This Is Not Going To End Well

May 8, 2012 § 2 Comments

I’ve written plenty recently on Israel-Turkey relations so I don’t need to rehash any of it, but the announcement that Turkey has completed its own investigation into the Mavi Marmara flotilla affair and that the Justice Ministry is awaiting a list of names from the Foreign Ministry of Israeli soldiers to indict is not a positive development. I understand Turkey’s lingering anger at Israel but at some point you need to look at the bigger picture and figure out whether the “pursuit of justice” is worth the cost in other areas. As Laura Rozen pointed out, there are signs of thawing between Turkey and Israel if you look at trade ties, flights between the two countries, and even reengagement among the diplomatic corps, but there are plenty of people at the top in both countries who seem to have no desire to put the feud behind them and would in fact rather perpetuate it. Israel’s report exonerated its actions, Turkey’s report will do the opposite, and the UN Palmer report split the difference by finding the blockade lawful but criticizing Israel for using excessive force. Why can’t everyone leave it at that, agree to disagree, and move forward? Indicting Israeli soldiers will accomplish absolutely nothing and will only lead in return to a harsher spotlight fixed on the violent actions of those who were aboard the Mavi Marmara. I know I am a broken record on this and am not winning myself any accolades among my Turkish readers, but enough is enough. The issue should not be about who is to blame but about reconstructing what was a productive and beneficial relationship for both sides.

The Likud-Kadima Deal Is Not About Iran

May 8, 2012 § 10 Comments

Last night right after the news broke that Shaul Mofaz and Kadima were joining Bibi Netanyahu’s governing coalition and that the early elections that had been announced for September 4 are now off, I wrote this post on the implications of the deal for Israeli domestic politics. On the morning after, I have a few more thoughts pertaining to how the new unity government will affect changes in Israeli foreign policy. The short version is, it won’t.

The area in which some people are expecting Israeli policy to shift with the new government is Iran. Jeffrey Goldberg thinks that the larger coalition and unity government might make it easier for Netanyahu to strike Iranian nuclear sites should he be so inclined. I think it is true that it makes doing so easier since the new coalition comprises 93 out of 120 MKs, and a unity government deciding to launch an attack takes some of the bite out of the recent cascade of criticism coming from former defense and intelligence leaders. Kadima joining the coalition, however, does not alter the basic realities that were preventing Netanyahu and Barak from carrying out a strike months ago. Israeli public opinion is still ambivalent on a unilateral Israeli strike, U.S. and world pressure to wait and give sanctions more time has not disappeared, four out of the eight Shminiya (Octet) members are still opposed, and the security and intelligence establishment have raised legitimate concerns that cannot be waved away just because Kadima joined the government. Add to all this the fact that Israel has serious renewed security concerns on its southern border with Egypt and is keeping an eye on its northern border following reports that Scud missile installations being moved closer to the border in Syria, and attacking Iran appears to be a dicey proposition.

There is also the Mofaz factor, which does not necessarily weigh in favor of a strike. Looking at Mofaz’s position on Iran, a little over a month ago he blasted Netanyahu for pushing for a strike that he deemed would be premature and ineffective, and said that he would stand with any PM who ordered an attack as the last resort but that Israel was not yet at that stage. Just yesterday, he accused Netanyahu of politicizing the issue of a strike and endangering the relationship with the U.S. Now, anything Mofaz said in the guise of campaigning must be taken with a grain of salt, but that he chose to hit Bibi hard on Iran cannot just be brushed aside so easily. It is also important to remember that Mofaz was not campaigning primarily on security or defense issues but rather donned the mantle of social justice, and was particularly targeting preferential treatment for Haredim. The deal with Likud gives Mofaz and Kadima the task of leading the committee charged with coming up with a Tal Law alternative, which is again not a security-related issue. It is easy to think that bringing a former defense minister and IDF chief of staff on board must mean that Netanyahu is seeking to add another buffer against criticism should he choose to attack Iran, but the details of Mofaz’s campaign and the particulars of the unity deal do not necessarily point to this conclusion. There are now three former chiefs of staff in the cabinet – Barak, Mofaz, and Yaalon – and based on what we know, only one of them is on board for an imminent unilateral strike on Iran. Just because the cabinet is full of generals does not mean that they are all gung ho to launch a new military adventure.

