February 23, 2017 § 1 Comment
Everyone will recall the debate that unfolded during the 2016 presidential campaign over how to treat Donald Trump’s utterances on various policy issues. His detractors were increasingly alarmed by the ideas that spilled forth from his lips at rallies, many of which seemed to be blurted out without much thought into their wisdom or the details of their implementation. Build a wall and make Mexico pay for it; ban Muslims from coming into the country; slap a tariff on American companies making products overseas. His defenders exhorted those who were panicking at what seemed to be a litany of questionable proposals to stop taking Trump literally, and instead to take him seriously. So, for instance, when Trump threatened to punitively tax companies that were moving jobs overseas, the interpretation was supposed to be not that he would follow through, but that he was serious about finding a way to increase domestic job growth. It turns out, however, that taking Trump literally was not as silly as his campaign surrogates suggested, and that his words do indeed provide a guide for where he will initially land on policy. So applying this frame, what does it mean in the Israel context?
Largely forgotten alongside his more famous comments about wanting to make the “ultimate deal” between Israelis and Palestinians is that early in his campaign, Trump actually laid out a precise roadmap for how he was going to approach Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In some of his first comments on Israel during an interview with the Associated Press in December 2015, Trump refused to be pinned down on a host of specific Israel-related issues, which in itself was a strategy. But he did say enough to make it easier to predict what he is going to do going forward, and figure out how it meshes with his comments during the joint press conference with Prime Minister Netanyahu last Wednesday.
Talking to the AP before the first primary votes had been cast, Trump said that the first thing he was going to do was sit down with leaders in the region to gauge not only their feelings about the contours of a deal and whether it is workable, but also to test their commitment to peace. He said that “I’ll be able to tell in one sit-down meeting with the real leaders” what is possible, and that he would know for sure within six months of taking office. He also said that he was not convinced that either Israel or the Palestinians were serious about an agreement and that he had greater concerns about one of the sides, but refused to say which side. He did, however, very clearly place the burden of resolving the situation on Israel; “A lot will have to do with Israel and whether or not Israel wants to make the deal — whether or not Israel’s willing to sacrifice certain things. They may not be, and I understand that, and I’m OK with that. But then you’re just not going to have a deal.” He also, in what is now a familiar refrain, would not commit to moving the embassy, would not refer to Jerusalem as Israel’s undivided capital, called settlements “a huge sticking point,” and would not commit to a two-state solution so as not to prejudice negotiations ahead of time. On whether he would want to dive into Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as president, he said, “I think if I get elected, that would be something I’d really like to do. Because so much death, so much turmoil, so much hatred — that would be to me a great achievement. As a single achievement, that would be a really great achievement.”
The Trump playbook so far has followed the literal script he laid out before the politics of the campaign forced him to adopt more traditionally hawkish positions. The first thing he said he would do was talk with regional leaders. Not only did he sit down with Netanyahu early on, he also sat down with Jordan’s King Abdullah, spoke with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and White House aides have been making the rounds of Arab ambassadors in Washington. He said that the burden would be on Israel to resolve the situation, and lo and behold he stood next to Netanyahu and warned him that both sides would have to compromise and again alluded to settlements being a sticking point in asking the prime minister to hold off on them for awhile. If we take Trump literally as we should, it means that he is going to make a very heavy early push on getting the two sides together, and will lean on Israel to stop taking actions in the short term that make a negotiated solution more difficult.
In this light, Trump’s pronunciations at last week’s press conference should not have come as a surprise. His infamous “I’m looking at two state and one state, and I like the one that both parties like” is not a declaration of policy. It is a declaration of tactics. Similarly, his repeated characterization of settlements as problematic in some limited way, in the AP interview and in the White House statement following Netanyahu’s announcement of new construction and then in his request of Netanyahu to “hold back on settlements for a little bit” is not a policy position but a tactical position. Trump wants to get to a deal and he doesn’t terribly care what is in it, so his primary strategy is to not get pinned down on any specific variable. He will focus on the tangible things, like Palestinian incitement and Israeli settlements, that each side points to as a specific barrier, and he will ignore what the actual end result will look like.
