Today’s Depressing News Roundup

April 23, 2012 § Leave a comment

There is so much to talk about on the Israeli and Palestinian fronts today that I don’t even know where to begin, so I thought I would just write about a bunch of stuff in one post.

First up, Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad are apparently now not even on speaking terms, with Abbas refusing to return Fayyad’s calls or schedule a meeting with his own prime minister. I wrote last week about the tension between the two men and what Fayyad might be thinking so no need to rehash it, but to state the glaringly obvious, this is a recipe for absolute disaster. Fayyad cannot continue in his post if Abbas literally refuses to interact with him, and Fayyad leaving will mean the collapse of any PA credibility, much of the PA’s international support will evaporate, conditions on the West Bank will deteriorate which may very well lead to an outbreak of mass violence, and Hamas will move in to fill the power vacuum. Despite everything else going on, this is the most important development of the weekend, and also the one with the potential to create the most long-lasting havoc.

Moving on, Egypt has unilaterally terminated its gas export deal with Israel (technically with East Mediterranean Gas Company, which is the entity that handles the exports), prompting a slew of responses ranging from Shaul Mofaz’s opinion that this is a possible breach of Camp David to Bibi Netanyahu’s Alfred E. Neuman what-me-worry impression since he says that Israel’s natural gas reserves will soon make it energy independent anyway. Netanyahu claims that this is nothing more than a business dispute that has nothing to do with politics, and Egypt says that the government was completely uninvolved in the decision, yet for some strange reason Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon met with the Egyptian ambassador today to get clarification on the reasons behind the gas cutoff. Methinks the the prime minister doth protest too much. This is just the latest headache for Israel on the Egyptian front, and while it is not going to put the peace treaty in jeopardy, Avigdor Lieberman’s contention that Egypt presents a bigger danger to Israel than does Iran is going to be a growing theme on Israel’s right. This is a perfect example of how the conflict with the Palestinians does Israel tangible harm and is not just a public relations problem, since canceling the gas deal is going to be immensely popular in Egypt – where public opinion suddenly matters a great deal – and until the Leviathan and Tamar gas fields are online, the loss of 40% of Israel’s current natural gas supply is going to be felt by Israelis in a big way with higher utility prices. The hollow insistence by both sides that this is purely about business and not about politics means that there is a face-saving way to rectify the problem (Israel renegotiates the deal and agrees to pay a higher price that corresponds to the market), but it is surely a harbinger of more bad things to come between Israel and Egypt.

Finally, there is the open fighting between Netanyahu and Barak over enforcement of the High Court’s evacuation order of Ulpana, with Netanyahu considering enlarging the scope of a military land acquisition order in order to bring the neighborhood under its aegis. Of course, he cannot do so with the defense minister’s acquiescence, and all signs point to Barak standing firm against it. In case you are wondering why Barak is all of a sudden standing up to Likud hardliners and taking on settlements, as he did earlier this month during the Beit Hamachpela mini-crisis in Hebron, it is because his new Atzmaut Party is going to need more votes to meet the Knesset threshold whenever the next elections are called, and Barak figures this is a good way to gain some support from leftwing voters who might not appreciate his recent hawkish stance on Iran. I am glad that Barak is using his muscle to prevent the government from ignoring High Court orders, but the reason this makes it into a blog post summarizing depressing news is that the clash between Barak and the rest of the governing coalition is accelerating, with Likud’s most influential hardline muckraker Danny Danon calling yet again yesterday for Barak to be thrown out of the cabinet. As I have discussed in depth before, Netanyahu cannot do this while confrontation with Iran looms, so what he is likely to do instead is retroactively authorize a number of illegal West Bank outposts in order to placate his base and quiet the potential revolt within Likud. This is not a good development, and just serves as the latest reminder that Israel’s domestic politics do not in any way, shape, or form encourage moderation or long term strategic thinking these days.

