Why I Do Not Agree With A Settlement Boycott
March 19, 2012 § 1 Comment
A couple of people have queried as to whether I agree with Beinart’s call to boycott the settlements, since it was not apparent from my earlier post. The answer is that I do not. A deeper dive into this will come when I have a little more time to write on it extensively, but the quick version is that I think it gives dangerous cover to BDS groups, whom I do not support in any way, and I also do not think it would have the intended effect of galvanizing Israel to pull out of the West Bank. The problems with the global BDS movement are manifold, from its double standards to its singling out of Israel to its masking its true motives, and as I alluded to earlier, I think a move to boycott settlement goods gives legitimacy to the wider BDS narrative and goals. From a purely logistical point of view, the West Bank settlers who would be most reluctant to leave are not there for economic reasons but for ideological reasons. A boycott will not only be unpersuasive in getting them to leave, but will probably reinforce their views on the importance of remaining right where they are. As for Israel at large, the Israeli economy does not depend on the settlements to a large enough extent to make a settlement boycott effective at forcing the government’s hand in evacuating the West Bank.
So in sum, I see no compelling reason to grant a victory to the undeserving BDS movement, and I do not believe that a settlement boycott will achieve its stated goals, and in fact might have the very opposite effect. Does this mean that I want to see Israel hold on to the West Bank indefinitely? Of course not. I would love to see Israel leave the West Bank as soon as is feasible, help in setting up a Palestinian state, and move on the to the next stage of its political development, but a settlement boycott is not the path to a comprehensive and fair negotiated two-state solution.
Turkey Wants Its Own Mickey Mouse
March 19, 2012 § 2 Comments
Dimitar Bechev argues that after a two decade lull, Turkey is resuming its post-WWII trajectory of Americanization both in how it conducts its foreign policy and in the shape of its political culture and domestic institutions. In some ways he is right and in others I think he is wrong – AKP majoritarianism does not look like what Arend Lijphart called the consensus model of European social democracies but it also does not look like the system in the U.S. Congress, and Turkey’s culture wars are more a mirror image of France’s than a carbon copy of American ones – but he glides over the way in which I think Turkey’s foreign policy does most resemble an American one, which is the strategy of expanding and utilizing soft power.
America’s rise as a global superpower was of course predicated on its victory in WWII and its military might, but its far reaching influence is just as attributable to its dominant soft power, which was increased by the spread of American culture and consumer goods. A constructivist take on the end of the Cold War is that the U.S. defeated the Soviet Union in the realm of ideas, and American culture was just as responsible for the downfall of the Soviet Union as was increased military spending. Certainly the obsession with all things American (a trend that has been on the decline for at least a decade and probably more) helped turn American companies into global behemoths.
Turkey has made a conscious effort to do the same thing, first in the Middle East and now in more far flung places. Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” strategy was an effort to increase Turkish influence, and Turkish soap operas are wildly popular in Arab countries, as is Turkey’s advocacy of the Palestinian cause. Posters of Erdoğan lining the streets of Cairo during his visit last September and his position atop Arab public opinion polls are the direct result of Turkish soft power and cultural/political influence. Turkey has also rapidly been moving into Africa, increasing their diplomatic presence and flooding markets with Turkish consumer goods that are viewed as being of higher quality than cheaper Chinese imports. This is all reminiscent of the push to increase American influence around the world during the second half of the 20th century amid the recognition that military power was not going to be enough. In looking at ways in which Turkey is consciously or unconsciously mimicking the U.S., the move to increase its soft power as a major component of its foreign policy seems to me to be a big one.
Peter Beinart’s Life Is About To Become Very Complicated
March 19, 2012 § 1 Comment
Peter Beinart has a forceful op-ed in today’s New York Times arguing that a stronger distinction needs to be made between Israel and the West Bank so that Israel’s democratic legitimacy cannot be used to legitimize its actions in the Occupied Territories and that concurrently what goes on in the West Bank cannot be used to delegitimize Israel. It as an interesting piece and I encourage everyone to read it for themselves, but here are some thoughts and some predictions.