It is important, however, not to ignore the other part of the equation that is clear from Trump’s words. He wants to get a deal, and he thinks the burden is on the Israelis to do the heavy lifting, but he also does not want to waste his time on a drawn out process and has no interest in convincing a party that does not want to be convinced. Contrary to President Obama and Secretary Kerry, he is not going to keep going back to the well if he is not able to work out an agreement in his first year in office, and he is not going to pressure Israel into changing its mind if it is unwilling at first to sacrifice in the ways that he asks. What the larger consequences of that may be for either Israel or the Palestinians are unknown, but if there is one thing that we know so far about this president, it is that he is deeply transactional. Understanding Israel’s reluctance to take certain steps is not the same as giving Israel free rein on every issue without fear of blowback for that reluctance. Hopefully Netanyahu is wise enough to take his new American partner both literally and seriously.
February 15, 2017 § Leave a comment
After spending his entire tenure as prime minister chafing under the strictures placed upon him by Democratic presidents, Prime Minister Netanyahu finally gets his wish today: his first face-to-face Oval Office meeting with a Republican president. And not just any Republican president, but President Trump – the man the Israeli right has hailed as a savior from the day he was elected and upon whom they have placed their hopes and dreams. There is no question that Netanyahu is looking for a vastly different relationship with the current president than he had with the previous one, and also no question that both men will emerge from their meeting with ear-to-ear grins and acting like best friends, irrespective of whether the meeting warrants it or not. There are some obvious reasons for this, from the fact that both men lead right of center parties and are broadly ideologically similar to the simple desire to get off on the right foot. The current moment, however, also provides some more detailed and specific reasons for the two men to avoid disagreements, and provides some guide as to what they are likely to discuss, what they are likely to avoid, and what they should discuss if they want to keep the relationship on an even keel.
What Trump needs out of this meeting is simple. He is being buffeted on all sides with headache-inducing crises, be it the North Korean ballistic missile test, the resignation after only twenty four days of his national security adviser Mike Flynn beneath a cloud of allegations of his being compromised by Russia, or questions over the basic competence level of his senior aides and his continuing inability to staff the government beneath the cabinet level. Trump also has clearly not yet formulated a coherent policy on Israel, with different advisers pulling him in different directions and his own thoughts apparently still unsettled. Whether it be the embassy move or the role of settlements in preventing Israeli-Palestinian peace, Trump’s positions from the campaign have shifted, and in the case of settlements they have subtly shifted between the statement issued by Sean Spicer two weeks ago and Trump’s interview with Yisrael HaYom on Friday. What Trump needs while he is sorting through everything else in the Middle East is regional stability, not having Israel as a constant issue to manage, and above all no surprises. For now, he wants Israel to be something that he doesn’t have to think about or worry about, since if that wish is fulfilled, it will be just about the only issue that clears that bar.
What Netanyahu needs out of this meeting is even simpler. He arrives in Washington in the midst of the biggest threat he has ever faced to his tenure as prime minister, namely the four separate investigations being carried out into various allegations of corruption and improper behavior. Should he be indicted, as most Israeli analysts and journalists expect, he will be under enormous pressure to resign, and only the complete and unbroken support from every member of his coalition will keep him in office. Even if none of the four investigations end with an indictment, Netanyahu is still in a precarious position, down in the polls to Yair Lapid and under constant demand from his Bayit Yehudi coalition members and many of his Likud coalition members to definitively reject the two-state solution, support annexation of Ma’ale Adumim and perhaps even larger parts of the West Bank, and to completely alter the paradigm with the Palestinians under which Israel has operated. None of these are things that Netanyahu has ever particularly appeared or appears now to want to do, but he is in danger of being swallowed up by the Israeli right, for whom ideological purity tests are increasingly important. More than any specific policy victory or understanding with Trump, Netanyahu needs something that will help his domestic standing back home, and the only thing that can provide that is a black hole in which no daylight between the U.S. and Israel escapes. Netanyahu was reportedly able to mollify Naftali Bennett and other cabinet members before his departure from Israel by appealing to his stewardship of the U.S.-Israel relationship, which is truly an Israeli existential issue, and he has to return home with an unambiguous demonstration of his ability – and his ability alone – to keep that relationship unbreakable. Netanyahu does not need a green light to build in the West Bank or a commitment to move the embassy or a vow to tear up the Iran deal. What he needs is no hint, no sign, and no leak of even the slightest public or private disagreement with Trump on anything.
