All Politics Are Local
March 15, 2012 § 2 Comments
It seems irresponsible to write a blog about Israel without at all addressing the biggest question regarding Israel these days, which is of course whether or not Israel is going to launch an attack on Iran. I will leave the wisdom of such a move for another post, but examining what is going on in Israeli domestic politics yields conflicting answers as to whether or not it is going to happen.
Aluf Benn argues in today’s Haaretz that Netanyahu is preparing Israelis for war by trying to convince them that attacking Iranian nuclear sites is the only way to prevent another Holocaust and that Israel is capable enough to do the job on its own. Certainly Netanyahu’s AIPAC speech was in the same vein, with its exhortation that Israel cannot afford to wait much longer and cannot depend on other states to guarantee its security. The fact that Bibi and Ehud Barak – according to various reporting the two most vocal proponents of an attack – appear to be freezing out the rest of the Security Cabinet while making decisions on how to respond to rockets from Gaza does not bode well for any restraint on Iran down the road. There is a speculation that Netanyahu is simply bluffing in an effort to get the U.S. to bomb Iran on its own and thus ensure that the job is done well while blunting any international condemnation that will rain down on Israel should it go alone, but to paraphrase Jeffrey Goldberg, such a gambit would make Netanyahu the favorite to win next year’s World Series of Poker main event.
On the other hand, Daniel Levy makes a strong argument that Israel will not attack Iran because Bibi’s history shows him to be risk-averse, likely to avoid military confrontation, and bombing Iran risks Netanyahu’s high popularity should the mission go wrong. Opinion polls indicate that there is not a majority of Israelis in favor of an attack, and Bibi does not want to endanger a third term, particularly if he decides to capitalize on his current status and call early Knesset elections. Furthermore, Levy points out that the Netanyahu coalition is based on expanding Israel’s hold over the West Bank, not getting into a war with Iran. It is also striking that very little has been done from a civil defense perspective to prepare for retaliations from Iran or Hizballah in the event of an Israeli raid. Matan Vilnai, the cabinet minister in charge of civil defense abruptly resigned in February to become the new ambassador to China, homefront drills have been canceled due to budget shortfalls, and gas masks have not been nationally distributed nor have bomb shelters been designated. In short, aside from a lot of overheated rhetoric, Israel does not appear to be a country busily preparing itself for war and the various repercussions that might accrue.
So what’s going on here? Option A is that Bibi is incompetent and rushing into a war without making the vital preparations first, but that does not ring true to me. I think Option B is the answer: Bibi wants someone to take out Iranian nuclear sites but does not want to be the one to do it, and this is all one enormous act for the benefit of the U.S. and other international players. It’s a variation on Richard Nixon’s Madman Theory, or an example of Robert Putnam’s two-level game, in which Netanyahu commits himself domestically to war so that he can then turn to Obama and say that his hands are tied unless the U.S. does the dirty work for him. The question that now bears watching is whether it will work.
What Is Iran’s Future In Gaza?
March 14, 2012 § Leave a comment
In a special Knesset session today called specifically to focus on “the political, economic, and social failures of Netanyahu’s government” the PM asserted that “Gaza is Iran” and blamed those who supported the 2005 disengagement from Gaza for allowing Iran a foothold right on Israel’s border. For those not following terribly closely, the implication is that Hamas is Iran’s close ally and allowing Iranian agents to operate in Gaza with impunity. However, as Jonathan Schanzer makes clear over at Foreign Policy, while Iran is most likely behind the recent spate of rocket fire, the Iranians are working at cross-purposes with Hamas this time around. Schanzer argues that Hamas desperately wants to avoid a war given its leadership’s exit from Syria and newly shaky position, and indeed senior Hamas leaders have explicitly committed themselves to stay out of any war between Israel and Iran. For the first time since joining forces, Iran and Hamas appear to have different interests and it is causing a real split.
This view strikes me as correct, but the interesting question is whether this is only a short-term shift or whether the Hamas-Iran de facto alliance is over for good. Hamas’s relationship with Iran was born out of necessity; it did not have the backing of secular Sunni dictators like Hosni Mubarak, and so it was not going to eschew the backing of an Islamic regime that was a sworn enemy of Israel, even if Iran was a Shia state. Iranian backing allowed Hamas’s leaders to set up shop in Damascus under the protection of Iranian proxy Bashar al-Assad, and Iran has bankrolled Hamas for over a decade. It is unclear whether Hamas can afford to pay any of its employees in Gaza if Iran withdraws its financial support, and so despite the current rift Hamas might eventually have to come to terms with the fact that it can’t live without Iran and go back to being more compliant with its wishes.
On the other hand, the Arab Spring and the ascension of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt means that Hamas is no longer as politically isolated as it once was. Hamas leaders have already moved on to Cairo and Doha, and it is no stretch to think that their money problems might soon be solved by more friendly Sunni governments. More importantly, Iran’s pitting of Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Resistance Committees against Hamas is destined to drive Hamas farther away from Iran rather than intimidating them into returning to the fold. The same folks who had no problem throwing Fatah members off the roofs of 15 story buildings are unlikely to be squeamish against cracking down on PIJ and PRC fighters when push comes to shove (pun intended). Hamas is in a better position geopolitically than it was when it needed to rely on Iranian largesse, and this spat might signal a permanent split.
My guess is that the latter position is the correct one, and that Hamas is going to permanently move away from Iran, even once events in Syria are sorted out, and into the orbit of similarly minded Sunni Islamist governments. Hamas is no longer so desperate as to accept help from just anyone, and wants to permanently disassociate itself from unpopular governments now that one of the main lessons of the Arab Spring is that Arab public opinion matters. Keep this in mind when hearing Israeli politicians or Middle East analysts link Iran and Hamas together in Gaza. Each presents a unique set of challenges in its own right, and while the connection between the two was strong for a decade, it is likely soon to come to a close.
