Likud’s Young Guns
March 22, 2012 § 2 Comments
There was a good analysis last week by Dimi Reider of what is going on in the Knesset and why there has been so much far-right legislation being floated. He chalks it up to the stability of Likud’s coalition and to the shifting dynamics inside Likud itself that have given rise to a younger and more hardline generation of legislators. Reider portrays Netanyahu as seeking to keep his coalition together above all else, and so he is willing to tolerate domestic policies that are to his right while killing some of the more blatantly anti-democratic proposals.
I couldn’t help but thinking of the parallels to current trends in the Republican Party while reading Reider’s piece. John Boehner is in a similar situation as Speaker, trying to hold together a diverse GOP while being challenged on his right flank by the self-styled Young Guns trio of Eric Cantor, Kevin McCarthy, and Paul Ryan. Both Bibi and Boehner are establishment figures leading conservative parties that have moved even farther to the right, and one gets the sense that both of them are engaged in a delicate balancing act in which they need to placate their younger and more radical colleagues while trying to keep the ship from steering itself off a cliff. In both instances, the younger legislators are concerned with ideological purity and shifting the center of gravity more than compromising on their principles in the name of legislative accomplishments, and this leads to overreach.
One factor that Reider did not touch upon is the war of attrition between Netanyahu and vice premier Silvan Shalom, who are long time rivals and who do not like each other. The two go out of their way to antagonize each other by scheduling conflicting events and trying to embarrass the other through tactical voting on legislation, and Netanyahu even made sure that Shalom’s face was blocked in the official picture from the Cabinet meeting in which the Gilad Shalit deal was approved. While Shalom often comes across in these confrontations as bumbling and hapless, his resentment of Netanyahu is at the boiling point and Bibi cannot afford to make any of the younger MKs unhappy and risk a genuine leadership challenge within Likud.
The upshot of all this is that Likud is going to keep on shifting to the right, particularly on nationalistic matters in the domestic policy arena, and with Kadima destined to lose more than half of its seats in the next election and Likud poised to gain, there does not appear to be any political reason for Likud to moderate. The wild cards are Yair Lapid’s new party and whether Shelley Yachimovich – the first Labor leader in over a decade to appear both competent and uninterested in using her position to become Defense Minister – can revive Labor’s fortunes, but all that is best left for another post.
Really, Israel?
March 21, 2012 § Leave a comment
Is this type of thing really necessary? Raiding East Jerusalem high schools to find kids who were throwing stones (and one look at the picture accompanying this article of the Border Police leaves no doubt as to how little damage stone throwers cause them)? I understand raids into Gaza to catch those who shoot rockets at civilians or attempt to cross the border to kidnap Israeli soldiers, but harassing, intimidating, and arresting unarmed teenagers makes no sense to me at all. This counterproductive bullying is completely pointless from a strategic or security perspective, and it is guaranteed to engender greater resentment of Israel both at home and abroad. It is not going to actually deter Palestinian teenagers from throwing stones, and it is likely to motivate them to move onto genuine violence. And of course the optics of a Christian NGO accompanying Palestinian kids to and from school to protect them from Israeli heavy handedness is wonderful for Israel’s image in the world. Bravo, Israeli Border Police, bravo. Whomever it is that makes the decision to waste time and resources on this should really rethink things.
The AKP’s Kemalism and the Kurds
March 21, 2012 § Leave a comment
When the AKP came to power a decade ago, many believed that it heralded the end of Kemalism now that an Islamist party was running Turkey. Kemalism has always been associated by the outside world with secularism (or perhaps more accurately, laicism) and the prevailing viewpoint was that the AKP would do away with the old Kemalist philosophy. This overlooked the inconvenient fact that dating back to Atatürk and Inönü and throughout the remainder of the 20th century, the CHP and the military only allowed new actors into the political system if they agreed to maintain Kemalism and protect its core tenets, and when this agreement was violated the military was all too willing to step and reset the system back to what it viewed as its natural equilibrium. When Atatürk determined in 1930 that an opposition party was needed in order to channel discontent and provide the CHP with some competition, his only requirement was that it agree to uphold Kemalism. Similarly, when the DP won Turkey’s first free and fair elections in 1950, the party was mocked in some quarters for being a carbon copy of the CHP due to its embrace of Kemalism. All of Turkish political history dictated that the AKP would not be allowed to compete and take over the reins of government in 2002 absent a commitment to at least tacitly maintain Kemalism, and the subsequent decade has revealed this to be the case.