In theory, this should be an easy plan for Trump and Netanyahu to execute. The problem is that Netanyahu is dealing with a president whom he expects to be an easier interlocutor than President Obama, but one who is unpredictable and unprepared to an unprecedented degree. Netanyahu cannot be sure what Trump will say, whether what he says can be trusted as an accurate predictor of what policies he will actually pursue down the road, to what extent Israel should rely on Trump’s assurance on various issues for its own policy planning purposes, and whether Trump has even devoted any real attention to planning for the conversation given that his national security adviser will have been replaced less than 48 hours earlier.
Given all of this, the one topic that is guaranteed to be on the agenda is Iran. As my colleague Ilan Goldenberg ably laid out earlier this week in his own preview of the meeting, Trump and Netanyahu have both focused on vigorously holding Iran to task and calling Iran out on its destabilizing actions in the region. It is unlikely that even Netanyahu is sticking to a position that the Iran deal needs to be scrapped, and both men might hold the view that even if the deal should be torn up, there are ways to make Iran be the actor that abrogates it through additional sanctions and testing the boundaries of Iran’s breaking point much as Iran has done since the JCPOA was implemented.
What both leaders want to avoid is any robust discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, settlements, or the two-state solution. Whatever Trump’s positions end up being, they are not going to be the positions pushed by Bennett and the annexation caucus, and Netanyahu cannot politically afford right now to publicly endorse two states. Neither Trump nor Netanyahu wants to start things off with a fight over where Israel will and will not build, and so my hunch is that they will both try and avoid any related subjects to the greatest possible extent.
There are two issues, however, that Trump and Netanyahu should discuss whether they want to or not in an effort to avoid any surprises or misunderstandings down the road. The first is Gaza, where Hamas’s newly installed leader Yahya Sinwar is far more hardline and confrontational than his predecessor Ismail Haniya and may be more willing to break the uneasy quiet that has largely held for two and a half years. It would be wise of the president and the prime minister to discuss how far Israel is willing to go in Gaza when the next war breaks out, what the plan is to deal with any wider regional fallout, and how the U.S. would like to manage a coordinated response with Israel and Egypt. This does not have to be a difficult conversation, and both men may be precisely on the same page, but it is easier to do it now than when the rockets start falling on Tel Aviv and the world is up in arms over civilian casualties in the Gaza war zone. The second issue is Syria, where Trump and Netanyahu may not be on the same page but cannot afford to let any differences of opinion fester. Rhetorically at least, Trump wants to make fighting ISIS in Syria a priority, which will be difficult to do while squaring completely with Israel’s objectives of maintaining its own freedom of movement against Hizballah weapons convoys and not allowing any long-term Iranian presence in Syria. If there will be disagreements on these issues, they should be dealt with up front and in private since any public blow up later will be far worse.
Today’s meeting will be the first of many, and we may not have any greater clarity after it has concluded than we do right now. Many assume that Trump and Netanyahu will set a new standard for the relationship between an American president and Israeli prime minister, but no matter what their personal relationship turns out to be, there is going to be friction over policy issues big and small. The most important question going forward will not be why and where there are disagreements, but how the two men manage them.
December 27, 2016 § 16 Comments
In the wake of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334, there are two points that need to be emphasized. The first has to do with the resolution itself, the second with how we got here and where it will lead. Both are important, and it is impossible to completely understand either in isolation.
