Some Strange Goings On With Gülenists In The U.S.
April 18, 2012 § Leave a comment
Fethullah Gülen and his followers are a source of controversy and mystery in Turkey. Gülenists are accused of being a cult-like group that holds sway over Erdoğan and the AKP, and there is plenty of evidence that Gülenists in the judiciary and police force are responsible for the Ergenekon investigation, among other things. Much like with the power of Turkey’s deep state, I am of the view that the reality is a mixture of truth and legend, which benefits both sides since the Gülenists get the benefit of being feared and awed while their opponents can chalk up much of their misfortune to shadowy figures with unfathomable behind-the-scenes power.
While Gülen lives in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania, his followers have not been much of an issue in the U.S. until recently. The New York Times last summer ran a series of articles on Gülenist charter schools in Texas that raised questions about immigration law violations and misuse of tax dollars. Yesterday, Tennessee’s legislature passed a law aimed at Gülenist schools that limits the number of foreign teachers a charter school may employ, which is bound to draw increased scrutiny of Gülen’s aims. Then today, the International Herald Tribune published a long front page article on Gülenists in Turkey that rehashed many of the claims about them and included the following sentences: ‘‘We are troubled by the secretive nature of the Gulen movement, all the smoke and mirrors,” said a senior American official, who requested anonymity to avoid breaching diplomatic protocol. “It is clear they want influence and power. We are concerned there is a hidden agenda to challenge secular Turkey and guide the country in a more Islamic direction.” Strangely, the article is nowhere to be found on the IHT website, despite it appearing on the front page of the print edition.
I am not entirely sure what is going on here – possibly it is a simple oversight, possibly the story was retracted for one reason or another, or possibly the Times was threatened with legal action after last summer’s investigatory journalism and thinks that keeping the story in print rather than digital form will not raise any red flags with Gülenists. The bigger issue here is what implications will follow from this “senior American official” calling out the Gülen movement so forcefully and publicly. Nobody questions that Gülenists are powerful in Turkey, and while there is evidence that Erdoğan has begun to push back against their more overt displays of power, the AKP and the Gülenists have a tacit alliance. If the Obama administration actually views Gülen and his acolytes as such a big problem – and to my ears, the quote is a strange one that sounds more like something a House GOPer would say – and it raises the issue with Turkey, there is bound to be some pushback. This is all very mysterious for now, but it definitely bears some close watching down the road.
Peace Process Theater
April 17, 2012 § 1 Comment
Today’s developments in Israeli-Palestinian peace process negotiations demonstrate why the two sides, despite the joint statement that they issued reiterating that they are both committed to peace, are in reality farther apart then ever in coming to a lasting, binding agreement. Let’s begin with the turmoil on the Palestinian side of the ledger. The much-anticipated letter from Abbas to Netanyahu was delivered by Saeb Erekat and Majed Faraj, and while there had been speculation that it would contain a threat to dismantle the Palestinian Authority and return day to day control of the West Bank to Israel, the letter reportedly did not go that far, which should be cause for optimism. This means that a small sliver of agreement and coordination still theoretically exists on which to base negotiations.
The bad news is that Salam Fayyad, who was slated to deliver the letter to Netanyahu, was a no-show. There are a number of reasons why this might be, and none of them bode well for the future. Fayyad might have backed out because he does not think another expression of Palestinian discontent is going to jumpstart negotiations, which would signal a worrying degree of frustration on his part. Fayyad is the great moderate of Palestinian politics, and he has enormous credibility with the U.S. and other international actors. He has led the effort to build up Palestinian institutions and improve the West Bank’s economy and security, and he has been largely successful. He is also the rare – or maybe even more accurately, only – Palestinian politician who says the same things in Arabic to his domestic audience as he does in English to an international audience. He has never been accused of inciting or excusing violence, does not glorify terrorists who kill civilians, called for Hamas to recognize Israel years ago, does not have even a whiff of corruption about him, and by all accounts is honest and determined. If Fayyad believes that things have degenerated to the point that this letter will accomplish nothing, the risk exists that he is at the point of abandoning his project of state-building. Fayyad does not have a natural constituency among Palestinians as he is not a career politician or a high ranking PLO member, and if he resigns as prime minister, international aid to the PA will dry up overnight and the situation in the West Bank will quickly deteriorate.