While the AKP has tried to soften enforced secularism at the margins, it has actually embraced other aspects of Kemalism with surprising vigor, particularly nationalism. As one of the six arrows of Kemalism, nationalism was meant to stress Turkish – rather than Ottoman – identity and focused on civic rather than ethnic citizenship as a means of foreclosing nationalist hope for groups such as the Kurds. Every citizen of Turkey was to be considered a Turk irrespective of ethnic background or heritage, and recognizing the Kurdish national movement would violate the Turkification project. Erdoğan and the AKP have taken up the mantle of Turkish nationalism, perhaps as a way to preempt or blunt any criticism that the AKP seeks some type of pan-Islamic arrangement, and this has manifested itself most visibly over the issue of Kurdish autonomy. On Monday I highlighted what I believe to be foolish behavior on the Turkish government’s part with regard to Nevruz celebrations and expressed that it would just lead to an ever larger outpouring of Kurdish demands for autonomy. Naturally, yesterday and today there have been more clashes and injuries and the official Nevruz celebration has been cancelled in Diyarkabır, which has Turkey’s largest Kurdish population. Just as predictably, a PKK bomb exploded outside the AKP office in Diyarbakır, explosives were found in a number of other locations, and four special forces soldiers were killed in clashes with the PKK. Inevitably, the uptick in terrorist violence along with the heavy-handed response of the government to Nevruz festivities and civilian demonstrations will lead to even greater disenchantment among Turkey’s Kurds and a hardening of Turkey’s position on Kurdish autonomy. In many ways, Nevruz is beginning to resemble marching season in Northern Ireland, during which Ulster loyalists inevitably clash with police and violence, chaos, and civilian deaths ensue.
While it appears as if this could all be easily avoided by a more open and honest discussion about the place of Turkey’s Kurds within the state and whether Kurdish autonomy – rather than outright independence – is a feasible compromise, such a discussion is unlikely to occur. Ideological legacies are notoriously difficult to overcome, and Kemalism has thoroughly shaped Turkish politics, society, and discourse for 90 years. If the AKP, a party populated by religiously devout officials that is open about its desire to see some of the secular restrictions loosened on things such as head scarves in government buildings, has only tiptoed at the very edges of challenging secularism, it certainly is not going to tear down the Kemalist wall surrounding nationalism. Ideology is not something that can be easily discarded, and in the case of the Kurds it means that an important rethinking of the Kurdish question is not going to happen. Instead, the government and the PKK will continue their battle, Kurdish political parties will fight with the government over Nevruz observance and whether Kurdish can be spoken in public settings, and an important policy issue that is hampering Turkish political development and society will remain taboo and unresolved.
Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism
March 21, 2012 § 5 Comments
The news that the man responsible for the shootings in Toulouse claims to be a member of al-Qaida and says that killing Jews was his way of avenging the deaths of Palestinian children is bound to set off a fresh round of debate over the distinction between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism and whether the two can be separated or if the former is just a cover for the latter. To be clear, by anti-Zionism I do not mean criticism of Israel but the delegitimization of Israel and the position that it has no right to exist. It’s a really difficult question and something with which I often grapple. On the one hand, it seems from a logical standpoint that the two concepts can be distinct – Jews are a people, Israel is a state, and since the two categories overlap but are not completely parallel, someone who opposes Israel does not necessarily oppose all Jews. Jeff Weintraub has thoughtfully touched on this issue in the past, arguing that an analytical distinction exists despite the fact that those who argue as such are often doing it insincerely. It is well known that there was a genuine split within the Diaspora Jewish community in the early 20th century over the question of Zionism and whether it was a movement that Jews should support. As someone who tries to think through things rationally and logically, I understand this argument and I accept it intellectually even while categorically rejecting anti-Zionism and what it stands for.
And yet. Why is it that the most depraved attacks on Jews now all come under the guise of anti-Zionism? I have no doubt at all that Mohammed Merah hates Jews qua Jews, yet he did not attempt to justify his homicidal actions by referring to classical anti-Semitic tropes but rather by Israel’s behavior toward Palestinians. If we stick with the theme of making logical distinctions and categorizing concepts correctly, in what sphere of logic does it follow that Jewish schoolchildren in France should have to answer for the actions of the Israeli government? Israel defines itself as a Jewish state and thus the argument that a fanatic like Merah makes is that all Jews are to be held responsible when Israel causes Palestinian deaths, but this of course blows up any distinction that exists between Jews and Israel and leaves us back at the conclusion that anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism are one and the same.