There is, however, one important way in which Israeli foreign policy might change with this unity deal, and that is the renewed empowerment of the foreign minister should Avigdor Lieberman be indicted, which I expect will happen in light of Zeev Ben Arie’s indictment and plea bargain last week. If Lieberman has to leave the government, it is safe to assume that Mofaz will take his place, and Israel will then once again have a foreign minister who is actually trusted to carry out the state’s diplomacy. This would undoubtedly be a good development should it occur, since Israel’s Foreign Ministry is too important to be left in incompetent hands.

When all is said and done, I do not think this deal is about Iran. I think it was done for domestic political considerations first and foremost. Let’s remember that while Netanyahu has faced no real challenges, Likud has not been on nearly as solid footing as its party leader. It is right now the second largest party in the Knesset – and that Kadima is the largest but is only getting one minister slot out of this deal tells you all you need to know about its long term prospects – but had been facing a new threat from Yesh Atid, a Labor bump following summer social justice protests, and a rightwing revolt within its own ranks led by Moshe Feiglin, Danny Danon, and others who do not find Netanyahu sufficiently committed to the settlement cause. The deal with Kadima eliminates these problems or gives Netanyahu more time to deal with them. By bringing Kadima and Mofaz into the coalition, it increases the chances that an increasingly unpopular Kadima (polls had it coming in fourth or fifth were elections to be held in September) will simply merge back with Likud before October 2013 and undo the rift that Ariel Sharon created in order to pull out of Gaza. It also cuts the legs out from under Yair Lapid and his new party before it can really get off the ground, and while Yesh Atid might stick around and build support, October 2013 is a long ways away for a party that has no seats in the Knesset. A newly stabilized government gives Netanyahu more time to quell the growing backbench rebellion within Likud as well, and he can expect Kadima to now back him full-tilt on settlements once he backs Mofaz’s Tal Law alternative. In sum, this is move to bring in Kadima and cancel the early elections is a no-brainer that eliminates potential rival parties, strengthens Likud internally, and probably increases its vote share over what it would have gotten in September. Does it make it easier to attack Iran? Sure – Mofaz might now become Netanyahu’s Colin Powell inasmuch as his known reticence about a strike and his presence in the cabinet make it more credible should Netanyahu decide to act. But I don’t think that is the correct prism through which to view yesterday’s political machinations.

P.S. Related to all of this, Brent Sasley has a great post over at Mideast Matrix that is well worth a read because it gets to the root causes of Israel’s political dysfunction. The casual observer familiar only with the American form of government looks at the fact that the Israeli prime minister just decided on a whim to cancel his own call for early elections and put them off for over a year as a gross violation of democracy, when in fact it is par for the course in a parliamentary system. That does not mean, however, that all is well with Israeli politics, and Brent makes a great counter-intuitive argument that yesterday’s events actually strengthen Israel democracy by temporarily papering over some of the immense structural problems that exist in the system.

Some Quick Initial Thoughts On The Israeli Political Bombshell

May 7, 2012 § 4 Comments

First of all, wow. The deal to form a Likud-Kadima government is a master stroke by Bibi Netanyahu, who now gets to avoid dealing with elections and having to make a bunch of imperfect choices in putting together a coalition, while also seizing on the fact that nearly 3/4 of Israelis want to see the Tal Law gone for good. He isn’t giving up anything, gets to cut Yair Lapid off at the knees, and strengthens his bid as the most dominant Israeli politician of his generation. This is an enormous win for him.