P.S. No, I did not forget about the news that Turkey has banned Israel from participating in a NATO summit, but it deserves its own blog post later today.

Some Cracks in the Coalition Armor

April 4, 2012 § 1 Comment

The IDF successfully evacuated the Beit Hamachpela building in Hebron today without incident – making me very happy that the proper procedure was followed and the rule of (military) law prevailed – but there are going to be long term political consequences that have the potential to upset the stability of the Netanyahu coalition. The evacuation was driven by Ehud Barak, who bluntly told Netanyahu that he had no choice in the matter and that there could be no further delays in carrying out the IDF missive, and this has predictably made Barak a target of right wing ire. Moshe Ya’alon, who is vice PM and himself a former IDF chief of staff like Barak, has lashed out at Barak and called for authority over the settlements to be taken away from him and given to a special ministerial committee, which would be highly unusual given the fact that the legal status of the West Bank is that it is under military occupation and hence unmistakably under the purview of the defense minister. Barak is not taking the criticism lying down and accused Ya’alon of playing politics with national security issues, which will not endear him to other Likud members who are wary of him to begin with. Additionally, Avigdor Lieberman made some comments about coalition members taking unilateral moves and contrasting that with what he described as Yisrael Beiteinu’s efforts to keep the coalition together, and warned that Barak had made a “grave diplomatic mistake” by not taking into account the views of other government members.

Netanyahu and Barak are an odd pair, bound together over the Iran issue but not a good match in any other way. Barak has no attachment to the settlements or to the Israeli right wing, and does not see any reason to jump through hoops to remain in the right’s good graces. He wants to serve as defense minister and continue to dominate Israel’s defense and security policy, and his breaking away from Labor and forming his own Atzmaut party for the sole purpose of remaining in the cabinet betrays the fact that he has no intention of attempting to become PM at any point. Unlike Netanyahu, traditional political and electoral concerns are the last thing from Barak’s mind at the moment. Netanyahu maintains this co-dependent relationship because he needs Barak around to deal with Iran, and Barak is no mere figurehead in this regard but a true partner as the two of them have frozen out the rest of the security cabinet.

Now, however, a number of issues are coming to a head that will test whether Bibi can hold his coalition together. It appears increasingly unlikely that an attack on Iran is imminent, a point driven home by Hillary Clinton’s warning yesterday that a unilateral Israeli strike is not in anyone’s best interests. If Iran is put on the back burner, then the Netanyahu-Barak relationship will come under a good deal of stress. Nobody questions Barak’s stranglehold on the defense portfolio while Israel is contemplating serious military action, but if a consensus emerges to delay it means that Barak is no longer a vital piece of the coalition puzzle. The evacuation of the Hebron settlers has meanwhile inflamed members of Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu, and Netanyahu’s base is going to start clamoring loudly to boot Barak out of the coalition. Given the fact that such a move would be seen as naked politics taking priority over legitimate national security concerns, this will be a tough move for Netanyahu to make. He has so publicly hitched his wagon to Barak that removing him as defense minister over an issue that Barak indisputably has authority over is bound to damage Netanyahu’s credibility both at home and abroad. If, however, Netanyahu ignores the anger coming from Likud voters and even from other coalition ministers such as Ya’alon and Lieberman, then he is putting his position as PM in danger. There is no way for him to replace Yisrael Beiteinu should it decide to leave, since a deal with Kadima before the next election reduces Kadima’s Knesset contingent is impossible, and Mofaz seems determined so far to see if he can make a play at becoming prime minister. If there is indeed a right wing revolt over the Hebron issue and a narrative takes hold that accuses Netanyahu of caving to Barak too quickly, the stability of the Netanyahu coalition is going to be seriously challenged. Stay tuned…

The Pitfalls of Preconditions

April 3, 2012 § 6 Comments

Barak Ravid reports in Haaretz that long-time negotiators Saeb Erekat and Yitzchak Molcho recently met in secret in an effort to revive dormant Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, and that the PA has outlined a number of demands that it plans on presenting to Netanyahu as preconditions to negotiations. Unsurprisingly, Abbas’s preconditions are that negotiations begin with a baseline of the 1967 borders and that Israel freeze all settlement activity.

