Syria: Bringing Former Friends Back Together
June 21, 2012 § 3 Comments
Michael Herzog and Soner Cagaptay have an op-ed in today’s New York Times on Israel-Turkey relations in which they argue that the situation in Syria can provide the impetus for the two countries to reconcile. I was reluctant to comment on it since I have an op-ed of my own coming out soon on steps that need to be taken for Israel and Turkey to make up, but I think their piece has some flaws that I can’t help but point out. I am no stranger to the Syria argument, having pointed out before that it would be to both states’ benefit to cooperate on Syria. Herzog and Cagaptay take this idea a few steps too far, however, by essentially arguing that the mess in Syria can be the primary force that will move Jerusalem and Ankara back together.
The first problem with this is that while Israeli and Turkish cooperation would be nice, Syria presents a very different set of problems for each. Turkey is facing a serious refugee crisis with Syrians fleeing across the Turkish border, the prospect of revitalized PKK terrorism if Assad provides the PKK with a safe haven inside Syria, and reputational and credibility problems following early Turkish threats to establish buffer zones inside of Syria that are clearly nowhere close to materializing. In contrast, Israel is facing the possibility of Assad and the Syrian army stirring up trouble with Israel in an effort to distract from the massacres being carried out by Assad’s forces, Hizballah shooting volleys of missiles into northern Israel in response to alleged “Israeli meddling” in the conflict, and the inclusion of Islamist elements dangerously hostile to Israel in the Syrian opposition. So yes, in a wider sense, both Israel and Turkey are facing problems because of the brewing Syrian civil war, but that does not mean that cooperation between the two is such a no-brainer that it will get them to reconcile. For instance, would Israel help install the Syrian National Council in Damascus in order to stem the flow of refugees into Turkey if it means that it now faces Islamist governments on its southern and northern borders? Does Israel have anywhere near the level of interest in driving the PKK out of Syria as Turkey does? Yes, both countries want a resolution of some sort, but it is entirely unclear that they would agree on what that should be.
Second, Herzog and Cagaptay argue that any Israeli involvement in Syria has to be secret:
Any Israeli contribution would, of course, have to be invisible in order not to create a sense that Israel was behind the Syrian uprising. This makes Turkish-Israeli cooperation against Mr. Assad even more valuable, for it would allow Israel to provide untraceable assets to support Turkey’s efforts to undermine the Assad government.
Well, doesn’t that contradict the premise of the entire argument? Israel and Turkey are very publicly at odds, and any reconciliation is going to have to be a public one as a result. Much of the benefit of reconciling, and this is particularly true for Israel, is a public relations one, so some sort of secret rapprochement that nobody knows about outside of the respective countries’ militaries and intelligence services does not do much good. The notion that Israel would agree to help out Turkey but do so in an untraceable way is not a point that bolsters the argument that cooperation on Syria is going to lead to a reconciliation. It might be an important confidence building measure, but if you are claiming that the Syria mess is going to push Israel and Turkey to repair their relationship, you had better come up with something more than covert intelligence assistance.
Then there are a bunch of smaller problems in the piece. The authors assert that “A Turkish-Israeli dialogue on Syria could bolster Israel’s interest in regime change and enlist Israel to generate American support,” but I hardly think that Israel voicing its approval of a Turkish plan to get the U.S. involved is going to sway the administration’s impulse to stay out of things. They also argue that Shaul Mofaz’s inclusion in the cabinet dampens the influence of Avigdor Lieberman and his strident criticisms of Turkey, but Lieberman is hardly the only politician to have a hard line on a flotilla apology and there is no evidence that Mofaz is itching to pursue normalized ties. There is no discussion in the piece of the larger structural incentives that might push Israel and Turkey to reconcile, since the Syria issue has not been enough up until this point. In sum, I don’t think that Herzog and Cagaptay are wrong to identify Syria as a problem for both Israel and Turkey, but the overall argument flies right over so many important details that to me their op-ed fails to convince.
