Distinguishing Fact From Fiction
May 22, 2012 § 3 Comments
Over the past few weeks, and then again even more intensely over the past few days, there has been a flood of stories surrounding Turkey and Israel, some of which ring truer than others. The various reports also paint a muddled picture as to what is going on between the two countries; on the one hand, Israel and Turkey are on the verge of reconciling, and on the other they are just as far away as ever. I thought I’d run down the list of what has been reported to try and cut through the fog a bit and figure out what is actually going on.
NATO Summit
This is the story that got the most attention after it was reported that Turkey, and specifically Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, had vetoed Israeli participation in the NATO summit that took place in Chicago over the past two days. On the face of it, there is no reason to doubt this report’s veracity. Turkey has been consistently ratcheting up the pressure on Israel in order to force an apology and compensation for the Mavi Marmara, and blocking Israel from the NATO summit would certainly be consistent with this pattern. On the other hand, the State Department said that Israel was never going to be invited to the summit in the first place and Israel confirmed that it had no plans to go anyway. This makes sense in light of the fact that Israel is not a part of NATO and to the best of my knowledge has never attended a NATO summit before, not to mention the fact that this particular meeting focused on the security situation in Afghanistan, which is not an issue that involves Israel in any way. I have also heard rumors that Davutoğlu did not actually veto Israel’s participation and that the story was leaked as misinformation. It’s hard to know what to make of all this, but the sum total of the evidence suggests to me that Israel was never going to be invited to the NATO summit having nothing to do with Turkey.
Israeli Violations of Northern Cyprus’s Airspace
Last week, Turkey accused Israel of flying into Northern Cypriot airspace after it scrambled jets to intercept the Israeli plane. This is part of the ongoing tension between Turkey on one side and Cyprus and Israel on the other regarding the natural gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean, and it is a thorny situation that is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. Israel and Turkey were certainly never in danger of exchanging fire over the Israeli plane, and it would take a huge screw up of massive proportions for that to ever occur. Chalk this one up to the omnipresent tensions that exist between Israel and Turkey at the moment, although I can’t help but note the oddity of Turkey scrambling jets and accusing Israel of violating the airspace of a country that nobody else recognizes but Turkey and that Turkey claims is its own sovereign state.
Israeli Troops in Cyprus
This one wins the prize for stretching all bounds of credulity. It has been reported that Israel is planning to station 20,000 troops in Cyprus in order to protect a gas terminal that it will build. First, it seems a bit out of proportion to deploy 20,000 soldiers to protect 10,000 construction workers, particularly given that this gas terminal is being built in Cyrpus, not in Afghanistan or Somalia. Second, the notion that Cyprus or the EU would allow Israel to base 20,000 troops in Cyprus (for comparison’s sake, the Cypriot military has only 10,000 active duty soldiers in total) is so laughable that it is barely even worth discussing. Suffice it to say that the Israeli Foreign Ministry must have thought that the reporter asking for a comment on this worked for the Onion.
Heron Drones
It was reported a couple of days ago that Israel, which sold Heron drones to Turkey and under the terms of the sale was responsible for repairs to the aircraft, has fixed the drones and returned them to the Turkish military. This is a good development by all accounts, particularly since I am of the view that good relations between the two militaries is much more important than a full restoration of amicable political ties. Obviously this was a political decision too, so it’s an encouraging sign that cooperation between Ankara and Jerusalem is still possible. The news did, however, make we wonder what Davutoğlu has to say about the issue now after denying in January that any Herons were sent to Israel for repairs.
Erdoğan’s Emissary to Netanyahu
Finally, there was the news reported by Israeli Channel 10 that Prime Minister Erdoğan sent a personal envoy to meet with Prime Minister Netanyahu in an effort to mend relations, but that Turkey will not be able to move forward absent an official apology. I have no way of knowing whether this report is accurate or not, although given everything that I know about Turkish domestic politics and Erdoğan himself, I am highly skeptical. The account has not been confirmed by any other source aside from Channel 10, and while Turkey would have plenty of incentive to keep such a thing quiet, Israel does not. The only thing that gives me pause is that Turkey desperately wants to buy U.S. drones (so much for Turkey’s own Anka drone, which is scheduled to be delivered in 2014) which Congress will never agree to sell until Turkey’s relations with Israel improve, so perhaps Erdoğan is starting to think a little more strategically for the long term. In any event, I’d still be surprised if a meeting between his emissary and Netanyahu actually occurred.
