Distinguishing Fact From Fiction
May 22, 2012 § 3 Comments
Over the past few weeks, and then again even more intensely over the past few days, there has been a flood of stories surrounding Turkey and Israel, some of which ring truer than others. The various reports also paint a muddled picture as to what is going on between the two countries; on the one hand, Israel and Turkey are on the verge of reconciling, and on the other they are just as far away as ever. I thought I’d run down the list of what has been reported to try and cut through the fog a bit and figure out what is actually going on.
NATO Summit
This is the story that got the most attention after it was reported that Turkey, and specifically Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, had vetoed Israeli participation in the NATO summit that took place in Chicago over the past two days. On the face of it, there is no reason to doubt this report’s veracity. Turkey has been consistently ratcheting up the pressure on Israel in order to force an apology and compensation for the Mavi Marmara, and blocking Israel from the NATO summit would certainly be consistent with this pattern. On the other hand, the State Department said that Israel was never going to be invited to the summit in the first place and Israel confirmed that it had no plans to go anyway. This makes sense in light of the fact that Israel is not a part of NATO and to the best of my knowledge has never attended a NATO summit before, not to mention the fact that this particular meeting focused on the security situation in Afghanistan, which is not an issue that involves Israel in any way. I have also heard rumors that Davutoğlu did not actually veto Israel’s participation and that the story was leaked as misinformation. It’s hard to know what to make of all this, but the sum total of the evidence suggests to me that Israel was never going to be invited to the NATO summit having nothing to do with Turkey.
Israeli Violations of Northern Cyprus’s Airspace
Last week, Turkey accused Israel of flying into Northern Cypriot airspace after it scrambled jets to intercept the Israeli plane. This is part of the ongoing tension between Turkey on one side and Cyprus and Israel on the other regarding the natural gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean, and it is a thorny situation that is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. Israel and Turkey were certainly never in danger of exchanging fire over the Israeli plane, and it would take a huge screw up of massive proportions for that to ever occur. Chalk this one up to the omnipresent tensions that exist between Israel and Turkey at the moment, although I can’t help but note the oddity of Turkey scrambling jets and accusing Israel of violating the airspace of a country that nobody else recognizes but Turkey and that Turkey claims is its own sovereign state.
Israeli Troops in Cyprus
This one wins the prize for stretching all bounds of credulity. It has been reported that Israel is planning to station 20,000 troops in Cyprus in order to protect a gas terminal that it will build. First, it seems a bit out of proportion to deploy 20,000 soldiers to protect 10,000 construction workers, particularly given that this gas terminal is being built in Cyrpus, not in Afghanistan or Somalia. Second, the notion that Cyprus or the EU would allow Israel to base 20,000 troops in Cyprus (for comparison’s sake, the Cypriot military has only 10,000 active duty soldiers in total) is so laughable that it is barely even worth discussing. Suffice it to say that the Israeli Foreign Ministry must have thought that the reporter asking for a comment on this worked for the Onion.
Heron Drones
It was reported a couple of days ago that Israel, which sold Heron drones to Turkey and under the terms of the sale was responsible for repairs to the aircraft, has fixed the drones and returned them to the Turkish military. This is a good development by all accounts, particularly since I am of the view that good relations between the two militaries is much more important than a full restoration of amicable political ties. Obviously this was a political decision too, so it’s an encouraging sign that cooperation between Ankara and Jerusalem is still possible. The news did, however, make we wonder what Davutoğlu has to say about the issue now after denying in January that any Herons were sent to Israel for repairs.
Erdoğan’s Emissary to Netanyahu
Finally, there was the news reported by Israeli Channel 10 that Prime Minister Erdoğan sent a personal envoy to meet with Prime Minister Netanyahu in an effort to mend relations, but that Turkey will not be able to move forward absent an official apology. I have no way of knowing whether this report is accurate or not, although given everything that I know about Turkish domestic politics and Erdoğan himself, I am highly skeptical. The account has not been confirmed by any other source aside from Channel 10, and while Turkey would have plenty of incentive to keep such a thing quiet, Israel does not. The only thing that gives me pause is that Turkey desperately wants to buy U.S. drones (so much for Turkey’s own Anka drone, which is scheduled to be delivered in 2014) which Congress will never agree to sell until Turkey’s relations with Israel improve, so perhaps Erdoğan is starting to think a little more strategically for the long term. In any event, I’d still be surprised if a meeting between his emissary and Netanyahu actually occurred.
