Henry Kissinger famously quipped that Israel has no foreign policy and only domestic politics. That observation was on full display this week, as rumors swirled that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was on the cusp of firing Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and replacing him with his erstwhile Likud rival Gideon Sa’ar. While Netanyahu’s camp claimed that the reason for potentially firing Gallant was unbridgeable differences over possible Israeli escalation against Hezbollah, military action in Lebanon had nothing to do with it. This was instead entirely about Netanyahu’s current and future political positioning, revealing the ways in which Israeli domestic politics is controlling Israeli foreign policy at the worst time.

When the security cabinet voted on Monday to add the return of Israeli residents to the north as a new objective of the war, it came against the backdrop of days of chatter about a new, more hawkish stance that Netanyahu was adopting with regard to military action in Lebanon. While the discourse for months had been that the likelihood of escalation between Israel and Hezbollah was low since neither side wanted it, suddenly the messaging from the Israeli side was that something consequential needed to be done to change the equation. Netanyahu’s circle claimed that Gallant was standing in the way of taking aggressive action against Hezbollah, and that if he did not shift his position, Netanyahu would have no choice but to replace him.

This spin on events struck anyone who has been following the Netanyahu-Gallant push and pull for months as off for a few reasons. First, it is widely known that in the days after October 7, Gallant wanted to begin Israel’s military campaign with Hezbollah and only afterwards turn to Hamas and Gaza, believing that it was more important to deal a blow to the more dangerous foe and the one that would be able to execute a much more damaging version of October 7 in the future. Netanyahu disagreed and, in order to prevent Gallant from winning out, brought Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot into an emergency government and created the war cabinet mechanism.

Second, part of the ongoing dispute between Netanyahu and Gallant over a hostage deal and ceasefire in Gaza is Gallant’s—and the IDF’s—preference to wind things down in Gaza in order to focus on the north. It didn’t compute that Gallant was now allegedly a dove on the issue of Hezbollah and a military campaign on the northern front. With the benefit of hindsight after Tuesday’s exploding Hezbollah pagers, it is possible that Gallant was worried about that operation specifically and whether it would spark a larger conflict before Israel was fully mobilized for one. But the idea that Netanyahu would fire Gallant over an argument over Hezbollah, of all things, did not pass the smell test.

The reason, of course, is that Netanyahu wanting to replace Gallant has nothing to do with Lebanon, or with Gaza, or with the matters under Gallant’s purview as defense minister. Netanyahu is thinking about one immediate political challenge and two medium-term political challenges, both of which present threats to his continuation as prime minister. In his view, replacing Gallant with Sa’ar—and with Sa’ar specifically, rather than someone else currently in the coalition—will mitigate these political threats.

The most pressing hurdle that Netanyahu has to get over is passing the 2025 budget. While the government passed a revised 2024 budget in March to account for changes post-October 7, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich decided to move up the next budget process, aiming to pass a new budget before the end of this year rather than the deadline in March. If a budget doesn’t pass, it automatically triggers Knesset elections, something that Netanyahu wants to avoid. As a result, the accelerated budget timeline means Netanyahu has to get everyone on board quickly, and the weak links in the coalition are the Haredi parties UTJ and Shas. Both are upset about broken promises on passing a new draft exemption law and on spending priorities for the Haredi sector, and while Shas is unlikely to buck Netanyahu and bring down a government that he leads, UTJ has already threatened not to vote for the budget if a draft exemption law is not passed first. Gallant has repeatedly said that he will not vote for a draft exemption bill that does not have consensus support, which includes opposition figures like Gantz and Yair Lapid, while Sa’ar has reportedly consented to the bill that has already been negotiated with the Haredi parties. If Netanyahu wants to prevent UTJ from triggering early elections, replacing Gallant might be necessary.

But the budget is only one aspect of the political landscape that Netanyahu is looking at. In the current coalition of 64, Netanyahu has little breathing room and is constantly beholden to political blackmail from the likes of Smotrich or Itamar Ben Gvir, who control only seven and six seats respectively, but can bring down the government in light of Netanyahu only being able to lose three seats before he loses his Knesset majority. Part of why Netanyahu brought Gantz and Eisenkot into the government four days after the October 7 attacks was to increase his buffer, in addition to wanting to prevent Gallant from going to war in Lebanon and wanting to neutralize Ben Gvir’s demands for more authority. Sa’ar controls four seats through his New Hope party, and bringing him in from the outside—and giving him the defense minister position that he is demanding as a condition—makes any future threats from Ben Gvir or Smotrich idle ones, as they will no longer be able to bring the government down without banding together. Netanyahu is likely worried about Ben Gvir in particular, as he makes threats constantly, is both the most inflammatory and most unreliable minister in a real position of authority, and is alone among coalition party heads in that his party is gaining ground in polls and thus would benefit from an early election. If Sa’ar joins the cabinet, it remedies one of Netanyahu’s most persistent political headaches.

Sa’ar has another advantage, which is that he’s not actually threatening to Netanyahu. Despite a reputation as a savvy political actor, Sa’ar’s track record belies that reputation. After challenging Netanyahu as Likud party leader and losing spectacularly, he was drummed out of the party and formed New Hope, which won only six seats running on its own. He then joined forces with Benny Gantz ahead of Gantz’s worst electoral showing since joining politics, was part of the post-October 7 emergency war government but not part of the war cabinet, split from Gantz in March and then left the emergency government a couple of weeks later after his demand to join the war cabinet was ignored, and is now powerless in the opposition in addition to being below the Knesset threshold in nearly every poll. If Netanyahu rehabilitates Sa’ar, he will not be an internal challenger to Netanyahu if he rejoins Likud and will not be a meaningful threat to take seats away from Likud if he keeps New Hope intact. He is exactly what Netanyahu is looking for, which is someone who is unthreatening and will be beholden to Netanyahu for granting him a measure of influence that he cannot get on his own.

There is one more advantage for Netanyahu making Sa’ar defense minister now, which is that the most dangerous political threat to Netanyahu is coming from the right with the looming return of Naftali Bennett. Poll after poll shows a Bennett party winning the most votes in an election, and he beats Netanyahu in the question of who is more suitable to serve as prime minister. Netanyahu is used to challengers from his left, but has managed not to be eclipsed by rivals in his own camp, and if Bennett is able to control a right-wing party that is larger than Likud, Netanyahu will be supplanted. Netanyahu wants to deprive Bennett of every additional Knesset seat possible, and that means blocking avenues for other right-wing politicians to join with him, including someone like Sa’ar, who is barely politically relevant but could mean the difference between Bennett finishing ahead of or behind Netanyahu.

The chaos that Israel sowed in Lebanon on Tuesday has quieted the Gallant issue for now, but it will soon reemerge. When it does, it will not be because of Israel’s war aims or strategic goals, but because of what Netanyahu’s reading of domestic politics dictates. As is so often the case, Israeli foreign policy is taking a backseat when it should be front and center.