While the Palestinians are in a difficult spot and want to gain some leverage going into peace talks, the preconditions gambit is a continuation of the same negotiating mistake. A little reminder of recent history is helpful in understanding why this is. When AIPAC convened its annual conference in March 2010, the attendees gathered during a particularly rocky period for Israel diplomatically. Earlier that month, Vice President Biden had landed in Tel Aviv to be infamously greeted with an announcement of 1600 new housing units in East Jerusalem which led to a mini-crisis with the United States and an hour-long dressing down from Secretary of State Clinton.  Israel’s deputy foreign minister Danny Ayalon was fresh off causing a diplomatic crisis with Turkey following his attempt to humiliate the Turkish ambassador with cameras rolling in response to Turkish television dramas portraying Israeli soldiers as kidnappers and intentional murderers of innocent civilians. Britain was also threatening to cut intelligence ties and cease intelligence sharing following revelations that Israel had used British passports while assassinating a Hamas military leader in Dubai.

Most importantly, serious pressure was building up for Israel to make real concessions in service of creating an independent Palestinian state. President Obama had called for Israel and the Palestinian Authority to resume negotiations and had pressed Israel for a freeze on all settlement activity. The PA seemed for the first time in nearly two decades to be making progress in building state institutions in the West Bank, and the U.S.-trained PA police force was winning accolades for its progress and professionalism.  There was also a growing sense among military officials that a lack of progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front was becoming a problem for the U.S., embodied by General David Petraeus’s Senate testimony that anti-American sentiment in the Middle East was partly due to the absence of a Palestinian state.  The momentum for an independent Palestine was building, and following the Biden episode and the fury among top U.S. officials at what they saw as an unacceptable humiliation of the vice president, the Palestinians were in an ideal situation to negotiate a favorable resolution to the conflict.

Such negotiations never took place, however, because the Palestinian Authority committed the crucial mistake of setting preconditions before coming to the negotiating table. As every first year law student required to read the seminal negotiation treatise Getting To Yes can tell you, setting preconditions to negotiating is a tactic that almost always fails. The book’s very first lesson is not to bargain over positions as it is inefficient, damages the relationship between parties, and leads to bad agreements. Tactics such as setting preconditions and refusing to negotiate until they are met are fated to backfire if the objective is to reach an agreement, as the other side is likely to dig in and paint the refusal to negotiate as evidence of bad faith. Over time, the party setting the preconditions will become hostage to the perception that it has no interest in reaching a deal, and will then be forced to maintain its principled position even when events on the ground put it at a disadvantage or give up credibility and leverage by dropping its demand entirely. In short, setting preconditions before agreeing to negotiate an agreement is rarely going to be a winning strategy.

In early 2010, Abbas insisted that no negotiations could take place absent a complete freeze on all building activity in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which was a condition that Israel was in no way prepared to meet given the extension of the freeze request to East Jerusalem.  Netanyahu did, however, agree to a 10 month West Bank settlement freeze, allowing him to take the high road by announcing that he was making concessions and was ready to negotiate at any time while portraying the Palestinians as unwilling peace partners. By September 2010, following months of demands that Israel freeze all East Jerusalem construction, the Palestinians finally agreed to negotiate, but by that point it was too late, as Israel’s settlement freeze expired. Events on the ground had also shifted by that point and Obama announced his unwillingness to ask the Israelis for yet another halt to all West Bank building activity, and the Palestinians were in no position to make a credible case having squandered months of potential negotiations. Fast forward two years later to the most recent AIPAC conference, and the Palestinians and peace negotiations barely registered with attention turned exclusively to Iran.