So what’s with all the misinformation and bogus reports? Assuming that the NATO story was actually inaccurate and combined with the ridiculous report about troops in Cyprus, it says to me that there is a group of government officials in Turkey that do not want to see any progress made on an Israeli-Turkish reconciliation, and are doing whatever they can to keep the pressure on. There is clearly value in this tactic from a domestic politics standpoint, as Turkish nationalism is always popular and Israel is considered by some to be a true enemy of the Turkish state. Leaking stories about Turkish efforts to punish Israel – whether true or not – and concocting up scare stories involving Israeli actions in Cyprus (another convenient Turkish bogeyman) makes it more difficult for any progress on rapprochement to be made behind the scenes, as it risks making it appear as if Turkey is selling itself short and gins up public pressure to maintain a hardline position. Let’s hope that if Israel and Turkey are indeed any closer to settling their differences, misinformation in the press won’t throw a wrench into those plans.
Guest Post: A Failure Of Reason
May 21, 2012 § 3 Comments
After a Twitter exchange a couple of weeks ago in which he schooled Ali Abunimah on Zionism and social cleavages within Israeli society, I asked Dov Friedman if he would be willing to turn his thoughts into a guest post and he graciously agreed. Aside from being an early booster of O&Z, Dov is a preternaturally astute analyst, and when he decides to use his prodigious talents to write something longer than 140 characters, you don’t want to miss it. You should also all be following his Twitter feed @DovSFriedman since I guarantee that it will make you think on a daily basis. Without further ado, I give you Dov’s thoughts on the shortcomings of the anti-Zionist movement.
Were the anti-Zionist movement wiser—and less unmoored—it might recognize that it could make common cause with the left wing of the Zionist movement. In many respects, leftist Zionists have far more in common with pro-Palestinian voices than they do with Zionism’s far-right wing. The Zionist left awaits an Israel that abandons the settlement enterprise, that disaggregates Orthodox Judaism and the state, and that increases equality of rights among its citizens. Some in the pro-Palestinian movement have recognized that much progress can be made promoting liberal values and human rights before the groups philosophically diverge; however, the anti-Zionist wing of the movement has not joined them.
In theory, the potential for common cause explains why J Street has—shortsightedly—downplayed its Zionism in an attempt to create a “big tent.” Yet, with much to gain through joint action, the anti-Zionist wing perpetually radicalizes the debate, precluding any meaningful consensus on forcing accountability from a recalcitrant Israel. Organizations like J Street jeopardize potential constituencies to accommodate a movement that lacks a shred of interest in fruitful dialogue aimed to carve out common ground.
Last week, I exchanged messages with Ali Abunimah, the founder of Electronic Intifada and a prominent anti-Zionist writer who authored a book advocating a one-state solution. On the surface, the topic was a bizarre op-ed by Yaron London in Yediot Ahronot that Israel should deal with its Haredi issue by seeking to reduce—not integrate—the population. The piece is troubling and weakly argued—even among Israelis who harbor bitterness toward Haredim, it is not clear London’s argument would draw sympathy. Yet, Mr. Abunimah saw an opportunity and pounced. The op-ed was proof, he claimed, of “Zionist anti-Semitism” that dates back to “Herzl’s vile Jew-hatred.” In Mr. Abunimah’s view, London’s piece encapsulates societal feelings that Haredi, Ethiopian, and Palestinian populations are all threats to the Zionist vision.
I replied to Mr. Abunimah that his understanding was impoverished, partly because he derives a societal feeling from a singular op-ed, and partly because he conflates three issues with different historical origins and different societal discourses.
The Haredi issue is one of civic participation, national economic health, and the welfare state. Historically, the republican equation dictated that secular, educated Ashkenazi Jews traded military service for political and economic power. This began to change as Mizrahi and religious Israelis achieved military and societal status. The only non-Arab group that escapes national service is the Haredi community. Deepening the societal rift, the state devotes major resources to support this community that contributes neither to the nation’s defense nor to its coffers. The predominant discourse surrounding the Haredim is not London’s proposal to thin their ranks; rather, it is how to increase their participation in society—in terms of both national service and economic contribution. The Haredim are essentially a national issue.