In Which I Sound Like A Broken Record
May 23, 2012 § 1 Comment
I mentioned a couple of weeks ago the news that Turkish indictments were forthcoming against Israeli soldiers over the Mavi Marmara flotilla. Apparently, Turkey has decided to set its sights very high by returning indictments against the top Israeli military leadership – former IDF chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi, Navy head Eliezer Marom, and military and air force intelligence chiefs Amos Yadlin and Avishai Levi. This is not only an exercise in futility, as none of these people stand any chance of ever appearing before a Turkish court, but a symbolic demonstration that makes Turkey look like it is not serious about justice and is rather seeking to prolong its feud with Israel. I have written before that I understand the anger felt by Turks and realize why they do not want to give Israel a free pass over the flotilla incident, but at the same time there is holding people accountable and then there is pure posturing. This falls squarely into the latter category. If Turkey had made a good faith effort to identify the actual IDF soldiers on board the ship it would be one thing, as those are the people with whom they have an actual beef. But to indict Israel’s top military and intelligence leadership? That is not a serious effort but a publicity shot across the bow. It is not designed to accomplish anything tangible or substantive, and in fact makes it that much harder for Turkey and Israel to come to an agreement acceptable to both sides that will amicably settle their differences.
As I wrote just yesterday, I am convinced that there is a power struggle of sorts going on behind the scenes at the upper echelons of Turkish government, with some pushing hard to maintain a muscular Turkish nationalism that widens the rift with Israel and with others looking to dial things back. There are too many conflicting signals being issued at the same time, and I think that there must be back channel efforts to reconcile with the Israelis while other attempts are being made to sabotage any progress that is made. There must be some high ranking Turkish officials beginning to wonder how the constant feuding with Israel is actually benefitting Turkey at this point, and it is obviously a good question for them to ask themselves. As I view things from my limited vantage point, the possible domestic politics advantage is being far outpaced by foreign policy problems that Turkey is creating for itself. Whether it is Davutoğlu or someone else who is continuing to push for a hard and unrelenting line against Israel, it is now crossing over into the absurd. Turkey is no closer to getting an Israeli apology or compensation, and wasn’t that the whole stated point to begin with?
Distinguishing Fact From Fiction
May 22, 2012 § 3 Comments
Over the past few weeks, and then again even more intensely over the past few days, there has been a flood of stories surrounding Turkey and Israel, some of which ring truer than others. The various reports also paint a muddled picture as to what is going on between the two countries; on the one hand, Israel and Turkey are on the verge of reconciling, and on the other they are just as far away as ever. I thought I’d run down the list of what has been reported to try and cut through the fog a bit and figure out what is actually going on.
NATO Summit
This is the story that got the most attention after it was reported that Turkey, and specifically Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, had vetoed Israeli participation in the NATO summit that took place in Chicago over the past two days. On the face of it, there is no reason to doubt this report’s veracity. Turkey has been consistently ratcheting up the pressure on Israel in order to force an apology and compensation for the Mavi Marmara, and blocking Israel from the NATO summit would certainly be consistent with this pattern. On the other hand, the State Department said that Israel was never going to be invited to the summit in the first place and Israel confirmed that it had no plans to go anyway. This makes sense in light of the fact that Israel is not a part of NATO and to the best of my knowledge has never attended a NATO summit before, not to mention the fact that this particular meeting focused on the security situation in Afghanistan, which is not an issue that involves Israel in any way. I have also heard rumors that Davutoğlu did not actually veto Israel’s participation and that the story was leaked as misinformation. It’s hard to know what to make of all this, but the sum total of the evidence suggests to me that Israel was never going to be invited to the NATO summit having nothing to do with Turkey.
Israeli Violations of Northern Cyprus’s Airspace
Last week, Turkey accused Israel of flying into Northern Cypriot airspace after it scrambled jets to intercept the Israeli plane. This is part of the ongoing tension between Turkey on one side and Cyprus and Israel on the other regarding the natural gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean, and it is a thorny situation that is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. Israel and Turkey were certainly never in danger of exchanging fire over the Israeli plane, and it would take a huge screw up of massive proportions for that to ever occur. Chalk this one up to the omnipresent tensions that exist between Israel and Turkey at the moment, although I can’t help but note the oddity of Turkey scrambling jets and accusing Israel of violating the airspace of a country that nobody else recognizes but Turkey and that Turkey claims is its own sovereign state.