Another big winner, perhaps even more so than Bibi when thinking about relative gains, is Ehud Barak. I wrote last week that I was confident Barak and Atzmaut would get enough votes to be seated in the Knesset and remain in the coalition, but now Barak doesn’t have to worry about that anymore. He gets to remain as defense minister and doesn’t have to keep taking symbolic stands against settlements in an effort to rebuild his constituency. Barak also seems to genuinely hate Lapid, mocking him in the past week for using a teleprompter and comparing his Yesh Atid party charter to that of the Baath party in Syria, so the fact that Lapid now goes back to being a television host for the time being must make Barak happy.

The fact that Barak is staying as defense minister is even more remarkable when considering the that it is Mofaz who cut the deal with Netanyahu to join the government. Mofaz is a former IDF chief of staff and former defense minister, and you know that he must have wanted to take Barak’s seat but is instead joining the coalition as vie premier. Certainly not a bad gig by any means, but you have to think it is his second choice. What this says to me is just how badly Netanyahu wants and needs Barak by his side in order to provide credibility and instill confidence in the Israeli public should Israel move to strike Iranian nuclear sites. Netanyahu is clearly unwilling to give him up, which again reinforces the point I have been harping on about Barak being the critical decision maker and figure to watch on Iran.

Another winner here is Shelly Yachimovich and Labor. Yachimovich has been in major pander mode lately, saying that she would join the Netanyahu government under the right circumstances and even absurdly claiming to share a lot in common ideologically with Shas and UTJ. She knew that she was facing an uphill battle in an election with Mofaz trying to siphon off social justice voters, Yisrael Beiteinu seen as the face of the battle against Haredi military exemptions, and Yesh Atid going after Labor’s main demographic. Labor as of today had no ministerial posts and was not even the largest opposition party. Now, Labor instantly vaults over Kadima to be the primary opposition party and Yachimovich has a new position as opposition leader and a larger bully pulpit. Given that she had zero chance of replacing Netanyahu and becoming the next prime minister anyway, the Likud-Kadima deal benefits her in the end as well.

In hindsight, a deal between Likud and Kadima was inevitable given Mofaz and Kadima’s free-falling poll numbers. Mofaz harbored hopes of beating Netanyahu and becoming PM, but the polls made it clear that this was not going to happen. Things were looking so bad that there were even calls in the past few days for Mofaz to make up with Tzipi Livni and bring her back into the fold. As I’ve noted previously, Mofaz had no intention of orchestrating a leadership fight with Livni and taking control of Kadima to be just another powerless politician, and it was clear that he was going to move closer to Likud if he thought he couldn’t beat Netanyahu outright. But it never occurred to me that he and Bibi would forge a deal before the elections rather than after them. Good for Mofaz for leveraging his position when he was at his most powerful, and good for Bibi for recognizing a good opportunity staring him in the face.

Israeli Elections Kick Off Universal Pandering to Haredim

May 7, 2012 § 2 Comments

Were there any question at all about whether the unconstitutionality of the Tal Law is going to bring a wholesale change to Haredi military exemptions, this weekend’s events should put an end to any speculation that it will. First there was the refusal of Netanyahu and Likud to postpone the Knesset dissolution despite the fact that its largest coalition partner, Yisrael Beiteinu, has formally requested that it do so. Yisrael Beiteinu has wanted to introduce its Tal Law replacement bill that would require mandatory Haredi military or national service, but because there is a chance that the YB bill will have the support of the majority of the Knesset, Netanyahu and Likud were not willing to risk that happening. A few hours ago, the Yisrael Beiteinu bill and another similar bill proposed by Atzmaut MK Einat Wilf were surprisingly approved for submission by the Ministerial Committee on Legislative Affairs but then frozen by Shas minister Meshulam Nahari, which means that they will not be brought before the Knesset for a vote for the time being. This should put to rest the speculation being floated that Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu are going to run on a joint ticket since if that were to happen Likud would not now be placing so many hurdles in Yisrael Beiteinu’s path. The reason, of course, that the Knesset is being dissolved now before the bill can be introduced and passed, is because Netanyahu and Likud need to do everything in their power to keep the Haredi parties happy so as not to have them jump ship when it comes time to form the new coalition after the elections. Netanyahu needs them in the fold to form a government without Yisrael Beiteinu, and Likud governments have a long and happy history of relying on Shas and UTJ (and the NRP in the old days) to build coalitions since the Haredi parties generally have no demands outside of being able to control the religious affairs and interior ministries and are content to leave Likud alone on other issues. The end run around Yisrael Beiteinu is a concession to Likud’s Haredi partners, and no doubt Likud is now expecting them to fall in line after the elections in September. Bibi particularly needs Haredi support following the hardline revolt within Likud yesterday that temporarily denied him the presidency of his own Likud convention, since he now needs to get his own house in order and will not need any other outside distractions.

