The NYT Editorial Board Needs A Political Science Lesson

November 1, 2012 § 1 Comment

The New York Times ran an editorial yesterday entitled “Tunisia’s Challenges” that dealt with the tensions between Tunisia’s Islamist government and the secular opposition, and more broadly attempted to grapple with the role of Islam in a nascent democracy. The gist is that Ennahda has promised to respect liberal values and not impose its own views of morality on the rest of the county, but has also tried to engage Tunisian Salafis, and in so doing has imperiled Tunisian democracy and not shown enough commitment to moderation. In the words of the Times,

Ennahda has also drawn fire for allowing the introduction of constitutional proposals that would enshrine Shariah, or Islamic law, and compromise rights for women. The party eventually backed off those positions and the constitutional draft before the assembly omits Shariah and endorses gender equality. Ennahda leaders may have been maneuvering to draw the Salafis into the process, while maintaining their political support, but it gave the secularists another reason to doubt Ennahda’s commitment to moderation…

The pressure is on Ennahda to deliver a Constitution that protects the rights of all Tunisians under a system of equal justice and to create jobs so educated but unemployed young Tunisians are not drawn to the Salafi movement, which would try to exploit their disillusionment. The pressure is also on the secularists to find ways to work with Ennahda to build a better state. That will require more compromise and commitment to the common good than either side has been willing to show so far.

This all seems like a plausible argument, but it also demonstrates that the Times editorialists have a misinformed and naive view of how democracy works and what brings it about. Let’s start with the glaring contradiction in this editorial, which is that on the one hand the NYT wants Ennahda to speak for all Tunisians but on the other seems to want to cut the Salafists, who last time I checked are Tunisian citizens, out of the process altogether. Tunisian Salafi groups espouse extreme and retrograde positions on all sorts of subjects, including women, secularism, and Jews, to name just a few. The problem is that Ennahda cannot just make the Salafists go away. They are a force to be dealt with, and Ennahda’s determination seems to have been to try and co-opt them in order to reduce their capacity to make mischief. In many ways this has been a bad strategy, and the violence carried out by Salafists on university campuses and against television stations is deplorable and has often been ignored or downplayed by the government. There is no good excuse for this – or, for that matter, Ennahda leader Rachid al-Ghannouchi’s encouragement and advice to Salafists on how to eliminate secularist power – but what the NYT misses is that Tunisia is not a country with decades of liberal tradition. The Salafists are not committed democrats willing to work within the confines of the political system, and so Ennahda has been trying to figure out a way to bring them in with as little chaos as possible. Yeah, the initial constitutional proposals were pretty bad, but like anything else this is a game of back and forth, and the current draft constitution is largely where it should be.

This brings me to the crucial point here, and the one on which the New York Times needs some schooling. Democracy does not just emerge from the mist, and leaders in a newly post-authoritarian state cannot just close their eyes and tap their heels together and create a democratic political system. Democracy has been aptly described as a second-best solution, because it results from a stalemate in which no side has the power to fully impose its will and thus everyone becomes willing to roll the dice and take their chances with democratic politics in order to win something. Essentially, democracy is installed by non-democrats who have no other choice, and over time democratic politics become habituated and the system (hopefully) becomes self-perpetuating. If this does not describe what is going on in Tunisia, then I don’t know what does. Tunisia is not filled with committed democrats, but is instead a combustible mix of parties that would all like to impose their will. The Salafists would like to create a pure Islamic state, Ennahda likely wants something closer to what the Muslim Brotherhood wants in Egypt, and the secularists want Ben Ali’s Tunisia without Ben Ali. Make no mistake though; the secular parties would just as soon impose their vision of society on everyone as the Salafists would if they had the strength to do so. The fact that none of these factions are able to carry out their will unimpeded is what gives me hope that Tunisia will emerge democratic.

This is precisely how democracy comes about, and yet the New York Times seems to think that democracy is not the end result of a difficult and torturous process. Let’s remember that the United States went through slavery and a civil war, so it’s not like we had an easy time of it either. When the Times editorialists talk about the need for more compromise, the maneuvering around the constitution is exactly that. Parties in a newly democratizing state are not going to compromise out of the munificent goodness of their hearts, but out of the need to break the gridlock, and that is what’s going on here. It may seem counterintuitive, but in new democracies the process is more important in some ways than the substance. Tunisia still has a long way to go, and Ennahda has displayed plenty of disturbing behavior to make doubts about a successful democratic transition perfectly legitimate. I don’t in any way mean to give Ennahda a free pass or to minimize the serious concerns everyone should have over the party’s flirtation with extremely illiberal and violent elements within Tunisian society. But in fretting over the haggling surrounding the constitution and sermonizing about commitment to the common good, the New York Times is missing the point about how democracy is born and demonstrating why taking an introductory course to comparative politics might be a useful thing to do.

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Israel’s Odd Couple

March 28, 2012 § 4 Comments

The New York Times has a story this morning on the relationship between Bibi Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, Israel’s version of Oscar and Felix. The piece does not cover much, if any, new ground, and regular readers of this blog (to the extent that there are any!) will be familiar with the politics and current whip count in the security cabinet for a strike on Iran. Two brief thoughts come to mind for me after reading the piece.

First, Netanyahu and Barak’s strengths, weaknesses, and insecurities have always been evident. Despite serving as a commando and being the brother of Israel’s most famous soldier, Netanyahu does not have lots of military street cred, and indeed has been more reserved on that front than any other prime minister of the last two decades. He has avoided conducting major military operations in Gaza or Lebanon and seems risk-averse, which is what makes his banging the drums of war on Iran such an interesting anomaly and leads to speculation on the influence of his father and the role that he sees for himself as preventer of another Holocaust. He relies on Barak’s presence at his side to give him cover in making a momentous military/security decision, since nobody questions the credentials of Israel’s most decorated solider. In light of this, the reporting and guessing about what Netanyahu wants and the efforts to convince him to wait are probably a waste of time, since the person who really needs to be influenced is Barak. Without Barak, Netanyahu cannot in all likelihood advocate for or carry out a strike, so any pressure the Obama administration or Israelis opposed to a strike are exerting should be aimed squarely at the defense minister rather than at the prime minister.

Second, and related to the first point, the fact that Barak was Netanyahu’s commander in Sayeret Matkal – which is the Israeli equivalent of the Navy Seals, and which was also commanded at various points by all three Netanyahu brothers and new Kadima leader Shaul Mofaz served in – takes on outsized relevance. I have never served in the military nor have I studied psychology so I make no pretense of being an expert on this topic, but I’ve got to imagine that it is a tough thing to disagree with or even override your former unit commander on military issues. Netanyahu is going to do what he thinks is best for Israel, but his decision must be that much easier for him to come to grips with when the commander of his extremely tight-knit military unit under whom he served agrees with him and backs him up. If that element disappears, I don’t know what it does to Netanyahu’s calculus, but surely it would have some effect.

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