The Case Against Presidential Systems, Egypt Edition

November 30, 2012 § Leave a comment

The current constitutional crisis in Egypt pitting President Morsi against the secularists and the courts has been dominating the news, and it got me thinking about how in some ways Egypt’s transition was set back irrespective of who won the presidential election just by dint of the fact that Egypt kept its presidential system in the first place. I wrote about it for the Atlantic, and here is a teaser:

As the battle lines, both literal and figurative, take shape between the Muslim Brotherhood on one side and secularists and liberals on the other, some are pointing out the naïveté of those who assumed that the Muslim Brotherhood would ever act democratically, while others are trying to locate Morsi’s actions in the context of overreaching in an effort to save Egyptian democracy. While Morsi’s motives will continue to be debated, his actions illuminate a larger question about what happens when you mix a presidential system with a fragile transitional state.

Presidential systems have their pros and cons, and both of these are enhanced when dealing with a state that has weak political institutions and a history of conflict. On the one hand, because a president is directly elected, he can be viewed as a unifying figure who stands above politics and is concerned with the good of the nation as a whole. If the president is seen as a credible and non-partisan figure who is directly accountable to voters in a way that parliaments are not, then a president can help paper over divisions that exist in society and within the political class. One of the reasons that George Washington was viewed with such awe by his contemporaries is precisely because he was seen as a figure above politics, and as such he was uniquely able to heal divisions that had been exposed by the American revolution and set the United States on the path to democracy.

Yet a presidential system also carries with it significant dangers for transitional states. A president is bound to come from one of the groups vying for power, and he can be expected to privilege that group above the rest. When this happens, it fractures a country and worsens any divisions that already exist, as the conflict now involves the institutions of the state as well, and it generally destroys any real chance for democracy to take root. In a polarized society, a presidential system might also create a problem of dual democratic legitimacy, where some people turn to the president for leadership and others turn to the parliament or the courts, fostering ever greater splits in a country already segmented into distinct groups.

To read the whole thing and find out why I think this applies particularly well to Egypt and Morsi, please click over to the full piece at The Atlantic.

This Is Not A Recipe For Hamas Moderation

April 20, 2012 § Leave a comment

Top Hamas official Mousa Abu Marzouk gave an interview to the Forward – and the more I read that sentence, the funnier it seems – in which he staked out a number of hardline positions to the right of his rival Khaled Meshaal. Most importantly, he said that any agreement between the Palestinian Authority and Israel will be considered a temporary hudna rather than a permanent peace treaty once Hamas is in power, and that he and his organization would feel free to unilaterally modify any deals that were previously struck. He also reiterated his position that Hamas would never recognize Israel, nor will it accept the Quartet’s conditions for negotiations. None of this, of course, is at all surprising.

While there will undoubtedly be much ink spilled over the fact that Abu Marzouk is pushing for a hudna rather than eternal armed conflict, the contents of the interview do not provide cause for optimism. Abu Marzouk implied that a temporary truce would not be a confidence building measure leading toward negotiations but an opportunity for Hamas to build up its capabilities without being hassled. He also scorned the idea that armed resistance should be abandoned in favor of mass non-violent resistance, and gave conflicting signals over the issue of killing civilians, defending past attacks on Israelis but then saying that targeting civilians is not Hamas policy. In addition, he disavowed the notion that Jews everywhere are responsible for anything that Israel does and tacitly acknowledged the Holocaust (“If you look carefully at what happened to the Jews in Moscow or Madrid, in Spain or in Germany or Poland, that’s very bad…. Anyone who historically his father or grandfather did something like that [to the Jews], he should be ashamed.”).

Evidence of moderation on targeting civilians, absence of Holocaust denial, giving an interview to a Jewish newspaper…I’m not really buying it. This interview is a classic example of Abu Marzouk saying a bunch of things to appeal to a Western audience without giving in on the important stuff. The only question that actually matters is whether Hamas will honor PA agreements, because given the attempt at a unity deal between it and Fatah and the possibility that it may one day soon control the PA, Hamas has to be trusted to make credible commitments. If Abu Marzouk is to be believed, Hamas cannot be trusted on that score. Netanyahu gets plenty of flack for not actually wanting to negotiate a deal that the Palestinians will be able to accept, but with all of the Fatah infighting and now a clear statement from one of Hamas’s top three officials that it won’t abide by any deals anyway, what’s the point of the entire peace process exercise? I think that Israel needs to get out of the West Bank and establish a Palestinian state, but it is madness to think that it is only the Israeli side that is obstructing such an outcome.

Meshaal’s position as political director is not assured, and Abu Marzouk’s tacking to the right on the question of accepting a permanent treaty – something that Meshaal has said he is willing to do following a Palestinian referendum – has got to be seen as campaign maneuvering. Nobody really knows what is going on in Hamas internal politics and what the Shura Council’s members are thinking, but to give an interview like this that is designed to attract attention from a number of distinct audiences says a couple of things. First, Abu Marzouk thinks that Meshaal is playing to public opinion with his embrace of the Arab Spring rather than worrying about the Shura Council, which is the only audience that matters in terms of deciding who is going to lead Hamas. His staking out positions that conflict with Meshaal’s is deliberate, and he must suspect that a more hardline position is going to be popular with the folks who matter. Second, he thinks that he stands a good chance of beating Meshaal and is already looking ahead to convincing Western audiences that he should not be shunned, which explains his position on Jews vs. Israelis and sympathy for Holocaust (and pogrom and Inquisition) victims. Expressing moderation on those issues is not going to win him accolades with Hamas’s leadership or rank and file, and I suspect that giving an interview to the Forward falls under the same category, and the only reason for someone like Abu Marzouk to try to curry favor with Westerners is because he plans on dealing with them in the future.

Assuming that Abu Marzouk’s thinking is correct and that a harder line is going to be more popular, it is also not going to do any wonders for Hamas’s alleged moderation. Just like in presidential primaries, a hardline position will bring everyone else along, including Meshaal. Hamas is not moderate or accommodationist, and there are plenty of good reasons to doubt that it will ever follow Fatah’s path in recognizing Israel, but at least it has been relatively quiet militarily lately. Abu Marzouk is not advocating in this interview for an immediate resumption of unrelenting hostilities as he thinks that a hudna is a good idea, but the rejection of a permanent peace treaty at any point and no matter the circumstance is designed to send the message that at the end of the day, Hamas is a military organization. This not so subtle reminder can only push Hamas toward its most extreme tendencies, and signals that Hamas’s version of Salam Fayyad is nowhere on the horizon.

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