As Israel continues to prosecute its war on Hamas and Israelis continue to process and recover from the horrors of Hamas’ October 7 assault, Israel is engaging with all sorts of actors. Some of these engagements are about solving problems, others about setting expectations, and still others about building support and solidarity. Unsurprisingly, Israel and its various interlocutors are not always on the same page, and there are three particular instances where the gaps between Israel and other parties are not being grasped enough by one of the two sides involved. Without both sides listening to each other more rather than just hearing, these gaps are going to turn into unpleasant surprises that may hamper Israel’s ability to fully recover and move forward once Operation Swords of Iron has concluded.

The first gap is between Israel and the region on the expectations everyone has for Gaza’s rehabilitation and reconstruction. The Israeli government and Arab governments do not want to talk about the day after for Gaza, but for very different reasons. Israel does not want to address questions about what happens in Gaza after the fighting until it has concluded its military campaign and assured Hamas’ complete removal from power, fearing that moving on will create more pressure on Israel to halt its operation prematurely. On the other end of the spectrum, Arab states have been unwilling to deeply engage in planning for a post-Hamas Gaza without pledges from Israel to shift its policies in the West Bank, rhetorically grant a role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, and affirm a political commitment to two states.

It is easy to chalk this up as only the latest example of policy and political disagreements that will result in everyone agreeing to disagree but still moving forward on practical arrangements for putting Gaza back together. And indeed, in conversations with Israeli officials, many of them have an expectation that the usual parties—Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf states, the U.N.—will ultimately contribute to Gaza reconstruction, provide humanitarian assistance to Palestinians, and make arrangements for internally displaced Gaza residents. In other words, that the aftermath of the fighting in Gaza will look like the aftermath of previous rounds of fighting between Israel and Hamas. Yet that assumption is a risky one. The Israeli government and IDF are still operating from a place of shock and—as television interviews with Israeli officials have widely demonstrated—are in no mood to accept criticisms of how they are proceeding while still identifying their dead and while 240 hostages are still in Gaza, while the international community increasingly has problems with Israel’s conduct in Gaza. There is no appetite to swoop in after the IDF has finished and take the problem off Israel’s hands, particularly as the Israeli government pays no heed to other stakeholders’ concerns, but Israel is proceeding as if that is precisely what will happen. If Israel finds when the fighting is over that other countries are not going to rebuild Gaza with U.S. coordination and U.N. oversight, it will not only be stuck with an historically epic mess with which it is ill-equipped to deal but will be surprised by it despite all of the messages being openly sent.

The second gap is between Israel and the U.S. over the steps that Israel feels are necessary for its security, and here it is the U.S. that may not be listening as carefully as it should. The Biden administration is doing its best to prepare for post-war Gaza by talking to different international actors about the roles they might play and looking for ways to get the PA involved, assuming that at some point in the next few months the IDF will leave Gaza and that it is important to get on top of the post-war issues now. But Israelis don’t view Hamas’ removal from power in Gaza as sufficient for people to return to the communities in the south that now sit empty, even if that step is necessary. Israel is likely to create a security zone inside of Gaza that may or may not have IDF troops permanently stationed in it, but that in any event will create a belt of two to three kilometers carved out of Gaza’s territory. This will make it harder for mortars to be shot at kibbutzim along the border and prevent the type of surprise infiltration that occurred on October 7, and at the same time may prevent either the PA or international actors from acceding to take responsibility in Gaza. It is hard to square Israel’s need not to have its borders shrunk by making the Gaza envelope uninhabitable with Palestinians’ desire not to have Gaza’s borders shrunk, but the latter is where things are headed, and that could make the U.S.’s best diplomatic planning efforts all for naught.

But it is on Israel’s northern border that the U.S. may be in for the bigger surprise. The bulk of American efforts has been to prevent Hizballah from entering the fighting in a major way and opening up a second front against Israel, and the U.S. show of military force in the eastern Mediterranean is designed to deter Hizballah from acting. It is not only Hizballah that needs to be deterred, however; there is a genuinely high risk that Israel is the party that ramps things up. The tit-for-tat between the two sides got louder early this week as Hizballah escalated its attacks on IDF positions in the north, and Biden envoy Amos Hochstein arrived in Lebanon on Monday in an attempt to quiet down tensions and restore a greater measure of calm. But even if Hizballah ceases firing anti-tank missiles and shelling Israeli positions, it won’t be enough. After Hamas’ attack, Israeli officials are not thinking about border security in terms of deterrence—the mistake that was made in assessing Hamas’ intentions—but in terms of prevention. In order for Israelis who evacuated northern communities to ever return, they need to be assured that a Hizballah infiltration has been prevented, which means pushing Hizballah back from the border. While it is conceivable that Hizballah will be convinced to abide by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 and withdraw north of the Litani River, it is also unlikely. That makes an Israeli operation against Hizballah almost inevitable in the current environment, even as Israel is still concentrating on Gaza, and it is striking how many Israeli officials and Israeli civilians grimly speak about a military campaign in Lebanon as a necessity irrespective of what it means for Israel’s homefront when Hizballah responds with the full weight of its arsenal. All of the U.S. carriers and fighter squadrons devoted to avoiding a second front in the north won’t matter if Israel determines that it needs to open that front up fully.

Lastly, there is a perception gap between what is taking place in Israel and what American Jews perceive is taking place in Israel. Maybe the only silver lining of October 7 is that a deeply divided Israeli society seemingly healed itself overnight, with everyone coming together to ensure that Israel would succeed in its fight against Hamas. The catchphrase ביחד ננצח (together we will win) is everywhere, and American Jews have not only celebrated Israeli unity but have embraced it themselves in standing with Israel. Israelis, however, are not united in the deep way that American Jews believe. While differences have been set aside for the purposes of winning the war, the burning anger that many have toward the government and toward Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu specifically is even more intense now than it was before. There is anger over the failures leading up to October 7, anger over the way the bereaved and hostages’ families have been ignored, and anger over Netanyahu’s unwillingness so far to accept any responsibility. The second the fighting is over, Israel will be shut down by daily and unrelenting protests and demonstrations that will make the Saturday night demonstrations against the judicial overhaul look like a lark, and unlike the previous round of protests, this round may be more violent. If Netanyahu does not immediately resign—something that few expect—and his supporters face off against hundreds of thousands of angry reservists and others, things will get ugly quickly. American Jews who are now standing in solidarity with a unified Israel are suddenly going to be surprised to find that Israeli unity is illusory, and there is little sign that American Jews are prepared for the next Israeli reality that is about to explode with an unprecedented ferocity and speed.

None of these problems are going to magically go away, and they may not even all have solutions. It is nevertheless important for everyone to start paying better attention to the signals that are being sent, which are not subtle and which require better listening and absorbing.