Israeli Troops in Cyprus
This one wins the prize for stretching all bounds of credulity. It has been reported that Israel is planning to station 20,000 troops in Cyprus in order to protect a gas terminal that it will build. First, it seems a bit out of proportion to deploy 20,000 soldiers to protect 10,000 construction workers, particularly given that this gas terminal is being built in Cyrpus, not in Afghanistan or Somalia. Second, the notion that Cyprus or the EU would allow Israel to base 20,000 troops in Cyprus (for comparison’s sake, the Cypriot military has only 10,000 active duty soldiers in total) is so laughable that it is barely even worth discussing. Suffice it to say that the Israeli Foreign Ministry must have thought that the reporter asking for a comment on this worked for the Onion.
Heron Drones
It was reported a couple of days ago that Israel, which sold Heron drones to Turkey and under the terms of the sale was responsible for repairs to the aircraft, has fixed the drones and returned them to the Turkish military. This is a good development by all accounts, particularly since I am of the view that good relations between the two militaries is much more important than a full restoration of amicable political ties. Obviously this was a political decision too, so it’s an encouraging sign that cooperation between Ankara and Jerusalem is still possible. The news did, however, make we wonder what Davutoğlu has to say about the issue now after denying in January that any Herons were sent to Israel for repairs.
Erdoğan’s Emissary to Netanyahu
Finally, there was the news reported by Israeli Channel 10 that Prime Minister Erdoğan sent a personal envoy to meet with Prime Minister Netanyahu in an effort to mend relations, but that Turkey will not be able to move forward absent an official apology. I have no way of knowing whether this report is accurate or not, although given everything that I know about Turkish domestic politics and Erdoğan himself, I am highly skeptical. The account has not been confirmed by any other source aside from Channel 10, and while Turkey would have plenty of incentive to keep such a thing quiet, Israel does not. The only thing that gives me pause is that Turkey desperately wants to buy U.S. drones (so much for Turkey’s own Anka drone, which is scheduled to be delivered in 2014) which Congress will never agree to sell until Turkey’s relations with Israel improve, so perhaps Erdoğan is starting to think a little more strategically for the long term. In any event, I’d still be surprised if a meeting between his emissary and Netanyahu actually occurred.
So what’s with all the misinformation and bogus reports? Assuming that the NATO story was actually inaccurate and combined with the ridiculous report about troops in Cyprus, it says to me that there is a group of government officials in Turkey that do not want to see any progress made on an Israeli-Turkish reconciliation, and are doing whatever they can to keep the pressure on. There is clearly value in this tactic from a domestic politics standpoint, as Turkish nationalism is always popular and Israel is considered by some to be a true enemy of the Turkish state. Leaking stories about Turkish efforts to punish Israel – whether true or not – and concocting up scare stories involving Israeli actions in Cyprus (another convenient Turkish bogeyman) makes it more difficult for any progress on rapprochement to be made behind the scenes, as it risks making it appear as if Turkey is selling itself short and gins up public pressure to maintain a hardline position. Let’s hope that if Israel and Turkey are indeed any closer to settling their differences, misinformation in the press won’t throw a wrench into those plans.
This Is Not Going To End Well
May 8, 2012 § 2 Comments
I’ve written plenty recently on Israel-Turkey relations so I don’t need to rehash any of it, but the announcement that Turkey has completed its own investigation into the Mavi Marmara flotilla affair and that the Justice Ministry is awaiting a list of names from the Foreign Ministry of Israeli soldiers to indict is not a positive development. I understand Turkey’s lingering anger at Israel but at some point you need to look at the bigger picture and figure out whether the “pursuit of justice” is worth the cost in other areas. As Laura Rozen pointed out, there are signs of thawing between Turkey and Israel if you look at trade ties, flights between the two countries, and even reengagement among the diplomatic corps, but there are plenty of people at the top in both countries who seem to have no desire to put the feud behind them and would in fact rather perpetuate it. Israel’s report exonerated its actions, Turkey’s report will do the opposite, and the UN Palmer report split the difference by finding the blockade lawful but criticizing Israel for using excessive force. Why can’t everyone leave it at that, agree to disagree, and move forward? Indicting Israeli soldiers will accomplish absolutely nothing and will only lead in return to a harsher spotlight fixed on the violent actions of those who were aboard the Mavi Marmara. I know I am a broken record on this and am not winning myself any accolades among my Turkish readers, but enough is enough. The issue should not be about who is to blame but about reconstructing what was a productive and beneficial relationship for both sides.
