When Zero Problems With Neighbors Becomes Over The Top
March 28, 2012 § 5 Comments
This is a good example of where trying to make everybody happy is going to leave nobody happy. Erdoğan is in Iran today for meetings with Ahmadinejad and other Iranian government officials on the Iranian nuclear program and what to do about Syria. To begin with, the optics of this are just silly given that any knowledgeable Iran observer insists that the nuclear program and any real decisions pertaining to it are controlled by Khamenei and not by Ahmadinejad, so these meetings are likely a waste of Erdoğan’s time. More importantly, Erdoğan arrived in Tehran straight from South Korea, where he attended President Obama’s conference on nuclear security. It is possible that he is conveying a message from Obama to the Iranians, but if not it can’t be terribly reassuring to the U.S. that Erdoğan is running straight to Iran to brief them on whatever went on behind closed doors in Seoul. On the Syria issue, it also appears to be bad timing with the Friends of Syria conference beginning on Sunday in Istanbul in light of Iran’s support and bankrolling of Assad. I don’t think that anyone is under any illusions as to whether Iran is going to dump Assad over the side of the boat, and I guarantee you that Erdoğan and Ahmadinejad are not discussing the best way to set up a buffer zone, so why have these meetings now? I am all for diplomacy and think it will have a big place in resolving the Iran nuclear issue, but the timing of this feels very off to me. Why not wait until after the Friends of Syria conference, which might provide some more impetus to exert pressure on Iran? I understand that Turkey feels a vital need to maintain good relations with almost every state in the region, and it is part of what makes Turkey a valuable U.S. ally, but this is one time where trying to get everyone to like you is not going to yield any tangible benefits.
Is Netanyahu The Decider on Iran?
March 22, 2012 § 1 Comment
The quick answer is only partially. In undertaking such a big decision, the Prime Minister needs to gain approval of a larger group of ministers. Eli Lake reported on the smaller group called the Octet (Shminiya in Hebrew) that is comprised of an informal group of seven officials aside from Netanyahu – Ehud Barak (Defense), Avigdor Lieberman (Foreign), Eli Yishai (Interior), Dan Meridor (Intelligence), Moshe Yaalon (Strategic Affairs), Yuval Steinitz (Finance), and Benny Begin (minister without a profile). However, Lake’s take is not entirely accurate, since there is a Lake focuses on the Octet, but also mentions the larger official security-political cabinet of fourteen that would probably have to give the official go-ahead before Netanyahu undertakes a decision. There is a lot of speculation on where people fall on the issue with some waffling, and Lake contends that Lieberman has switched his position from being against a strike to being in favor of a strike. There was a report in Maariv last week (Hebrew language only) that in the group of fourteen, eight are in favor of an attack and six are against. Of perhaps greater consequence though is that four members of the Octet – Yaalon, Yishai, Meridor, and Begin – are currently opposed to Israel carrying out a strike, and if Lake is correct that this is the group that actually needs to come to an informal consensus, it contributes more evidence to my argument that an attack on Iran is not imminent. Other people to watch are high ranking IDF officials, with Chief of Staff Benny Gantz having to be on board for a strike irrespective of the cabinet’s views. Pay attention to the speculation that you read arguing that Israel will or will not go ahead with a strike, and remember that anyone who paints it simplistically as being solely up to Bibi and his mood does not have any real idea how the Israeli political system works. Netanyahu is in favor of an attack, but unlike George W. Bush he is not The Decider.
Thanks, Zion Square
March 16, 2012 § Leave a comment
Glad that this little blog is punching above its weight!
All Politics Are Local
March 15, 2012 § 2 Comments
It seems irresponsible to write a blog about Israel without at all addressing the biggest question regarding Israel these days, which is of course whether or not Israel is going to launch an attack on Iran. I will leave the wisdom of such a move for another post, but examining what is going on in Israeli domestic politics yields conflicting answers as to whether or not it is going to happen.
Aluf Benn argues in today’s Haaretz that Netanyahu is preparing Israelis for war by trying to convince them that attacking Iranian nuclear sites is the only way to prevent another Holocaust and that Israel is capable enough to do the job on its own. Certainly Netanyahu’s AIPAC speech was in the same vein, with its exhortation that Israel cannot afford to wait much longer and cannot depend on other states to guarantee its security. The fact that Bibi and Ehud Barak – according to various reporting the two most vocal proponents of an attack – appear to be freezing out the rest of the Security Cabinet while making decisions on how to respond to rockets from Gaza does not bode well for any restraint on Iran down the road. There is a speculation that Netanyahu is simply bluffing in an effort to get the U.S. to bomb Iran on its own and thus ensure that the job is done well while blunting any international condemnation that will rain down on Israel should it go alone, but to paraphrase Jeffrey Goldberg, such a gambit would make Netanyahu the favorite to win next year’s World Series of Poker main event.
On the other hand, Daniel Levy makes a strong argument that Israel will not attack Iran because Bibi’s history shows him to be risk-averse, likely to avoid military confrontation, and bombing Iran risks Netanyahu’s high popularity should the mission go wrong. Opinion polls indicate that there is not a majority of Israelis in favor of an attack, and Bibi does not want to endanger a third term, particularly if he decides to capitalize on his current status and call early Knesset elections. Furthermore, Levy points out that the Netanyahu coalition is based on expanding Israel’s hold over the West Bank, not getting into a war with Iran. It is also striking that very little has been done from a civil defense perspective to prepare for retaliations from Iran or Hizballah in the event of an Israeli raid. Matan Vilnai, the cabinet minister in charge of civil defense abruptly resigned in February to become the new ambassador to China, homefront drills have been canceled due to budget shortfalls, and gas masks have not been nationally distributed nor have bomb shelters been designated. In short, aside from a lot of overheated rhetoric, Israel does not appear to be a country busily preparing itself for war and the various repercussions that might accrue.
So what’s going on here? Option A is that Bibi is incompetent and rushing into a war without making the vital preparations first, but that does not ring true to me. I think Option B is the answer: Bibi wants someone to take out Iranian nuclear sites but does not want to be the one to do it, and this is all one enormous act for the benefit of the U.S. and other international players. It’s a variation on Richard Nixon’s Madman Theory, or an example of Robert Putnam’s two-level game, in which Netanyahu commits himself domestically to war so that he can then turn to Obama and say that his hands are tied unless the U.S. does the dirty work for him. The question that now bears watching is whether it will work.