The Ethiopian issue stems from racism, parochialism, and fierce protection of communal interests. Thus, Ethiopians, in essence, are the new Mizrahim. They are the new “marked” Israeli group. Particular social classes fear the pressures these new Israelis have placed on their economic prospects and communal interests—spurring some of the racism that can accompany class resentment. Certainly, Israel’s affluent, educated residents are less concerned with Ethiopian immigration than are Israel’s blue-collar families. If any critique is valid in this case it is a Marxist one. A rudimentary understanding of Israeli history and contemporary society would reveal the incongruity of the Haredi and Ethiopian issues.
This is all before we arrive at the Palestinians—who for Mr. Abunimah are the heart of the matter. Defining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is beyond the scope of this post. Suffice it to say, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may be well understood within the history of nationalism as an idea and within the development of 20th century international order on the basis of nation-states. To tie Israel-Palestine in with Israel’s Haredi and Ethiopian issues goes beyond poor analysis—it constitutes willful misrepresentation.
When evaluated closely, this misrepresentation is only the initial sleight of hand. If all three issues are one and the same, as Mr. Abunimah suggests, then not only has Zionism begat hatred of Palestinians—it provokes deep anti-Semitism as well! I wonder if Mr. Abunimah esteems his readers so lightly that he believes he can pose as the premier anti-Semitism watchdog. This from someone who advocates a solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict which—as Gershom Gorenberg notes in his most recent book—solves the borders issue, shifts every other issue from an international to a national one, and risks civil war. Mr. Abunimah warps history and obfuscates the issues at hand to score a political point.
Yet Mr. Abunimah’s ahistorical misrepresentation was not the most mindless note I received that day; Palestinian activist Susan Abulhawa seized on my call for nuance in evaluating Israel’s societal issues by ignoring the debate over Haredim and Zionism completely. She simply posted pictures of IDF soldiers with crying Palestinian children. No context, no opening for discussion—Abulhawa was “justsayin.” What is there to say back to such deliberate non-argument?
And therein lies the tragedy. The anti-Zionist wing of the pro-Palestinian movement is so consumed with frustration—so aggressive in trying to “win” arguments—that it willfully distorts reality and proves immune to reasoned debate. In so doing, it fails—day after day—to recognize a true partner in achieving Israeli retrenchment and Palestinian self-determination in a better Middle East.
Dov Friedman is a research fellow in foreign policy at the SETA Foundation in Ankara.
Why It’s Good To Know About A Topic Before Writing On It
May 21, 2012 § Leave a comment
Paul Alster had a column yesterday in the Times of Israel predicting a reconciliation between Israel and Turkey. Seems like a reasonable enough proposition, particularly in light of the news that Israel has repaired and returned four Heron drones belonging to Turkey after agreeing to fix them over a year ago. Sure, there are other factors to weigh, such as the Turkish warning to Israel just last week not to violate Northern Cyprus’s airspace or the reports of Turkey vetoing Israel’s participation in this weekend’s NATO summit, but let’s assume that Paul Alster is a glass half full kind of guy. Reasonable people can differ on this issue, and for every sign that the freeze between the two countries is only getting deeper, there are signs of thawing in the relationship.
On the other hand, the specific arguments made by Alster in support of the proposition that Turkey and Israel are going to mend their relationship border on the patently ridiculous, and his command of the facts is, to put it charitably, a bit suspect. Let’s look at some representative examples.
Erdogan (who went out of his way to antagonize and inflame relations with Israel at every possible opportunity) seems to have realized what a grave misjudgement he made in allying himself to two of the most despotic leaders on the planet, and by association being tarnished with the very dirty brush that has seen them gain pariah status across the globe.
I hardly think that Turkey has been tarnished with any brush that puts it at risk of becoming a pariah. At the moment, Turkey is being touted as a model by all sorts of Islamist political parties across the Arab world, is increasingly relied upon by the United States as a vital ally in the Middle East, has the second largest military of all NATO members, is once again making some progress on its EU bid, and is universally viewed as one of the most important actors of the coming decades. Does this sound to you like Turkey’s international status has been put at risk in any way? Undoubtedly Turkey waited too long to give up on Assad, but after that initial stumble Turkey’s reputation does not seem very much worse for the wear.