Point one is that UNSCR 2334 is a deeply flawed resolution that should not have passed and that will only make matters worse. This is not because Israel should get the benefit of an American veto no matter what it does, or because settlements are little more than a distraction from the real issues. It is because this particular resolution laid out a line regarding settlements that the overwhelming majority of Israelis do not and cannot accept, treating the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and Amona as one and the same. It is because it made absolutely no mention of the fact that one of the two territories that will make up a Palestinian state is controlled by a terrorist group that poses a far larger obstacle to a permanent solution than any single Israeli settlement. It is because it betrayed a complete and total misunderstanding of the state of Israeli politics and created an immediate incentive for this Israeli government to build anywhere it wants with total abandon. It is because it provided succor to the BDS movement, which is not interested in altering Israeli behavior but in altering Israel itself. It is because it offended Jews across the globe by treating Judaism’s holiest site as occupied territory. To put it bluntly, when expanding the Western Wall plaza is deemed an illegal and illegitimate act of an occupying power, something has gone way off the rails. That this resolution was more balanced than previous ones does not make it objectively balanced, and to assert that anyone who opposes it is ipso facto a shill for settlements misses the reasons why it is problematic.
Contrary to many people whom I respect who have argued that this will be the first step in halting Israeli settlement activity and putting the two-state solution on a firmer footing, I believe the opposite will be the case. By not adopting a policy that distinguishes between settlements, the incentives now run the wrong way. This is an Israeli government that is ideologically committed to building in the West Bank, but were the United States and the broader international community to institute a system by which Israel could build unfettered within the blocs – contingent upon Israel laying down hard borders defining the blocs absolutely – in return for a complete and total freeze outside of them, it would do more to enshrine two states than any UN resolution or sanction could possibly accomplish. The plan from Commanders for Israel’s Security to complete the security barrier and freeze all construction to its east is as wise a policy as exists. If such an understanding were reached and Israel violated it, I would be all for coming down on the Israeli government like a ton of bricks.
Instead, the net effect of what this resolution actually did is to convince Israelis that the world is out to get them no matter what they do, and provide a fresh tailwind to hardline efforts led by Habayit Hayehudi and much of Likud to annex Area C outright. After all, if Gilo and Alon Shvut are no different than Ofra, why bother to make any distinctions at all and suffer a domestic political cost? The countdown has now officially started not only toward a serious push to annex much of the West Bank, but also toward Israel building in previously untouchable places like E-1 and Givat Hamatos. Once that happens, we really will have crossed the Rubicon absent an enormous upheaval. The passage of this resolution makes that crossing a lot closer than it was before Friday.
Point two is that you can inveigh against President Obama all you want, but the one who actually owns this debacle is Prime Minister Netanyahu. If you truly want to be upset at someone, direct your ire at him. When he says that Israel had a commitment from the U.S. for diplomatic protection, he is right, but he entirely elides the reality that this is not a blank check that exists in perpetuity irrespective of changed circumstances. Let’s leave aside for a moment the terribly inconvenient fact that before Friday, Obama was the first post-1967 U.S. president to never allow a resolution targeting Israel to get through the Security Council, making the claims of this being unprecedented utter tripe. When Obama vetoed a similar resolution in 2011, it was before Netanyahu publicly said that there would be no Palestinian state on his watch; before Netanyahu created a governing coalition comprised of a majority of MKs who are on record as opposing two states; and before Netanyahu rhetorically supported and voted for a Knesset bill legalizing illegal West Bank construction that his own attorney-general denounced as violating both Israeli and international law. In Netanyahu’s estimation, is there any line at all that he could cross that would nullify an American commitment to wield its veto on Israel’s behalf? The extremely flawed resolution itself now allows Netanyahu to issue jeremiads against those who would try and remove a Jewish connection to the Western Wall, but it is not Israel’s presence in the Jewish Quarter that led to this move at the UN. Netanyahu brought his country to this point, either never believing the myriad warning signs he received or knowing that this was coming and thinking that it did not matter. Either way, it gives him the ignominious distinction of presiding over a disastrous diplomatic failure that was entirely predictable and entirely avoidable.