Fayyad might also not have agreed to deliver the letter because Abbas was trying to discredit him by asking him to do it. Today is Palestinian Prisoners Day, in which Palestinians express their solidarity with those in Israeli jails, and the optic of meeting with Israeli officials today is not a popular one. Abbas and Fayyad do not have a good relationship, and it was not improved with the news that the unity deal that Abbas agreed to with Hamas stipulated sacking Fayyad. Abbas might have been trying to embarrass Fayyad even further by demanding that the letter be delivered today, and Fayyad understandably did not want to do it himself. The PA’s footing is tenuous enough already, and it certainly will not be improved by more fighting between its two top figures. If the PA implodes, the party that stands to benefit the most is Hamas, and that will certainly not do any wonders for Israeli security or the prospects of a deal.
Finally, it’s possible that Fayyad did not deliver the letter himself because he does not think that negotiations with Israel are still a viable path to a Palestinian state. Fayyad is on record as being against a unilateral declaration of statehood and did not agree with last fall’s strategy of pressing the UN to recognize a Palestinian state, and if he has one way or another become so disenchanted that he now believes in institution-building for its own sake without it leading to negotiations with Israel, then Israel will have lost in a big way. In many ways, Fayyad is the perfect Palestinian counterpart for Netanyahu, as they have both expressed the opinion that improving the West Bank’s economy and security is a vital precursor to successful political negotiations. If Fayyad does not want to be a part of the PA’s current negotiating process because he thinks it is a waste of time, it would signal the death knell of true moderate Palestinian partnership.
In the meantime, while Israel and the PA held a meeting and issued a joint statement that nobody expects to lead to any real progress, 1200 Palestinians in Israeli prisons began an indefinite hunger strike to protest the practice of administrative detentions and what they allege to be abusive and humiliating behavior on Israel’s part. This more than anything highlights the absurdity of today’s peace process theater. Of these two separate and distinct events, the one that is guaranteed to hold Palestinian attention and support is prisoners going on a hunger strike in opposition to Israel rather than Palestinian negotiators exchanging letters with the Israeli government. Even if Abbas were to drop his preconditions and come to the negotiating table, and the two sides were able to make some progress, is there really going to be much appetite for talks among Palestinians at this point? With hunger striker Khader Adnan being freed today, there is a stark example of what appears to be a successful strategy for countering Israel against the backdrop of endless negotiations that have not produced much in the way of tangible gains. This doesn’t mean that it will lead to Palestinian violence, but it also does not mean that negotiations are still viewed as the only alternative to armed resistance. Of all the days in which the peace process has seemed moribund, today might have reached a new low with its hollow message of two sides working together.
Turkey Is More Than Just A Bridge Between Iran And Everyone Else
April 17, 2012 § 1 Comment
Laura Rozen has a fun behind the scenes recap of the P5+1 Istanbul talks, but the best nugget is the reporting that Davutoğlu tried to set up a number of bilateral meetings between Iran and other states, and that Iran rebuffed him because it does not want to give Davutoğlu and Turkey a diplomatic victory in light of the newfound tension between Turkey and Iran. If this is indeed the reason why Iran would not agree to any bilateral meetings aside from one with China, then it suggests a high degree of Iranian naivete and miscalculation. Recall that as of only a couple of weeks ago, Erdoğan was describing Iran’s nuclear program as peaceful and as a purely civilian project, and criticizing reporters for focusing on Iranian nuclear efforts but not calling out Israel on its nuclear arsenal. Since then, Iran has angered Turkey by waffling on holding the talks in Istanbul which prompted Erdoğan to question Iran’s sincerity and truthfulness, and then after seemingly smoothing things over, has now decided to put playing childish games ahead of securing Turkish support. For a country that is increasingly isolated and facing devastating oil sanctions from the EU in a few months, this is a puzzling move in the extreme. It either means that Iran is very confident that it has managed to avoid a strike on its nuclear facilities, or that Iran is the little boy in a room full of grown men. There is no good reason to annoy the Turks, who will be critical in convincing the U.S. to sit tight and give negotiations a chance, or who will be valuable from a logistics and supply chain perspective should the U.S. decide to attack. Making Davutoğlu look impotent in front of a powerful international audience is only going to backfire, and it is a strange move for a state with few powerful friends left to purposely offend an influential potential supporter.