Exactly what was truly behind Erdogan’s posturing is hard to figure, as he had long been pushing for membership in the EU, and his cozying up to Iran and Syria was hardly likely to endear him to Turkey‘s potential European partners. This ill-conceived strategic gamble has clearly backfired and quickly blown up in Erdogan’s face. The prospect of the EU admitting a new member-state that is joined at the hip with two of the world’s most corrupt and authoritarian regimes was never going to prove a vote winner in Brussels; the tactic seeming to reveal a significant flaw in the political maneuvering of a man who has gradually been losing his way, only three years after he appeared to be a major player with growing influence on the international scene.
Hard as it may be to figure out for Alster, let’s see if we can come up with some reason for Erdoğan’s “posturing” in which he tried to develop closer ties with his neighbors. Might it be Turkey’s stated policy of zero problems with neighbors? Guess it wasn’t that hard to figure out after all.
As for this argument with regard to the EU, Turkey was not exactly sailing effortlessly toward EU membership before it consciously improved its relations with Syria and Iran. More saliently, there are a number of reasons why Turkey is having problems with its accession bid, from European cultural bias to worrying government suppression of the press to discredited witch hunts of military officers. Being “joined at the hip” with Iran and Syria is so far down the list of things that EU member states are worried about that to mention it betrays a staggering lack of knowledge about the real issues surrounding Turkey’s EU bid.
A PLAY IN ONE ACT
Herman van Rompuy: Nice to see you again Tayyip. I must say, you have made amazing progress in your efforts to join the EU. Who would have thought that just months after Sarkozy was out of office you would have made your peace with Cyprus and successfully negotiated all 35 chapters needed to gain accession to our club? We have never before seen such singleminded devotion by an EU applicant.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Thank you Herman. My fellow countrymen and I are most excited to take our spots in the European Commission, the European Council, the Council of Europe, and your various other bodies that have such wonderfully differentiated names. So when do I get my official EU membership badge?
Herman van Rompuy: Unfortunately, you made the grave mistake of being joined at the hip with Syria and Iran, which is the single greatest flaw we have ever encountered from a prospective EU member and is the subject of the double secret 36th chapter which you have now violated. As such, you are no longer considered to be a “major player with growing influence” – after all, your credibility with Iran, Pakistan, and Sunni Arab states is worthless to us, as is your rapidly expanding economy and military strength. Please confine yourself to Kadıköy and all points east from now on, as we have voted in Brussels to revoke your Europe visitation privileges.
CURTAIN
In recent months, with Iran becoming increasingly isolated by the international community as a result of its alleged development of nuclear weapons, and the Syrian government continuing to massacre large numbers of its own people while driving many more to seek refuge in Turkey — causing a growing humanitarian crisis within Turkey’s own borders — Erdogan’s government, amid rumors that Ankara is keen to re-establish relations with Jerusalem, has been noticeably short on its previously stinging anti-Israel rhetoric.
Right, I forgot about how popular Israel is among the international community. That BBC poll released just last week revealing Israel to be ranked above only Iran and Pakistan in favorability, and in which majorities in Spain, France, Germany, and Britain viewed Israel negatively, didn’t accurately capture the public relations value in Europe for Turkey of cozying up to Israel following Iran’s isolation and Syria’s horrific massacre of civilians (both of which everyone knows are Turkey’s fault, of course). That is precisely why Turkey’s top officials have in the past six months ceased berating reporters for not focusing on Israel’s nuclear weapons or accusing Israel of not wanting peace with the Palestinians or bragging about isolating Israel and bringing it to its knees. Isn’t it great how that previously stinging rhetoric has just disappeared?
This easing of the tensions in the eastern Mediterranean is surely more down to necessity on the part of the Turks than to a sea change in the attitude of their leader. With the door to Europe slammed in their face, Syria and Iran remaining on the international blacklist, no improvement in their relationship with Greece, and problems on their eastern front with Syrian refugees and Kurdish separatists, Turkey is surely keen to find friends in the region.
Yes, Turkey’s isolation is really terrible. Granted, the P5+1 talks were held in Istanbul last month, and Turkey is fresh off the NATO summit in Chicago, and Turkey’s approval rating in the Arab world is 78%, but Turkey is still desperate for a friend, and that is why it is going to make up with Israel. Not because the world’s superpower is pushing for it, not because it benefits Turkey’s tourism industry and export markets, not because the two countries have a long history of military cooperation, but because Turkey is feeling terribly isolated and lonely. I mean, everyone knows that Turkey is just another term for Iranian/Syrian province, right? And oh, let’s not forget about Alster’s reference to Turkey’s “majority secular population” in which 83% of Turks identify themselves as religious and 55% self-identify as either “extremely” or “highly” religious.