Furthermore, this episode reveals the hollowness of Netanyahu’s arguments about Israel’s place in the world. After spending years touting lines about Israel never being less isolated, how the world cares about Israeli high tech to the exclusion of anything it does in the West Bank, and that mutual interests over countering Iran and fighting Islamist terrorism make the conflict with the Palestinians irrelevant, it turns out that the joke is on the prime minister. Look at the countries that voted in favor of this resolution – not abstained like the U.S. did, but actually voted in favor. Egypt, which is supposed to be Israel’s close regional ally and a country about which we are told that fighting ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood together with Israel outweighs everything else. Great Britain, which under the Conservative leadership of Theresa May was supposed to be Israel’s great supporter in Europe. Russia, which allegedly cares more about purchasing Israeli drones than about anything Israel is doing with regard to two states. China, which also supposedly does not care about the Palestinians but only wants to increase trade ties with Israel and benefit from Israeli ingenuity. All 14 countries that cast votes on Friday cast them the same way. All of these countries, counted upon as some of Israel’s closest relations, stated loudly and clearly that they will not compartmentalize settlements and Palestinian issues from their larger dealings with Israel. That is a fact, and no amount of Netanyahu spin about Start-Up Nation and desalination plants can change that.
Netanyahu’s statement on Sunday calling the vote “the swan song of the old world” and heralding a new era in which a heavy price will be exacted by Israel against countries that oppose its policies could not possibly be more obtuse. You have to seriously lack a semblance of self-awareness to issue a statement like that. This is not a blip on the radar, and it will not be an isolated event should Israel continue down its current path. As rightly proud as Israelis and many American Jews are of Israel’s economic successes and military strength, it is not a world power and it cannot afford to behave like one. Threatening countries like Senegal and Ukraine while studiously avoiding eye contact with China and Russia is the hallmark of a paper tiger, and does not make Israel look any stronger coming out of this episode.
The Israeli government simply cannot have it both ways. Either you get to do what you like, the rest of the world be damned, but you accept the consequences of your actions, or you recognize that no action is taken in isolation and you change your behavior to avoid the consequences even if your principles dictate otherwise. Netanyahu has to choose which road he wants to tread. The choice seems like an obvious one to me, but even for those who disagree, do not make the mistake of thinking that Netanyahu and Israel do not have to choose. Be angry about the UN’s moral bankruptcy and be frustrated with the Obama administration’s myopic decision making; I share those sentiments. But no matter what, if you take one thing away from UNSCR 2334, it must be that the mantra of “settlements don’t matter” is an apocryphal myth. In the real world, actions have consequences.
December 8, 2016 § 5 Comments
The Regulation Bill, which aims to legalize thousands of homes in the West Bank built on private Palestinian land and that passed a preliminary reading in the Knesset on Monday and a first reading yesterday, is a disaster for more reasons than I can list in one place. But that’s no excuse not to try. So (deep breath):
To start with the glaringly obvious, legalizing thousands of homes inside existing recognized settlements and legalizing fifty-five illegal outposts makes a permanent status agreement resulting in a two-state solution farther away than it has been at any time since before Oslo. It hardens Israel’s presence in the West Bank to a degree that makes it impossible to envision a withdrawal of civilians that will not result in violence and bloodshed or exact a crushing emotional toll. Given the location of these outposts, it also enormously complicates what is the best way in the current environment to create a de facto two-state solution on the ground – namely, the plan from Commanders for Israel’s Security to freeze expansion east of the security barrier and renounce any claims to Israeli sovereignty in that territory. Should it pass and become law, the Regulation Bill not only makes negotiations down the road that much harder, it eviscerates Israel’s own unilateral options. It is self-binding in the worst sort of way, since it does not do anything productive in deterring an enemy or reassuring an ally – which is the purpose of the self-binding contained in the North Atlantic Treaty, for instance – but instead creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of doom for Israel’s future. You need to have zero regard for your political successors or for your own political independence to take an action that boxes you in like this to one and only one trajectory going forward.