Despite all this, Abbas is about to pull a Groundhog Day and make the exact same mistake, although this time his starting point is far less favorable and thus his tactic is even more unlikely to work. The question is whether the PA actually wants to have serious negotiations at this point in time or is just looking to win a p.r. battle with Israel. If it’s the latter, then setting preconditions makes sense since it highlights Israeli settlement activity, which is already being cast in an unfavorable light following the High Court’s Migron decision and the current standoff between the IDF and the prime minister’s office over the Beit Hamachpela group in Hebron. If the objective is to actually negotiate though, Abbas and Erekat need to wake up to the fact that setting preconditions is a terrible negotiating strategy that is fated to fail from the start.

Honesty About the Settlers In Hebron

April 2, 2012 § Leave a comment

There is nothing at all positive to say about the news that Netanyahu has asked Barak to delay implementing an IDF order to evacuate the settlers who moved into a house across from the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron. The settlers appear to have legally bought the building from its Palestinian owner (although it was done through a front man so that the owner would not know that it was being bought by Jews, which is a sad commentary on both sides) and then moved in without the proper permits, and were ordered to leave by the IDF so as not to disturb public order. Bibi then asked Barak not to enforce the army’s order, but that request has apparently been rejected.

It’s important to be up front about what is going on here. There cannot be a policy of settlers and their supporters cheering on the IDF when it makes determinations in the name of national security about the route of the security fence, or decides where Palestinians can or cannot travel within the West Bank, or enforces a West Bank closure during Jewish holidays, but then slamming the IDF when it uses the same security rationale on settlers. If it is the job of the IDF to keep the general peace in the areas under military occupation, then its decisions cannot be questioned only when they apply to one side but not to the other.

It is also crucial to recognize that the settlers in Hebron, or Migron for that matter, are not there because of cheap housing, government subsidies, or a desire to live in proximity to Jerusalem. They are also not living in large towns over the Green Line that everyone presumes will become part of Israel proper in an eventual deal with the Palestinians. The argument about applying patience and understanding with these types of non-ideological settlers – one which I understand and sympathize with – does not apply in any way, shape, or form to the 500 folks who decide to live in Hebron for purely ideological and religious reasons. I have been to Hebron and visited the homes of the settlers who live there, and they are true believers in every sense of the word. They do not live there for economic reasons or because the government made it easy for them to do so. They live there because they fervently believe in the righteousness of their cause, which is ensuring that there is a Jewish presence throughout the entire biblical land of Israel, and particularly in Hebron, which is the holiest city in Judaism outside of Jerusalem. There is no logical argument that can possibly be made justifying their presence there on security grounds, and they do not intend to vacate when asked, nor do they make any pretenses of hiding their abhorrence at the idea of an independent Palestinian state.

Now, they are certainly entitled to their opinions and their views, and they have the right to espouse them as loudly as anyone else. But when Netanyahu attempts to delay a military order that was issued in order to avoid a messy situation that might easily degenerate into violence, let’s not pretend that it has anything to do with Israel’s legitimate security needs or the lack of a true Palestinian partner for peace. There are many good reasons why Israel cannot pick up and immediately leave the West Bank, and even though I think this needs to happen as soon as possible, I am all too familiar with the real security concerns presented by the Palestinian response following the Gaza disengagement. The group of settlers in Hebron, however, is well outside the realm of real security concerns. They recognize the danger of being there, and yet they remain despite the danger they create for others by doing so. Their presence there is on purely ideological grounds and has nothing to do with Israel’s defense. So when Netanyahu puts forth his litany of reasons for why Israel cannot leave the West Bank, remember that none of those reasons apply when he asks his defense minister to contravene an army order that was issued to prevent a possible conflagration in Hebron. This is craven politics, pure and simple, and like I wrote about Migron, nothing good can possibly come out of this. It just reinforces what an intractable situation Israel has gotten itself into, and how difficult it is going to be to eventually reach a negotiated peace agreement.

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