Today’s post is going to be a departure from my usual fare, but it’s an issue I have been thinking about lately so I figured I’d muse about it. There is a debate currently taking place among policymakers and security analysts over whether to arm the Free Syrian Army and other rebel groups in an effort to bring down the Assad government. While there have been reports that Turkey and Sunni Arab states such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been doing so, the United States has so far been resistant despite criticism from John McCain – who yesterday, in response to a question asking if we should be arming the rebels, flippantly said, “Sure, why not?” – and others. The U.S. is reluctant to do so primarily because we don’t know precisely who the rebels are and there are reports that the rebels are being supported by al-Qaida, which makes arming them a dangerous proposition. The decision not to arm the rebels is being driven by the specifics of the situation in Syria, but I think there is a bigger picture question that should precede it, which is whether arming rebels is ever a good idea in any situation.
Looking at the U.S. history of arming rebel groups reveals some major long term strategic blunders. The most prominent one was the effort to arm the Afghani mujahideen in the 1980s in a bid to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan. This policy seemed like a smart one at the time, at it was undoubtedly successful in carrying out its immediate objective, as the Soviet Union suffered enormous losses in Afghanistan and ultimately pulled out, which was one of many contributing factors to its ultimate demise and the end of the Cold War. In hindsight, however, arming the mujahideen caused enormous blowback for the U.S., since the weapons supplied by the U.S. were ultimately turned on U.S. and NATO troops years later and the arms and training indirectly benefited al-Qaida and the Taliban down the road. All you have to do is read the very first chapter of Steve Coll’s excellent book Ghost Wars, in which the CIA is running around desperately trying to buy back all the Stinger missiles that it handed out in Afghanistan 15 years earlier so that they aren’t turned on American planes, so see why the policy was highly problematic. In other examples, arming and training rebels in South and Central America ultimately led to death squads or brutal military dictatorships in places like Honduras, Nicaragua, and Chile, and did not create stability or end the bloodshed but rather extended it.
I asked the question on Twitter yesterday whether there is an instance in which arming rebels did not lead to terrible unintended consequences down the road, and the two answers people collectively came up with were the French supplying weapons to the colonists during the American Revolution and the arming of the French Resistance and other partisan groups in Nazi-occupied Europe. A few people suggested Libya as a positive example, but it is way too soon to tell what the long term consequences there will be. Neither of the two historical examples is particularly encouraging given that one happened 250 years ago and involved no weapons more powerful than muskets, and the other was a much smaller scale and less organized effort to arm rebels who were also engaged in many other resistance activities other than fighting. Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the Syrian rebels should under no circumstances be armed or provided with support. More importantly, I am absolutely not suggesting that the world should just sit back and watch Assad massacre more Syrians in an effort to stabilize the country and end the bloodshed as quickly as possible, since that is not a viable or ethical solution. What I am suggesting is that before people rush to arm the Syrian rebels, there should be a real conversation about what happens the day after the immediate goals are achieved. Where do those arms go next and what will they be used for? What can we learn from previous historical examples that will help us manage the unintended consequences that accrue from arming rebel groups? Given what we know happens when a country in the midst of a civil war is flooded with more weapons, is there a better option and should active outside intervention be rethought? I would like to hear more discussion that focuses on what happens once the conflict ends in addition to the current discussion about the easiest and least short term costly way to remove Assad from power.
I’ve heard realists like Pape argue that during the Bosnian War, everyone would have been better if the Bosniaks were better supplied with armor. Two other examples that come to mind: the “Sunni Awakening” is another case where it can be argued that arming a rebel force (broadly defined) increased stability. The Soviets armed the Viet Cong, which helped achieve their strategic goals without too many unintended consequences for them that I can think of. The future core of a professional army armed with weapons that are difficult to operate and transport which will likely be responsible to people without weapons is quite different from underemployed kids armed with automatic weapons and stinger missiles. I can think two way that the Syrian case is different from most other cases of armed non-state actors 1) in a best case scenario, arms would flow through an ethnically-religiously diverse core of defecting professional officers and 2) these officers would (inshallah) be seeking national liberation, rather than succession or an ideological imposition. Granted both are clearer on paper than in real life, but they’re two important distinguishing features of the Syrian case.
Yeah, Pape is kind of Waltzian in that way. The problem with the Bosnia example is that I’m not sure they quite fit the definition of rebels.
No doubt the Sunni Awakening increased stability, but 1) again, not sure I’d classify the ones being armed as rebels and 2) I’m sure in some instances those arms were turned back on the U.S., which is the big problem with arming rebels in the first place.
Great point about the Soviets and the Viet Cong. I am hard pressed to come up with a way in which that backfired on the Soviets.
I think your first assumption/hope about Syria is an exceedingly optimistic one, and I’m not sure your second assumption is distinguished from the Afghan mujahideen case. There too the rebels were seeking national liberation following the Soviet invasion.
Very important to start giving all the rebels Subarus to see if the standard AWD helps move them forward