The bill also puts the lie to long-standing Israeli claims about settlements. Prime Minister Netanyahu gives no quarter in claiming that settlements are in no way the issue in preventing Israeli-Palestinian peace. He instead argues that they are a smokescreen that the other side hides behind to mask its refusal to accept Israel’s legitimacy. Netanyahu has also gotten lots of mileage from his claim that Israel has not authorized any new settlements on his watch, relying on the fact that most outside observers do not know how illegal settlement activity has proliferated. But that rhetorical flight of fancy is now gone for good. Plenty of people, myself included, have never seen settlements as the core issue behind the conflict, but recognize that they are in fact an enormous obstacle and not anything that can be blithely dismissed as insignificant. When you throw any and all restraint to the wind, however, and let settlements swallow up everything else, they become a core issue. Imagine a Palestinian living in Area C whose home is one of the 11,000 structures under a demolition order for having been built without a permit, and he wakes up to see that with a stroke of a pen Israeli homes in the exact same situation are now deemed legal. If you think that his anger is motivated by a desire to drive Tel Avivians into the sea rather than the blatant discrimination and injustice to which he is being directly subjected, you are deluding yourself.
But it is more than just arguing about the role of settlements that is at stake here. I have enormous sympathy for settlers who moved to the West Bank because they were repeatedly encouraged to do so by the government and were provided all sorts of financial incentives to go. They cannot and should not be hung out to dry. Legalizing what was blatantly illegal activity, however, creates a completely different and perverse set of incentives, and accelerates a moral hazard problem that will become impossible to overcome. We are talking about Israelis who moved onto private Palestinian land without permits and without explicit or clear government approval, and even though the bill as drafted only retroactively legalizes the activity if they didn’t know they were building on private land, it now makes everything they did completely consequence-free. There is no reason from now on for anyone to heed the laws or directives of the Israeli government with regard to building in the West Bank, since the precedent has been set that it will be treated as perfectly fine and that someone else will bear the costs. This decimates the rule of law and encourages a wide range of bad behavior that cannot be put back in the box.
The Regulation Bill also reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of what it means to be democratic. A majoritarian theory of democracy, in which leaders and parties that win elections get to do anything they please with no checks and balances, is precisely what political philosophers and creators of longstanding democracies like Great Britain and the United States feared. It is why checks and balances and separation of powers exist. Supporters of this bill seem to think that its almost-certain rejection by the High Court is a sign that the High Court is undemocratic because it is thwarting the will of the people, or that Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit’s determination that the bill is unconstitutional does not matter because nobody elected him. This is precisely how democracies turn into populist non-democracies controlled by demagogues, and supporters of Israel who dismiss this attitude as irrelevant do so at their own peril.
Finally, the legalism being used to justify the Regulation Bill is reaching Orwellian heights, and should not be viewed as anything positive. One of the ironies of the three Soviet constitutions was that they guaranteed a wider range of rights than Western constitutions; if an alien landed on Earth and read the Soviet Union’s constitutional and legal documents, it would assume that the Soviet Union was the most free and liberal country on the planet. For similar reasons, countries in which elections do not matter to the transfer of political power almost all go to great lengths to hold elections and make big shows of how they are respecting the will of the people. A patina of legality is used to legitimize that which is illegitimate. I am not suggesting that Israel is an authoritarian country, and it shares no resemblance to the totalitarian Soviet Union. But the focus on what is narrowly legal – the structures being legalized must have been built with no direct knowledge that they were built on private land, there had to have been implicit or explicit government or municipal support – is designed to make what happens appear as if it is above board. It is not. To seize private land without authorization and pay the landowners compensation whether they are willing to cede their land or not is not legal, full stop. The Israeli High Court does not view it as legal. The Israeli attorney general does not view it as legal. No source of international law views it as legal. Tying it up with a phony legal bow almost makes the entire thing worse.