First, anybody who does not read the op-ed itself is going to have no idea that there is anything of substance in it other than a call to boycott the settlements. The piece has been shooting around Twitter and that is the only detail being mentioned. That Beinart writes “But a settlement boycott is not enough. It must be paired with an equally vigorous embrace of democratic Israel” is a facet that is going to be glossed over entirely. Those who think that calling for any pressure on Israel over settlements is outrageous will find anything else contained in the piece to be a mere coda, and those who embrace the BDS movement will trumpet Beinart’s call for a settlement boycott as the first step on the road to a boycott of Israel proper. That there is a large group of people who fall in between these two positions will not matter in the slightest, because the debate on Israel is driven by the loudest voices on the extremes. Beinart is about to be demonized by one side and embraced by the other, and the fact that he is advocating both a settlement boycott and a redirection of any funds not spent in the settlements to Israeli goods will be completely ignored. My guess is that Beinart does not want to be used as a cudgel by the BDS folks or as a punching bag by the Greater Israel crowd, but that is precisely what will happen.
This leads to my second point, which is about Beinart’s advocacy of the term “non-democratic Israel” for the West Bank. I appreciate Beinart’s reasoning, which is that it makes a clear distinction between Israeli democracy and Israeli occupation and thus does not let either side use the West Bank in a res ipsa loquitur manner, but I do not agree that using the phrase will have the effect that he intends. I think that very few people think that the term “West Bank” automatically prioritizes its connection to the Kingdom of Jordan as Beinart contends, but rather realize that it actually reinforces the political boundary with Jordan. This does not make the term meaningless; if anything, it highlights the absurdity of those who argue that Palestinians who want a state should just go to Jordan, or who hold on to the pipe dream that Jordan will ever incorporate the West Bank into the Jordanian polity. I think that the term “non-democratic Israel” actually complicates things even further, because rather than creating the hard line that Beinart wants between the Israel and the territories, it muddies the waters even further. Those who want to maintain the status quo will seize upon the fact that someone is now referring to the West Bank as Israel, irrespective of the modifying adjective preceding it, and those who believe that Israel is not in any way a democracy will argue that this proves their case. I understand that Beinart think this will have the effect of forcing some hard decisions by clarifying the situation, but I think he is being naive on this point. It will just cause each side to dig in harder and ensure that neither ever views the other as legitimate. [ed. note: by each side, I mean Israelis and Palestinians – I do not mean to imply that I find the global BDS movement to be putting forth a legitimate good faith stance, since I don’t.]
Finally, I very much identify with Beinart’s description of his agony at calling for a boycott of other Jews given his deep ties to the Jewish community. I am in a similar situation to him in belonging to an Orthodox synagogue and sending my daughter to a Jewish preschool and being outside the dominant position on Israel and the West Bank in such institutions. I have had close friends tell me that I must hate Israel since I think that Israel needs to pull out of the West Bank and let the Palestinians have a state. I have never had an op-ed in the Times calling for a settlement boycott, however, and I am terribly curious to see what reaction Beinart will get when he shows up to synagogue next Saturday. My hunch is that some people will commend him for taking a controversial but principled position, but that the overwhelming sentiment will be condemnation to the point of outright hostility.
Turkey Shoots Itself in the Foot Over Nevruz
March 18, 2012 § 3 Comments
Nevruz, which is the Turkish name for the Persian New Year (traditionally celebrated the first day of spring) has caused all sorts of headaches for successive Turkish governments. It is a day that is celebrated by Kurds, leading to increased Kurdish nationalism and sometimes to PKK violence, both of which the Turkish government wants to avoid. In fact, Nevruz has been so controversial in the past that its celebration was actually banned in the mid-90s following demonstrations and police shooting and killing civilians in 1992. This year, controversy swirled again after the pro-Kurdish BDP announced that it would be celebrating Nevruz this year on March 18 rather than March 21 since Sunday festivities would get more people into the streets, and Turkish provincial governors responded by ordering celebrations to take place on March 21 as usual.
The reasoning behind forbidding Nevruz celebrations today was to minimize excessive shows of Kurdish nationalism, but as was entirely predictable, the move backfired terribly. The BDP refused to back down, police in Diyarbakır and Istanbul ended up using tear gas and water cannons on crowds that gathered to celebrate/protest, and BDP member in Istanbul was killed during the clashes (rumored to be a Kurdish politician).
Two quick thoughts on this, one specific to today’s events and one more general. First, having state officials attempt to dictate when a non-state holiday is to be celebrated is nothing more than foolish and guaranteed to lead to trouble. Ankara is understandably wary of PKK violence on Nevruz and of louder calls for Kurdish autonomy, but attempting to designate an official day on which festivities can be held is always going to be a losing proposition. There was no doubt that Kurds were going to fill the streets, and that police equipped with crowd control devices trying to stop them would lead to injuries and possibly fatalities. What was the potential upside to doing things this way? Now pro-Kurdish politicians get to loudly proclaim that Turkey’s actions make it a “fascist state” and Kurdish nationalism gets a larger boost than it otherwise would, obviating the very purpose of trying to eliminate a Sunday Nevruz observance.