It is not entirely fair to let a violent killer like Merah be the spokesperson for the anti-Zionist movement, so moving off him for the moment, there is still an emerging and growing strain of argument that explains away attacks on Jews by referencing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At some point, anti-Zionists need to explain how to resolve this gap – if anti-Zionism is distinct from anti-Semitism, how does anyone ever arrive at the conclusion that non-Israeli Jews are somehow understandably targets of violence? And relatedly, if the argument is that it is Jews’ fault for their association and embrace of Israel, then doesn’t that effectively mean that anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism are different terms describing the same concept? It seems to me that anti-Zionists – even if they genuinely do not believe that their position is an anti-Semitic one and harbor no ill will toward Jews – need to come to grips with the consequences of their stance and deal with the inescapable fact that when people murder or harass Jews in the service of exacting revenge on Israel, anti-Zionism ceases to be a meaningful distinction.
Would love to hear some thoughts on this from both sides.
Tzipi Livni Update
March 20, 2012 § Leave a comment
Well, this is certainly a unique way of attracting voters. I speculated earlier that a Tzipi Livni win or loss will likely herald the end of Kadima and that a Mofaz win might mean Kadima’s absorption into Likud, and now Livni seems to agree with me. Today she unveiled her new slogan “Without Tzipi Livni, there is no Kadima” and argued that Kadima without her is no different than Bibi’s party. It is an interesting tactic to tell Kadima voters that the rest of the party is essentially Likud lite in the hopes that they will vote for her as leader and then vote for a Knesset slate that she herself has denigrated. I’m glad to see though that she and her advisers are clearly reading this blog, and if any other Israeli Knesset candidates want some help coming up with catchy slogans that also yield deep political insights, I am more than happy to oblige.
Ottoman Law and Adverse Possession in the West Bank
March 20, 2012 § 1 Comment
The Israeli Supreme Court issued a ruling today that overturned a law remaining on the books from the Ottoman period allowing settlers to claim ownership of land that they did not previously own if they have farmed it for at least ten years. Law students will immediately recognize the parallel to adverse possession, which is a common law concept relating to property that allows someone who openly, notoriously, and continually possesses someone else’s land to gain ownership of it after a set amount of time (I have blocked most memories of law school from my mind, but I seem to recall seven years as being the minimum). This Supreme Court ruling does away with the use of adverse possession in the West Bank, and it should be applauded for two reasons.
One, there is a distinction to be made between settlers who have used the law to gain possession of farm land and the type of adverse possession law that exists in the U.S. The reasoning behind adverse possession in U.S. common law is that we want to maximize the efficient use of property, and so if the adverse possessor is using the land in a productive manner and the land’s true owner is neglecting it, utility maximization dictates that the person using the land should get to continue to do so legally. There is an important component to this, however, which is that the adverse possessor does so openly and notoriously, which gives the land’s owner adequate notice and opportunity to challenge the adverse possessor. In the West Bank cases, the original Palestinian owners have largely not been afforded the opportunity to evict the settlers farming the land or have been blocked from challenging the settlers in court due to the military’s jurisdiction over the West Bank. Today’s ruling rights what is a clear wrong, and does not allow settlers to, in the words of the court, invade land rather than honestly take it.
Two, that the Israeli Supreme Court stepped in to overturn this law on behalf of Palestinians in the West Bank is an important reminder that Israel is indeed a democracy and even in matters pertaining to the West Bank the rule of law can prevail. The usual caveat applies, which is that Israel’s actions in the West Bank do not befit a democratic state and its use of military law there should be ended as soon as possible. Nevertheless, those who loudly proclaim Israel to be an authoritarian polity across the board are wrong, and today’s decision illustrates that in a meaningful way.
Davutoğlu’s Thoughts on the World
March 20, 2012 § 2 Comments
Ahmet Davutoğlu has a wide-ranging interview in the Cairo Review on a host of topics ranging from Turkey’s strategic interests to its issues with Cyprus and Armenia, and there’s way too much in there to cover comprehensively, but I want to hone in on a few of the more interesting points.