I could go on, but I think you get the point. I do not know what your expertise is, Mr. Alster, but it is clearly not this. Israel and Turkey may very well reconcile, but just as a broken clock showing the right time twice a day is not evidence that it is working, an Israeli-Turkish rapprochement will not be a testament to your analytical skills in the realm of foreign affairs.
Why Third Parties Fail in America
May 17, 2012 § 5 Comments
This post has nothing to do with Israel or Turkey but everything to do with political science, so if you are here for the regional analysis only, feel free to skip this one. As a trained political scientist, I feel like I simply must cut through the wrongheaded nonsense being put forth by much of the political commentariat on why Americans Elect, the latest group to attempt to mount a third party challenge to the Republicans and Democrats, failed so miserably, and why third parties in the U.S. do not exist. For those who are unfamiliar, Americans Elect planned on nominating a third party candidate for president to be selected through an online primary, but none of the nominated candidates were able to reach the vote threshold set by the organization to actually qualify to appear on the Americans Elect line. This is hugely embarrassing for Americans Elect itself, but equally as embarrassing for the high profile pundits who predicted that the group would shake up the political system forever. Leading the charge was the New York Times’ Tom Friedman, who touted the group in his column on numerous occasions but never more devastatingly to his reputation as when he concluded a column last July with this:
Write it down: Americans Elect. What Amazon.com did to books, what the blogosphere did to newspapers, what the iPod did to music, what drugstore.com did to pharmacies, Americans Elect plans to do to the two-party duopoly that has dominated American political life — remove the barriers to real competition, flatten the incumbents and let the people in. Watch out.
Why exactly did Friedman think that Americans Elect was going to destroy the two party system? Because “an impressive group of frustrated Democrats, Republicans and independents, called Americans Elect, is really serious, and they have thought out this process well.” The insinuation here is that Americans are frustrated with the options available to them, and a party that is well funded and well organized can break through the morass and actually challenge the monopoly that the Republicans and Democrats have on elections. When Americans Elect announced its failure on Monday, various post-mortems focused on the fact that there is an incumbent president running for reelection, or argued that successful third parties need to appeal to demagogic populism rather than technocratic elitism. This led the Atlantic’s Max Fisher to ask why nobody writes articles explaining that third parties fail due to the electoral system we have in place. Fisher was 100% correct to hone in on the fact that third parties do not work here because of our first-past-the-post system, and for the uninitiated, here’s the reason why.
The French political scientist Maurice Duverger posited an idea that has since become known as Duverger’s Law, which is that plurality electoral systems – namely those in which the winner is the person who simply gets the most number of votes – tend to produce two-party systems. The reason is that weaker parties will join together in an effort to present a united front against a stronger opponent while simultaneously voters will in turn abandon parties that have no real chance of winning elections. In a system in which candidates run in districts in a winner-takes-all elections, voters quickly realize that, unlike in a proportional representation system, a vote for a weak candidate or party is a wasted vote, and voters generally do not like to waste their votes. As Gary Cox argues, when voters have the short term motivation of electing someone they are happy with – as opposed to being motivated to vote for a new party in consecutive elections irrespective of its chances in order to build up its support long term – they are going to vote strategically rather than sincerely. What this means is that voters would rather pull the lever for the candidate that they prefer among those that have the best chance of winning than pull the lever for their dream candidate who is destined to lose. While there are some exceptions such as Britain, which is a two and a half party system, the general rule holds most of the time, and it has certainly held in the United States.
Americans Elect may have some specific flaws that doomed it to failure, whether those be the seriousness factor eliminated by an internet nominating system or the dearth of good candidates or the fact that it was not set up for fire breathing populism. That these things are true does not mean that Americans Elect would have succeeded had these problems been reversed. Third parties do not work in our electoral system, period. The perfect candidate endorsed by all the right people with a bottomless source of financing would not have changed that, whatever the Tom Friedmans of the world may think. The world is shaped by structural forces, and our two party monopoly is beholden to the structure of our electoral system. That’s a fact, and the vast numbers of fiscally conservative socially moderate backers of Americans Elect would do well to remember that the next time a muckraking third party movement comes knocking on their door making promises of a new and better political utopia.