How To Lose Friends and Alienate Allies
April 23, 2012 § 1 Comment
In its eternal Sisyphean quest to extract an Israeli apology for the Mavi Marmara, Turkey has decided that involving other countries against their will in its battle is a good strategy. Hürriyet reports that Turkey has blocked Israel from attending the NATO summit in Chicago next month despite entreaties not to do so from the U.S., France, and NATO’s secretary-general. Furthermore, Turkey has now been threatened with retaliation by other NATO members who are promising to block other partner countries that are close to Turkey from participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue group. Not content to let the matter lie, Davutoğlu criticized other countries for criticizing Turkey and lectured them for considering Israel to be a partner.
Let’s go through the reasons why this is incredibly foolish and short-sighted. First, Turkey has taken what is a purely bilateral dispute between it and another state and tried to use its position in NATO to internationalize it, despite the fact that it does not concern other NATO members who have no desire to be used as pawns in Turkey’s game. This harms Turkey’s standing in NATO and damages its credibility and reputation for seriousness, and it also damages the alliance in general since now none of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries will be participating following Turkey’s veto of Israel and the resulting counter-vetoes. This does not help anyone, least of all Turkey. No other NATO country is going to look kindly upon Turkey’s efforts to hijack the group for its own selfish ends, and it is guaranteed to come back and hurt Turkey down the road. Like it or not, NATO states value Israel’s military and intelligence capabilities, and excluding Israel from a NATO summit where its presence is wanted by other countries is nothing short of petty and misguided. Turkey has every right to cancel bilateral military exercises, downgrade diplomatic relations, and do anything else that it wishes to do so long as it involves its own sovereign activities, but bringing NATO into it against the will of other NATO countries is going to have consequences next time Turkey turns to the U.S. or France for a favor (see next paragraph).
The move is even more puzzling given the timing. Turkey has been making noise about invoking NATO Article 5 over violations of its border by Syrian forces, and so it decides in its infinite wisdom to pick the upcoming NATO summit as an appropriate time and venue to annoy its NATO allies and open itself up to criticism that it does not respect the alliance’s purposes or values? I fail to see how this in any way advances Turkish interests or marshals NATO to back up Turkey without reservations should the situation with Syria escalate. It’s as if Ankara is so blinded by its fury that it is willing to sacrifice anyone and anything in order to cause even minor amounts of damage toward Israel, irrespective of any other consequences. Turkey needs to figure out its priorities and act accordingly. I would think that unvarnished NATO support to contain Syrian mischief would be Turkey’s chief concern right now rather than scoring points against Israel, but I suppose in thinking that I must be out of my strategic depth (and yes, pun very much intended).
The final reason why this is a silly move unbefitting Davutoğlu’s reputation for canny diplomacy is that it will not bring Israel any closer to the apology that Turkey is seeking. Israel is extremely reluctant to comply with Turkey’s terms for normalized relations given its view that Turkey tacitly blessed the Mavi Marmara’s journey, and reports such as this one that describe firsthand accounts of what was waiting for the paintgun-wielding Israeli soldiers as they dropped onto the ship’s deck only magnify Israel’s reluctance. If Turkey actually thought that excluding Israel from a NATO meeting would prompt an apology, and knowing how big a priority this is for Erdoğan and Davutoğlu, then perhaps I would understand it, and it might even be logical for Turkey to do from a cost-benefit perspective. But there is literally zero chance that doing so will bring about Ankara’s desired result, and it will instead only convince Israel that the Turkish government is determined to damage it in any and every forum, making the possibility of an apology further and further remote. What’s more, the Turkish government knows this full well, and this is not a gambit designed to do anything more than poke Israel in the eye. When you take this into consideration, and then factor in the fact that Turkey is genuinely pissing off its NATO allies, this move makes no sense at all. One can only conclude that the architects of Turkish foreign policy are either not thinking particularly clearly at the moment, or that their rage toward Israel is indeed impeding other more important goals from being realized. Either way, it does not put Turkey in a very good light.