Make no mistake about what this is. It is not an attempt to right wrongs. It is not an attempt to administer fair and impartial justice. Naftali Bennett, to his credit, has not been cagey but has said what this is proudly and clearly: “The Israeli Knesset shifted from a path to establish a Palestinian state, to a path of extending sovereignty to Judea and Samaria. Let there be no doubt, the Regulation Bill is what will spearhead the extension of [Israeli] sovereignty.” The bill will not pass the High Court and will not become law, but what it says about the current state of political affairs in Israel is as disturbing as anything that has happened since Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination. It is an attempt to radically overhaul Israel’s system of democracy, and that it is playing out in the Knesset does not make it any more democratic.
December 4, 2016 § Leave a comment
I published an op-ed in Ha’aretz today on Keith Ellison’s DNC bid, and why I think the perfect candidate to lead the Democratic Party would be an Ellison who isn’t actually Ellison. The op-ed can be found on Ha’aretz, and the text is reproduced below.
Keith Ellison has a real Israel problem.
Many pro-Israel groups had been skeptical of his candidacy to lead the Democratic National Committee from the start due to concerns over his past affiliation with the Nation of Islam and his criticism of Israel’s use of force in Gaza in response to Hamas rocket attacks.
But the revelation of a 2010 audio clip of Ellison charging that American foreign policy in the Middle East is governed primarily by Israeli interests has significantly complicated Ellison’s efforts to lead the DNC. The Anti-Defamation League, which had initially taken a wait-and-see approach to Ellison, responded to the clip by calling his words “deeply disturbing and disqualifying.” Making the case that Ellison is within the reasonable boundaries of being pro-Israel is far harder now than it was before.
When taking everything into context, the DNC will be better off without having Ellison at its helm.
The Mearsheimerian allegations of Israeli control over American decision making is indeed, as the ADL says, disqualifying, even if Ellison meant it as an example of American Jewish success that American Muslims should seek to emulate. Ellison’s past defense of Louis Farrakhan from charges of anti-Semitism should also not be given a free pass or chalked up simply to youthful indiscretion. It has been evident for decades to anyone with basic comprehension skills that Farrakhan is a repugnant and unapologetic anti-Semite, and defending him personally cannot be waved away as misguided or an error in judgment.
The concerns about Ellison are valid, and given the growing strains within the Democratic Party over Israel, having a figure at the helm who raises alarm bells within mainstream American Jewish organizations is bad for the party and bad for the American Jewish community at large.
There is a tragedy though in how this saga is playing out, because nothing would be better for the pro-Israel cause than having a Keith Ellison at the DNC who is not Keith Ellison. Much has been made about both Ellison’s background and Ellison’s specific statements, but it is only the latter that should sink his DNC bid. Not only should Ellison’s background not disqualify him, it is actually beneficial. That someone like Ellison has worked so hard to be seen as pro-Israel only demonstrates the strength of Israel’s case and shows how support for Israel can remain broadly bipartisan going forward.
Ellison is not a figure whom anyone would normally expect to be a supporter of Israel. He is an African-American Muslim who did not grow up in a particularly Jewish area of the country, came of age after 1967, when Israel’s image as a David began shifting to that of a Goliath, did not have any prominent Jewish mentors, and has a background in radical politics. As a student, he was harshly critical of Zionism and its legitimacy.
Given this biography, one would expect Ellison to be a loud voice in Congress criticizing Israel given every opportunity, and to perhaps even lead an anti-Israel movement akin to what has become common within Britain’s Labour Party.
Yet Ellison unambiguously self-identifies as pro-Israel, supports a two-state solution without reservation, has repeatedly said that Israel has a right to defend itself and expressed the importance of protecting and maintaining Israel’s security, and there is no evidence that he has ever supported or advocated for BDS.