Second, this type of stuff is going to keep on happening until Turkey finds a genuine solution to its Kurdish problem. Kurdish nationalism is not going to disappear, and the 15-20% of Turkey’s population that is ethnically Kurdish is not going to all of a sudden embrace the Kemalist narrative of “we are all Turks.” Erdoğan’s brief Kurdish opening was a start, but he quickly reversed himself and now again has gone back to trying to sweep the issue of Kurdish nationalism and identity under the rug. Until the government has an open and honest conversation about what to do with its Kurdish population in the long term, Nevruz is going to continue to be a day of violence rather than an innocuous festival heralding the end of winter.
Say Goodbye to Tzipi Livni, and Possibly to Kadima As Well
March 16, 2012 § Leave a comment
As head of Kadima, Tzipi Livni has had a good run. She has served as foreign minister and was almost prime minister, and led her party to gaining the most seats in the 2009 Knesset elections. As opposition leader she has been a constant thorn in Netanyahu’s side, and remarkably for an Israeli politician is viewed as honest and noncorruptible (no small feat given the history of constant criminal investigations of Israeli prime ministers and other cabinet members). Unfortunately for Livni, it appears as if she will not get a second chance at becoming PM any time soon as she looks likely to lose the internal Kadima leadership vote to former IDF chief and defense minister Shaul Mofaz at the end of March. Livni’s Knesset allies mostly now support Mofaz, and polls show her trailing her intra-party rival.
If Livni does indeed lose, she will be hard pressed to retain much influence. Whereas figures like Ariel Sharon and Ehud Barak have formed their own breakaway parties following discord within the ranks, Livni does not have enough of a natural constituency or support within Kadima to do so successfully. Given the shenanigans surrounding the last Kadima leadership election – where Livni’s win was reported before the polls actually closed and then her margin of victory turned out to be a mere 431 out of 39,331 votes – she is unlikely to be treated particularly well by Mofaz and his supporters should he win this time around.
The end of Livni’s reign at the top of Kadima will not have as great an effect on Israeli politics as will the fact that Kadima’s future is uncertain no matter what happens. If Livni manages to eke out a victory, Mofaz and other Kadima members are likely to break away and form their own party. Even if they don’t, Kadima right now is fourth or fifth in opinion polls and its position is not going to improve. Kadima was founded around a single issue – the Gaza disengagement – and the current hawkish mood in Israel combined with rocket fire from Gaza makes Kadima something of an anachronism. No matter who is at the top, it’s relevance is fated to decline considerably.
A more intriguing possibility is that Mofaz wins the election and then dissolves the party to remerge it with Likud, which is where Kadima originated and where many of its members belonged. If Kadima ends up in fifth place after the next round of Knesset elections, there is little reason for this scenario not to play out. Unlike a party like Shas or Yisrael Beiteinu, Kadima does not have an ethnic or religious constituency behind it and does not exist to win benefits from the state, and Mofaz (who has served in two different cabinet posts) is unlikely to be content as a backbencher. It would be relatively painless for Mofaz to bring his Kadima MKs with him, get rewarded with a cabinet post, and let the Kadima experiment end.
About That 3 AM Phone Call…
March 16, 2012 § Leave a comment
Perhaps the most famous moment of the 2008 presidential campaign was when Hillary Clinton ran an ad showing sleeping kids safe and sound in their beds with a phone ringing in the background and implying that Barack Obama was not prepared to answer a phone call in the middle of the night detailing a national security crisis. A couple of weeks before the election and well after he had been selected as the vice presidential nominee, Joe Biden told a crowd of Democrats at a fundraiser that Obama would be tested by other international actors looking to take advantage of his inexperience within six months of taking office. Both of these episodes caused a furor given that Obama’s area of greatest weakness upon assuming the presidency was widely seen to be national security, and it contributed to his choosing Biden – who had chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee – as VP and retaining Bob Gates as his secretary of defense. These moves were meant in part to convey a sense of continuity and expertise on the part of the new administration and assure supporters and foreign adversaries alike that the Obama White House would be able to hold its own.
The news reported by David Igantius today that Osama Bin Laden ordered attack plans to be drawn up for an assault on Obama’s airplane any time he would be in Pakistan or Afghanistan is remarkable in this light because of Bin Laden’s rationale. His reasoning was that Biden would then become president, and that Biden was “totally unprepared” for the role and would embroil the U.S. in a crisis! Isn’t it remarkable what sitting in the Oval Office can do for your image?