This incident also underscores the changing environment that Ankara will have to navigate going forward as it rethinks its global role and adjusts accordingly. Turkey has made a big deal under its current government of being a valuable bridge between the West and its own neighbors farther east. Part of the zero problems with neighbors strategy was to establish Turkish credibility in the region so that it could serve as a go-between and become more influential with the U.S. and Europe. That Davutoğlu would be running around trying to set up bilateral meetings is completely in character with this strategy, and the fact that he was not able to deliver is not a knock on him but an indicator of how Turkey needs to shift course. Becoming a regional power means less neutrality and more forcefulness. Turkey is now demonstrating that with regard to Syria, as it has over the past months moved away from trying to gently influence Assad to organizing efforts with an eye toward forcing him to leave. It might mean a loss of credibility as an arbiter or mediator, but the flip side is a more muscular role for Turkish power in the region. The same thing is true with Iran. Turkey may now find it more difficult to act as the middle man that brings Iran and the West together, but having a stronger independent voice and taking sides will bring with it a different array of benefits. Just as Turkey shifted course with Syria, I expect the same thing to eventually happen with Iran, since Davutoğlu is too smart to stick with an outdated policy that no longer matches Turkey’s reach or its geopolitical circumstances. The fiction that Turkey could somehow remain neutral on all issues and be friends with everybody has been exposed by the Arab Spring, the chaos in Syria, and now by Iran. It’s time for Ankara to drop the charade, acknowledge that it is not going to be able to rewrite the rules of international politics all by itself, and come up with a new grand strategy and slogan that recognizes that being a regional power means having to act like a bully sometimes.
Coup Country
April 16, 2012 § Leave a comment
Following the arrest of the generals involved in the 1997 “post-modern coup” that toppled Necemttin Erbakan’s government and outlawed his Refah Party, Erdoğan yesterday declared the era of military coups over and said that Turkey is no longer a “coup country.” While this appears to be a dangerous prediction given Turkey’s history, the purging of generals and the prosecution of officers as part of the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations, along with the trials for the September 12 and February 28 coup plotters, means that Erdoğan is probably right. The military is no longer in a position to overthrow the government and was badly exposed when it tried unsuccessfully to intimidate the AKP from appointing Abdullah Gül as president, and the various reprisals it has suffered over the past few years are going to have the intended effect of keeping the officers in their barracks.
Few people will argue that this is a bad thing. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, civilian control of the military is a hallmark of democracy and Turkey has finally established true vertical accountability. At the same time, Erdoğan must not use his newfound unfettered power to create a different type of problem for Turkey’s democracy. While military interference in democratic politics is a bad thing, so is using democratic institutions to advance creeping authoritarianism. Worrisome signs abound, including the fact that the investigations into the military have been trumped up and relied on forged documents, and opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu has denounced the recent arrest of the February 28 generals as motivated by a desire for revenge. After all, Erdoğan was a Refah member and a disciple of Erbakan, and the harsher restrictions placed on public displays of religion following the coup must have rankled Erdoğan personally. Now that the military is out of the picture as a constraint – and Erdoğan’s declaration of Turkey being coup proof indicates that he himself now feels that his freedom of movement is unrestrained by the army – it is crucial that the temptation of bending the rules to make the AKP a permanent ruling party is avoided. Turkey has made great strides in some areas, such as empowering the ability of Turks to participate in democratic politics with an increased voice on constitutional issues, and now that the structural constraint of military oversight is gone, it will be an encouraging sign for Turkey’s democratic future if the government does not now overreach and crack down further on groups that present challenges to its rule, real or perceived.