It is not only Likud, however, that is trying to buy Haredi support. Last week, Yair Lapid announced his proposal that would extend the blanket Haredi military exemption for another five years. This was quite the backtrack from his previous strident position that Shas and UTJ had the country and various ministries wrapped around their fingers and that the Tal Law should be completely revoked. Lapid has also recently announced his willingness to serve in a future Netanyahu coalition and is a newcomer to politics with his new Yesh Atid party, and since his raison d’etre seems to be his own political advancement it is perhaps unsurprising that does not want to make an enemy out of Netanyahu’s probable coalition partners.

More surprising is Shelly Yachimovich and Labor’s sudden turn toward the Haredim. Last night, the Labor party leader said that the Haredi parties would be good coalition partners for her were she to lead the government. In a fit of rhetorical mind bending, she also claimed that she and the Haredim are ideological bedfellows. This is the textbook definition of pandering, and it just reiterates that the Avigdor Lieberman era is over. It might be that the Knesset as it is currently configured would support a bill that makes Haredi military service mandatory, but now that election season is upon us, the Haredi agenda is outside the danger zone once again. When Lapid and Yachimovich are giving Shas a free pass and even making outrageous claims about the ideological compatibility of leftwing socialism and ultra-Orthodox religious fundamentalism, it means that the handwriting is on the wall as regards Netanyahu’s future coalition partners. With Netanyahu poised to coast to another term as prime minister, and Shas and UTJ all but guaranteed coalition spots, expect Mofaz as well to soon join the chorus of those reassuring Haredi voters that the Netzah Yehuda battalion is not slated to grow any time soon.

The Fate of Ehud Barak and Atzmaut

May 3, 2012 § 2 Comments

Of all the Israeli politicians affected by the call for early elections, the one whose fate is most uncertain is Ehud Barak. While he joined the coalition as defense minister by bringing in the Labor party, he ended up splitting from Labor and forming Atzmaut for the sole purpose of remaining in the government. That move allowed him to stay where he was in the short term, but it might end up costing him big in the long term. The latest polls from the Jerusalem Post, Israel Hayom, Dahaf and Maariv show Atzmaut nowhere to be found and Barak is not going to run on the Likud party list. There is the possibility that Netanyahu appoints him as defense minister anyway, but this would likely prompt a revolt unless Barak is elected to a party that is serving in the next coalition.

On the other hand, there is some evidence that all is not yet lost for Barak. Haaretz cites an unnamed poll showing that Atzmaut now has enough support to meet the Knesset threshold, and Atzmaut MK Shalom Simhon predicts that Atzmaut will four seats alone from the Druze, moshav, and kibbutz vote. In addition, Yediot reports another unnamed poll showing Atzmaut with three seats already, and there is a long time between now and the election so Barak has plenty of time to win over more potential supporters. The drop in support for Kadima over the past month alone should be enough to give Atzmaut supporters comfort in demonstrating how quickly the polls can change.

When all is said and done, I find it difficult to imagine that Atzmaut will not cross the vote threshold to win seats in the Knesset. There are a few factors at work here. First, like I said, four months is a long time, and Atzmaut has plenty of time to organize and drum up support. Barak has certainly been hard at work lately staking out positions on settlements and the Tal Law, and even taking on newcomer Yair Lapid – who might siphon off voters from Barak’s traditional center-left base – by mocking his use of a teleprompter.