Whatever else one thinks of him, Davutoğlu is an impressive character and his reputation as a thinker is well earned. He speaks on topics with a depth and understanding that is rare for foreign ministers of any stripe. That said, the first thing that jumps out at me is a combination of stubbornness and what I assume is willful naivete. He makes it clear that he believes “zero problems with neighbors” is alive and well despite the numerous assumptions that should have been shattered by the Arab Spring. It is all fine and well to trumpet the desire to have harmonious relationships with everyone and help other states solves their problems, but it is not anything that can be seriously sustained if Turkey is to guard its own interests. This is international relations 101, and Davutoğlu surely knows that its dumping of Assad has guaranteed newly strained relations with Iran, to take one prominent neighbor. Zero problems with neighbors is a nice slogan and might have even worked when the Middle East appeared to be relatively static, but for an ambitious global power like Turkey that is aiming to expand its reach throughout and Middle East and beyond, it is nothing more than hubris to believe that it can revolutionize the way in which states interact. Turkey and Davutoğlu need to publicly and privately come to grips with this fact sooner rather than later.
This might be reading between the lines too much, but it is interesting that in listing Turkey’s interests, Davutoğlu orders them as economic, democratic, and the alliance with Europe and the Atlantic community. I think his prioritization of economic interests is perfectly normal but gives lie to the idea that Turkey is able to dance on the head of a pin when it comes to respecting everyone and forming a set of cooperative and non-confrontational relationships. Some of Turkey’s relations in the region will be characterized as such but others will not, and the foreign minister’s rundown demonstrates that Turkey is actually not so different from everybody else.
Davutoğlu also talks about Turkey consolidating its democracy as its greatest success on the domestic front. Political scientists all know that democratic consolidation is a famously slippery term that can mean all sorts of things from preventing democratic backslide, to moving from electoral to liberal democracy, to improving democratic quality in even highly advanced democracies, but at its heart it implies reaching some sort of democratic threshold that puts a country’s democratic status and liberal qualities beyond reproach. I think that few people outside of Turkey, and certainly no democracy experts, would describe Turkish democracy as consolidated. Turkish democracy has made strides in some places and been abysmal in others, and in fact Turkey appears to be closer to Thomas Carothers’ grey zone than it does to achieving liberal democratic status. Certainly no serious argument can be made that Turkey is a consolidated democracy when it has over one hundred journalists in jail, editors and reporters talk of a climate of fear surrounding criticism of the government, and students who throw eggs at politicians risk being imprisoned for five years. Turkish democracy has improved in many ways, but the consolidation talk is extremely premature.
Davutoğlu also does an interesting about-face that will be apparent only to those who read his doctoral dissertation (which was turned into the book Alternative Paradigms) when he talks about his categorical refutation of the Huntingtonian clash of civilizations thesis. The foreign minister used to sing a different tune, and in fact before Huntington even wrote his seminal 1993 article Davutoğlu argued that the divisions between the Western and Islamic world stem from an irreconcilable chasm between the philosophical and political traditions of the two civilizations, and that both sides can justifiably view the other as being ideologically intransigent. In the Cairo Review interview, he adds the interesting modifier “with the advantage of hindsight,” but I’d be interested to hear a first-hand account of when and why he changed his mind.
Finally, the subject of the Arab Spring makes for some fascinating reading. Davutoğlu claims that Turkey expected the Arab Spring, which is interesting in light of Turkey’s heavy reliance on ties with Syria under Assad and its seemingly being taken by surprise on Tunisia and Libya, and so there seems to be some serious revisionist history taking place. On the question of whether Turkey is an appropriate model for Arab countries, the foreign minister gives a surprising yet cogently insightful answer, which is that Turkey does not want to hold itself forth or be seen as a role model given every state’s unique history and sociopolitical legacy. He says that Turkey is happy to share its democratic experience with other countries, but that anyone looking solely at the evolution of civilian-military relations is missing the big picture and that it took Turkey decades to arrive at where it is now. Anyone who has ever studied democratization and knows just how difficult and rocky the path to democracy is will greatly appreciate that answer, and it is unusual to see Davutoğlu go out of his way not to promote Turkey as a model in that manner (I cannot imagine a similar level of restraint from Erdoğan).
For more thoughts, there is a good roundup of the interview by Steven Cook, Marc Lynch, and others.
