to me the logic behind this brilliant tactical disruption of a panel of Knesset members, including Israel’s first Arab cabinet minister, to show that Israel’s alleged intolerance of dissent is best countered by committing the exact same offense yourself. Please explain to me why a protest against discriminatory policies should be carried out by announcing a vigilante-enforced parallel discriminatory policy against any Israeli official with the nerve to want to attend or speak at a Brandeis-sponsored event. I wonder if these paragons of liberal virtue have the basic skills of logic and reasoning to understand that their actions to disrupt the free exchange of ideas are the very antithesis of liberalism. I wonder if they comprehend that the effort to obnoxiously silence others and attempt to exclude an entire class of people from an imagined political or social community not because of anything they themselves have said or done but by virtue of who they are is the real display of fascism here.
The response to objectionable speech is not censorship, but more speech. If you are confident that you are right, then let your argument win the day. If, however, you are a cowardly bunch of simpletons who think that shouting down your opponents and preventing them from expressing their ideas in a public forum is somehow a vindication of any values you profess to uphold, then keep on doing what you’re doing. Time to grow up, Brandeis Students for Justice in Palestine, and to think about the meaning of this quote from the man who lent his good name to your group: “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”
March 28, 2012 § 5 Comments
This is a good example of where trying to make everybody happy is going to leave nobody happy. Erdoğan is in Iran today for meetings with Ahmadinejad and other Iranian government officials on the Iranian nuclear program and what to do about Syria. To begin with, the optics of this are just silly given that any knowledgeable Iran observer insists that the nuclear program and any real decisions pertaining to it are controlled by Khamenei and not by Ahmadinejad, so these meetings are likely a waste of Erdoğan’s time. More importantly, Erdoğan arrived in Tehran straight from South Korea, where he attended President Obama’s conference on nuclear security. It is possible that he is conveying a message from Obama to the Iranians, but if not it can’t be terribly reassuring to the U.S. that Erdoğan is running straight to Iran to brief them on whatever went on behind closed doors in Seoul. On the Syria issue, it also appears to be bad timing with the Friends of Syria conference beginning on Sunday in Istanbul in light of Iran’s support and bankrolling of Assad. I don’t think that anyone is under any illusions as to whether Iran is going to dump Assad over the side of the boat, and I guarantee you that Erdoğan and Ahmadinejad are not discussing the best way to set up a buffer zone, so why have these meetings now? I am all for diplomacy and think it will have a big place in resolving the Iran nuclear issue, but the timing of this feels very off to me. Why not wait until after the Friends of Syria conference, which might provide some more impetus to exert pressure on Iran? I understand that Turkey feels a vital need to maintain good relations with almost every state in the region, and it is part of what makes Turkey a valuable U.S. ally, but this is one time where trying to get everyone to like you is not going to yield any tangible benefits.
March 28, 2012 § 4 Comments
The New York Times has a story this morning on the relationship between Bibi Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, Israel’s version of Oscar and Felix. The piece does not cover much, if any, new ground, and regular readers of this blog (to the extent that there are any!) will be familiar with the politics and current whip count in the security cabinet for a strike on Iran. Two brief thoughts come to mind for me after reading the piece.
First, Netanyahu and Barak’s strengths, weaknesses, and insecurities have always been evident. Despite serving as a commando and being the brother of Israel’s most famous soldier, Netanyahu does not have lots of military street cred, and indeed has been more reserved on that front than any other prime minister of the last two decades. He has avoided conducting major military operations in Gaza or Lebanon and seems risk-averse, which is what makes his banging the drums of war on Iran such an interesting anomaly and leads to speculation on the influence of his father and the role that he sees for himself as preventer of another Holocaust. He relies on Barak’s presence at his side to give him cover in making a momentous military/security decision, since nobody questions the credentials of Israel’s most decorated solider. In light of this, the reporting and guessing about what Netanyahu wants and the efforts to convince him to wait are probably a waste of time, since the person who really needs to be influenced is Barak. Without Barak, Netanyahu cannot in all likelihood advocate for or carry out a strike, so any pressure the Obama administration or Israelis opposed to a strike are exerting should be aimed squarely at the defense minister rather than at the prime minister.
Second, and related to the first point, the fact that Barak was Netanyahu’s commander in Sayeret Matkal – which is the Israeli equivalent of the Navy Seals, and which
was also commanded at various points by all three Netanyahu brothers and new Kadima leader Shaul Mofaz served in – takes on outsized relevance. I have never served in the military nor have I studied psychology so I make no pretense of being an expert on this topic, but I’ve got to imagine that it is a tough thing to disagree with or even override your former unit commander on military issues. Netanyahu is going to do what he thinks is best for Israel, but his decision must be that much easier for him to come to grips with when the commander of his extremely tight-knit military unit under whom he served agrees with him and backs him up. If that element disappears, I don’t know what it does to Netanyahu’s calculus, but surely it would have some effect.