Magical Thinking On Turkey’s EU Bid
May 16, 2012 § Leave a comment
The swearing in of new French president François Hollande has led to a round of renewed optimism in Turkey over its bid to join the European Union. The Turkish parliament is racing to introduce new legislation that would establish a human rights commission and a panel to deal with complaints about Turkey’s judiciary, and the hope is that these moves will lead France to unblock five chapters in the EU accession talks. On Monday, Germany’s foreign minister said that there is space to once again resume negotiations but that Turkey should not get its hopes up too much since progress on the issue will take awhile. As always, it is interesting to note the difference in the accounts from Hürriyet and Today’s Zaman, as the former includes the German minister’s words of caution while the latter omits them. Zaman does, however, take stock of the elephant in the room, which is Cyprus. Despite the fact that Cyprus is a member of the EU, Turkey’s seaports and airports are closed to Cypriot ships and planes, which is what led the EU to suspend succession talks in the first place. Turkey has no plans to change its policy, and on Monday FM Davutoğlu confirmed Turkey’s position that it will suspend relations with the EU once Cyprus assumes the rotating presidency on July 1. At the very same press conference, Davutoğlu also voiced the expectation and hope that there is going to be a “positive acceleration” of relations between Turkey and the EU now that Sarkozy is gone and Hollande is in his place.
I call this magical thinking because it completely glosses over the real obstacles to Turkey’s EU bid and and ignores the hard facts on the ground in favor of highlighting ephemeral minutiae that will barely register in the grand scheme of things. The actual situation is as follows: of the 35 chapters of EU law that must be negotiated, 13 have been successfully opened, 17 are currently frozen, 4 have yet to be opened, and only 1 has been successfully completed. Furthermore, of the 17 that are frozen, only 5 were blocked by France; the other 12 were blocked by the EU itself or Cyprus, a situation which is not bound to resolve itself any time in the foreseeable future. Turkey is convincing itself that a new French president means that its EU bid is about to begin sailing through, as if perfidious France was the only obstacle to Turkey’s accession, and Davutoğlu is busily crowing about a new era of positive relations while at the same time preparing to freeze all political relations and EU accession talks come July. The notion that replacing Sarkozy with Hollande is ultimately going to make even one lick of difference is laughable. Until Turkey complies with EU demands over normalizing relations with Cyprus, Turkey will remain on the outside looking in. The French could elect Abdullah Gül and it still wouldn’t change a thing.
For what it’s worth, outside experts appear to believe that Turkey’s future if it does not soon join the EU is going to be one that looks very different from its present. Foreign Policy surveyed 59 experts (including heads of state and foreign and defense ministers) about issues relating to NATO, and on the question of Turkey’s orientation in five years if it is still not a member of the EU, 21 believed that Turkey would pursue a revival of Ottoman power, 13 that it would be more closely aligned with its Muslim neighbors, and only 11 that Turkey would still be closely aligned with its Western allies. The point of bringing this up is not to allege that Turkey is on the verge of anything drastic, but to illustrate the European and American perception that Turkey’s reliability as an ally is in many ways contingent on it officially joining Europe in the form of becoming an EU member. If this perception holds and Turkey is not able to join the EU, the consequences will be bad for all parties involved. It is encouraging to see Turkish optimism over the EU once again, but the optimism will continue to be entirely misplaced so long as Turkey continues to fool itself over what true obstacles remain in its path. It is altogether possible that Turkey could do everything that is asked of it and still get rejected for xenophobic cultural reasons, and if that does indeed happen, it will be the EU’s loss. But Turkey as of now is not doing everything that is required to mount a successful accession bid, and that has not changed just because we now have President Hollande.
The Thorny Question of Israeli Citizenship
May 15, 2012 § 2 Comments
There is a lot of buzz today over the decision by an Israeli court declaring that Judaism, rather than being born in Israel, is the appropriate determinant of citizenship for a petitioner who wanted his citizenship to be based on something other than his religion. Uzzi Ornan had asked the court to recognize his citizenship based on the fact that he was born in Palestine during the British Mandate and not on the fact that he was born Jewish since he says that he has no religion and thus does want to be classified as religiously Jewish. The court ruled that Ornan is Jewish according to the 1970 amendment to the Law of Return, which grants every Jew the right to move to Israel and automatically gain citizenship, and thus his self-definition is irrelevant.