Second, despite the fact that Israelis find him to be a slippery character and that his breaking away from Labor was an unpopular gambit, Barak is still a towering figure in Israeli politics. He is a former prime minister, former IDF chief of staff, the most decorated solider in Israel’s history, and is the current defense minister and second most powerful/influential politician in the country next to Bibi. I find it inconceivable that any party led by Barak won’t be able to muster the measly 2% of the vote required to win seats in the Knesset. Playing into this is the fact that Netanyahu desperately needs Barak at his side as long as the possibility of a strike on Iran still exists, and the Israeli public view Barak as a credible defense and security figure, no matter what they think of him as a politician. A new poll shows that only 25% of Israelis agree with Yuval Diskin’s criticism that Netanyahu and Barak are not equipped to deal with Iran, and no doubt Barak is going to spend the next four months reminding Israelis of how important his continued political career is to their safety and security. The last time Israel had an untested defense minister in former labor union leader Amir Peretz it was an unmitigated disaster, and Barak will be the beneficiary of the lingering memory of Peretz’s mishandling of the 2006 war with Hizballah.

So despite the polls, remember that you read this prediction here first: Atzmaut is going to have seats in the next Knesset, will serve in the governing coalition, and Ehud Barak will continue as defense minister.

Not A Great Week For Turkey and Western Institutions

May 3, 2012 § 2 Comments

For reasons of both history and geography, Turkey is a member of various institutions associated with the West, but its relationship with these bodies is sometimes acrimonious. This week demonstrated this dynamic perfectly on a number of fronts. First there was the continuing dispute between Turkey and other NATO states over who is going to get to participate in the NATO summit in Chicago later this month. I wrote last week about the fight over Israel, but it turns out that the arguing goes beyond that. Turkey says that it will also block EU participation in the summit unless the Organization of the Islamic Conference is invited as well. The logic is that the EU was extended an invitation because its preparation to take over peacekeeping duties in Afghanistan once the NATO mission there is terminated, and Turkey says that the OIC is in the same position and has actually contributed more so far than the EU has. This is particularly embarrassing because Herman Van Rompuy and Jose Manuel Barroso, the European Council and European Commission presidents, have already received their invitations to the summit, and to rescind them would be a major diplomatic faux pas. Undoubtedly the other NATO members do not appreciate the headache that Turkey is now causing for them.

The NATO disagreement is actually one that has spilled over from a larger fight with the European Union. One of the reasons that Turkey is blocking the EU from the NATO conference is that Cyprus is slated to take over the EU presidency on July 1, and Turkey is preparing freeze its relations with the EU once this happens and has even made noise about annexing Northern Cyprus. Turkey has continually objected to NATO sharing information with the EU since Cyprus became a member in 2004, and Cyprus in turn has blocked the EU from allowing Turkey to participate in the European Defense Agency. The back and forth between the two will no doubt step up come July with Turkish-EU relations suffering collateral damage, and blocking the EU from attending the NATO summit over Cyprus is Turkey’s opening salvo.

This was not the only negative development regarding Turkey and the EU this week. A report commissioned by the European Parliament threw some cold water on Turkey’s EU bid and said that it could not predict whether Turkey will have become an EU member by 2030. This is a disheartening signal given that Turkey will have been shooting for EU accession for decades by then, and with its application currently being held up over disagreements in five key areas, the ambiguous stance presented in the report cannot be seen as a positive development. Furthermore, the report explicitly tied Turkish power and influence to its potential EU membership, which is bound to make some in Ankara quite unhappy.

In addition, the S&P downgraded its outlook on Turkey this week from positive to stable, citing its high debt ratio and trade deficit and over-reliance on domestic demand, which immediately caused the Turkish lira to fall against the dollar. There is some disagreement among economists over whether this was a fair move on S&P’s part given the trading price of credit default swaps on Turkey that suggest a higher credit rating and the fact that Turkey’s trade deficit looks a lot worse when examined month by month rather than year by year (the trade deficit has fallen by $2.45 billion over the past year), but it is nevertheless not a positive development. Rather than taking it in stride, Erdoğan predictably went ballistic at S&P and other credit rating agencies, accusing them of targeting Turkey for ideological reasons and threatening to withhold Turkish recognition of S&P as a legitimate ratings body. This came on top of more measured denouncements of S&P by Turkey’s finance minister and deputy PM, both of whom said that the data was either inaccurate or outdated but did not accompany their complaints with threats.