That is not to say that there are not worrisome aspects to Ellison’s record on Israel, from his 2014 vote against emergency Iron Dome funding to his naive misunderstanding of the lengths to which Hamas will go to maintain its arsenal of rockets in Gaza. Nobody will ever accuse him of being Scoop Jackson, and it obliterates the bounds of credulity to suggest that Israel has no better friend.
But the fact is that in supporting two states, in supporting Israel’s right to defend itself, and in rejecting BDS, Ellison falls within a wide pro-Israel tent. That someone with his background embraces these principles is the best case for Israel that Democrats could possibly make. It shows that those who spend time marinating in a toxic anti-Israel stew can be convinced of the importance of supporting Israel through greater exposure and education, and it gives a green light to those who genuinely want to support Israel on most fronts but are uncomfortable with some of its more hawkish policies to not throw the baby out with the bathwater.
In Ellison’s case, this has to be weighed against the parts of the ledger where he disregarded overt and purposeful anti-Semitism and spouted an ugly conspiracy theory about an Israeli veto over American foreign policy, and it should not come out in his favor. But it does not alter the reality that a different Ellison is what Democrats need.
The shifting demographics of the U.S., and particularly those within the Democratic Party, make future bipartisan support for Israel murkier than it has been in decades. The ubiquity of social media that broadcasts every Israeli misstep and the constant news cycle that keeps Israel in the crosshairs are not going away, and they complicate political support for Israel in real ways.
Having someone lead the DNC who embraces Israel despite not being an obvious candidate to do so should be viewed as a strength rather than a weakness. Democrats should be looking for a new Keith Ellison who isn’t actually Keith Ellison.
November 18, 2016 § 1 Comment
Natan Sachs and I argue today in Foreign Affairs that despite the jubilation on the Israeli right at Trump’s election, it actually creates some real political problems for Bibi Netanyahu.
On November 9, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu congratulated President-elect Donald Trump through a video message, in which the Israeli leader could barely contain his giddiness at the prospect of a friendlier White House. The ruling Israeli right-wing coalition, which sees Trump as a potential champion of Greater Israel, believes that the United States’ next president will finally remove any outside constraints on settlement construction in the West Bank or the legalization of already existing settlements built without governmental approval. Settlement-friendly politicians in Israel are already working hard on such moves; on Wednesday, a bill legalizing settlements built on private Palestinian land passed its first reading in the Knesset, despite the objections of the attorney general and a near certain rejection by Israel’s High Court of Justice. Some in Israel even view the next four years as an opportunity to annex the West Bank outright. This is a “tremendous opportunity to announce a renunciation of the idea of founding a Palestinian state in the heart of the land,” Naftali Bennett, leader of the Jewish Home party, stated. “The era of the Palestinian state is over.”
It’s not clear what Trump will do, of course, nor whether he even knows his position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During the campaign, he initially said that he would like to remain a “neutral guy”—a contrast to decades of U.S. policy that his tilted toward Israel—but he later shifted to a more traditional pro-Israel stance. To the delight of the Israeli right, the Republican platform omitted any mention of a two-state solution. And since the election, the co-chairs of Trump’s Israel advisory committee have reiterated controversial statements about Trump moving the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to West Jerusalem. They’ve also said that Trump does not view settlements as an obstacle to peace. At the same time, Trump himself told The Wall Street Journal of his desire to close the “ultimate deal” between Israelis and Palestinians. “As a dealmaker, I’d like to do … the deal that can’t be made,” he said. “And do it for humanity’s sake.”
Despite the myriad conflicting signals, it is reasonable to assume that Netanyahu will now have a freer hand to implement the policies he desires with regard to settlements and negotiations with the Palestinians. Politically speaking, he may no longer have to run the gauntlet between a coalition that demands more building in the West Bank and a White House that insists on less.
But Netanyahu may soon find out that he needs to be careful with what he wishes for. Freedom from U.S. pressure would be a mixed blessing. Rather than solving his problems, it could cost him his political leverage, his ability to play two-level games.
Head over to Foreign Affairs to read the rest of the piece.