This is not the first time that a similar case has come up. Ornan has tried this gambit before, and the court then noted that the determinant of citizenship is not a proper question for the courts to decide but is one that must be left to society. This idea is one that should be intimately familiar to Americans, as there is a long established tradition in U.S. legal history that courts may not rule on political questions that are best left to the executive and legislative branches. The issue of how to determine what makes someone a citizen of Israel certainly appears to fall into this category, and I think that the Haifa district court in this case did a good job of simply following the law it is written. It doesn’t mean that the law should necessarily remain this way, but rather that it is not the job of the courts to take up an issue that is clearly best left to the purview of the Knesset.
There are four ways in which to acquire Israeli citizenship: being born to an Israeli parent or being born on Israeli soil (although this second one is not automatic), immigrating to Israel and being subject to the Law of Return, being a former citizen of British Mandatory Palestine who remained following the establishment of Israel, and naturalization after residing in Israel for a set amount of time. Critics of Israel focus on this second path since it is open only to Jews, but as can be seen, citizenship generally is not restricted to only Jews (although it is easier for Jews to become citizens by virtue of the Law of Return). The problem that the court decision raises is that one’s Jewishness is determined based on a religious definition, which ipso facto makes Jewishness exclusively a religious category rather than an ethnic category. This is problematic both as a matter of history and policy.
The word Jew is derived from the Latin Iudaeus Greek Ioudaios, both of which were terms that originally denoted ethnicity and geography rather than religion by referring to residents of Judaea or the nation (but not religion) of Judaeans. In time, the term Judaean evolved into the term Jew, which had a religious dimension, but it was not always this way. Being a Jew has always meant a mix of things: ethnicity, religion, culture, and (in Antiquity) geography. While in some ways the Law of Return embraces ethnicity – a Jew is someone whose mother was Jewish – it is misleading since that is ultimately the religious definition; someone whose mother was not Jewish but whose father was is not considered to be Jewish according to halakha, and is thus not Jewish for the purposes of the Law of Return without undergoing a conversion. Thus, the ethnic aspect of being a Jew is discarded, which may comport with recent centuries of Jewish history but certainly does not comport with what it meant to be a Jew the last time Jews had sovereignty over the territory that now constitutes Israel.
More relevant to today is the fact that making Jewishness an exclusively religious category inserts the state into making some weighty personal decisions that it should not be making. Ornan says that he is not a Jew and that he has no religion, but the state of Israel disagrees and is telling the world that Ornan is an Israeli citizen specifically because he is Jewish and not because he was born on Israeli territory. Doesn’t it strike you as odd that the state is putting itself in the business of arbitrating someone’s personal convictions on religion? Israel officially labels Ornan a Jew when he himself say that he is not, which might be the province of rabbinical authorities to do but shouldn’t be something in which the state should be engaging. It is one thing to create guidelines to determine whether someone who declares themselves Jewish is indeed Jewish, but it is altogether another thing to foist Jewishness upon someone who renounces it. Like I said, I’m not sure that the court had a choice in this matter based on the way the law is written, but it is something that the Knesset should certainly debate and clarify.
One final aspect to consider here is why the question of citizenship is so important. As Marc Howard has pointed out, in liberal democracies political rights are no longer a prerequisite to social and civil rights; one need not be a citizen but rather only must be a resident to enjoy the benefits of the state, and thus some argue that political rights (and hence citizenship) are not as important as they once were as they are not required as a gateway to gaining social rights. Marc’s book presents an elegant and persuasive argument that this argument is wrong and that even in the EU citizenship still matters greatly, but in Israel this is even more acute given Israel’s nature as a Jewish state. The preference that Israel gives to Jewish immigration and the easier pathway to citizenship for Jews is precisely because of Israel’s Jewish identity, and thus what should be a somewhat abstract legal question over the proper basis for Uzzi Ornan’s citizenship becomes something much larger. Here’s hoping that Israeli society takes up this question and reopens the debate, because as anyone who has observed the wide variation in religious observance and identification in Israel itself knows, Judaism in the 21st century is much more complex than a simple halakhic formula suggests. I believe that Israel is correct to zealously guard its Jewish identity and I defend its right to do so without qualification, but Jewish identity is something that should be borne by choice rather than by the state’s fiat.