The S&P was not the only institution that Turkey fell afoul of this week, as the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force has made plans to visit Turkey and meet with its justice and finance ministers over Turkish foot dragging on anti-terrorism financing legislation. The justice minister warned Parliament that Turkey is about to land on the FATF black list, which is humiliating since Turkey is one of the task force’s 34 member countries, but it is still unclear whether Turkey will pass the legislation despite pressure from the U.S., the UN, and the task force itself.

It is a hallmark of lazy analysis to talk about Turkey generally turning away from the West, as if this is something that can so easily be done or that is even true. Turkey embraces its status as having one foot in Europe and one foot in the Middle East, and the current government has pushed this theme more than any previous Turkish government since it realizes the value that this unique position confers on Turkey. Let’s also not forget that it is the AKP that has pushed for Turkish EU membership, and that Turkey can no more unilaterally disengage from the West than can any other European country. It is also true, however, that Turkey’s relations with the rest of Europe have plenty of room to become needlessly antagonistic and Turkey sometimes appears to be hurtling down that path. It does not benefit Turkey to be arguing with its NATO partners by bringing feuds with non-NATO states into NATO forums, or to further jeopardize its EU bid. It is also silly to prod the credit ratings agencies with a stick and increase the likelihood of being further mistreated, as if Turkish “recognition” of S&P will affect its business or reputation one iota. Turkey has chosen for decades to pursue integration with Western institutions, so treating those institutions with contempt or displaying antagonistic behavior is entirely self-defeating. Turkey has legitimate issues with Cyprus, and its sense that the credit agencies punish it unwarrantedly is not without merit, but it needs to grow up and act like an adult. Continuous tantrums, threats, and tit-for-tat fistfights only guarantee that when the next set of Western institutions is formed, Turkey will be left out.

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

May 2, 2012 § 2 Comments

Ankara has been trying to lure Israeli tourists back to Turkey for awhile now but has faced the problem that Israel issued a serious travel advisory to its citizens that warned of an “imminent threat” against Israeli tourists. Yesterday, the Israeli Counter Terrorism Bureau downgraded the travel advisory to its lowest possible level of a “continuing threat” and Israel’s Channel 2 reported that this was due to Turkey acting on Mossad information to thwart an Iranian terror plot against Israeli and Jewish targets in Turkey. The Turkish government had been convinced that the elevated travel advisory was politically motivated rather than security motivated since it was issued following Erdoğan’s strident comments on the situation in Gaza, so the lesser travel warning is a good thing for Turkish-Israeli relations irrespective of whether the Turks are correct in their suspicions or not.

Unfortunately, any good will that this will create may evaporate in light of today’s report in the Turkish press that Israel has been eavesdropping on Turkish pilot communications during military training flights. The report claims that Turkey discovered that Israel had been listening in and now encrypts these conversations to prevent Israeli spying. That the report came out today, one day after Israel’s travel advisory olive branch, is curious timing. It makes me wonder if Israel knew that this would happen and whether the reduced travel warning is an effort to blunt blowback from the Turkish government, which might be pressured into responding now that the news of Israeli espionage is public. Alternatively, it is possible that the news of Israeli spying was leaked by elements within the government that see benefit in a continued war of attrition with Israel. And of course, it is possible that all of this is a coincidence and I am wasting my time trying to see things that aren’t there.

In any event, news of Israeli spying being made public is obviously not a good thing for anyone wishing to see a thaw in relations between the two countries. It almost doesn’t matter whether the report is true or not, since perception and public opinion in both countries often drives the responses on both sides. Let’s just hope that the travel advisory remains low, that the Mossad and Turkish intelligence continue their cooperation behind the scenes, and that this news does not lead to another round of mutual recriminations.

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