So what’s with all the misinformation and bogus reports? Assuming that the NATO story was actually inaccurate and combined with the ridiculous report about troops in Cyprus, it says to me that there is a group of government officials in Turkey that do not want to see any progress made on an Israeli-Turkish reconciliation, and are doing whatever they can to keep the pressure on. There is clearly value in this tactic from a domestic politics standpoint, as Turkish nationalism is always popular and Israel is considered by some to be a true enemy of the Turkish state. Leaking stories about Turkish efforts to punish Israel – whether true or not – and concocting up scare stories involving Israeli actions in Cyprus (another convenient Turkish bogeyman) makes it more difficult for any progress on rapprochement to be made behind the scenes, as it risks making it appear as if Turkey is selling itself short and gins up public pressure to maintain a hardline position. Let’s hope that if Israel and Turkey are indeed any closer to settling their differences, misinformation in the press won’t throw a wrench into those plans.
Turkey and Iranian Oil
April 26, 2012 § 6 Comments
One of the obstacles, if not the largest obstacle, to peeling Turkey away from Iran is the economic ties between the two, particularly when it comes to energy. Turkey imports 90% of its oil, and Iran was its largest supplier until 2007 when Russia took the top spot. Through March of this year, Turkey was importing 200,000 barrels per day from Iran, which accounted for 30% of Turkey’s oil imports and 7% of Iran’s oil exports. This is obviously a huge barrier for the U.S. to gaining closer cooperation from Turkey in pressuring Iran over its nuclear program, and the announcement last month that Turkey was slashing its oil purchases from Iran by as much as 20% was accordingly a big deal.
Turkey does not import oil from Iran because it is necessarily a supporter of the regime, but because Iran has been a convenient source. There are, however, real bilateral energy issues between the two that make Turkey receptive to U.S. entreaties to get its oil from elsewhere. Turkey consumes around 1.3 trillion cubic feet of natural gas annually and it imports 24% of its gas from Iran, but Iran charges Turkey more than $500 per 1000 cubic meters of gas, which is more than it charges any other country and $100 more than the market price. In contrast, Turkey pays $350 for gas from Azerbaijan and $400 for Russian gas. Turkey is stuck because it signed a 25 year deal with Iran in 1996 and because it has no way of replacing Iranian gas imports, which Tehran knows full well, and in the last few weeks Turkey has taken Iran into international arbitration over its natural gas price gouging. The gas price has become an even bigger problem in the past year as energy prices have risen across the board fueled by insecurity about global energy supplies, which led to a 40% increase in Turkey’s energy imports in 2011 as compared to 2010. The point here is that Turkey may very well be actively looking into ways to reduce its reliance on Iranian oil anyway, U.S. pressure or not. The agreement to buy oil from Libya in conjunction with reducing Iranian imports is a good first step, since it gets Turkey’s foot in the door with the new Libyan government, and might eventually lead to Saudi concessions on price as well.
It is in this context that today’s news that Turkey is starting oil and gas drilling in northern Cyprus should be viewed. Obviously this is partly a response to Cyprus’s own oil and gas exploration, but TPAO’s drilling is not merely symbolic. Turkey’s energy needs are enormous and growing, and the question is whether it will have to continue relying on Iran or if it can fill the gap somewhere else. If the answer ends up being the latter, it will have the effect of isolating Iran further and making a resolution to the nuclear issue that does not involve military strikes more likely. To that end – and to continue beating a dead horse from previous posts – a Turkish-Israeli rapprochement would help Turkey soften the blow from Iranian natural gas once the Tamar and Leviathan natural gas fields are up and running in 2013. In any event, keep an eye out for Turkey exploring any possibility open to it as far as oil and gas are concerned, since that will yield clues as to how the Iranian nuclear standoff is likely to be resolved.
